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COERCION, DECEPTION, AND OTHER DEMAND-
INCREASING PRACTICES IN ANTITRUST LAW
MARK R. PATTERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Allegations of coercion and deception have been prominent in recent
antitrust cases.' Such allegations are not entirely new to antitrust, of
course: coercion has long been an element of tying claims,' and the
Supreme Court has accepted that certain practices that mislead consum-
ers-the manipulation of product standards, for example-can be anti-
trust violations.3 But some of the recent cases do not fit neatly into
these categories, and the Court has never articulated general rules for
determining what coercive and deceptive practices violate the antitrust
laws. Consequently, the lower courts are forced to decide these cases
without Supreme Court guidance, and the result is much uncertainty.
One such recent case, Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Moody's
Investors Service, Inc. , will illustrate the difficulties that claims of coercion
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful for
helpful comments from Benjamin Zipursky, Steve Thel, Mark Lemley, William Landes,
James Kobak, jack Kaufmann, Barry Hawk, Warren Grimes, Kenneth Glazer, James Flem-
ing, Jill Fisch, and an anonymous referee, and for excellent research assistance by Melissa
Alwang. The Fordham University School of Law provided valuable financial assistance.
I These cases include claims that a bond-rating agency issued or threatened to issue
inaccurate ratings to force bond issuers to purchase its rating services, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 4-11 and 187-206; claims that a Florida electric utility deceived its customers
regarding the electricity consumption of electric swimming pool heaters to discourage
them from purchasing solar-powered ones, see infra text accompanying notes 259-67; and
challenges to Microsoft's use of its operating system to increase demand for its other
products, see infra part V.B.2.
2 SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) ("Our cases have
concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product toforre the buyer into the purchase
of a tied product .... ") (emphasis added).
, See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); American
Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
4 No. 95-WY-2649-WD, slip op. (D. Colo. Apr. 4,1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-1157 (10th
Cir.). The Department of Justice is also investigating Moody's marketing practices. See
Suzanne Woolley et al., Now It's Moody's Turn for a Review: The Justice Department Is Probing
Possible Antitrust Violations, Bus. WK., Apr. 8, 1996, at 116.
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and deception present. The defendant is Moody's Investors Service, Inc.,
one of the two leaders in the business of rating the creditworthiness of
debt issuers. 5 The plaintiff is a Colorado school district that chose not
to hire Moody's in connection with a bond issue, relying instead on two
other rating services. 6 Moody's learned on the morning of the issue that
it would not be hired, and that morning issued a statement that "[t]he
outlook on the district's general obligation debt is negative" and
announced that it would issue an unsolicited rating of the district.7 As
a result, investors became concerned, and the district had to pay a
higher interest rate to complete the issue.a The plaintiff alleged that the
statement regarding the "outlook" for its debt was "materially false" and
"misleading,"9 and that an unsolicited rating from Moody's "is invariably
lower" than solicited, paid-for ratings. 10 Moody's purposes in making the
statement and the "threat" of the unsolicited rating, the plaintiff claimed,
were to "penalize" it for not hiring Moody's and "to force [it] and other
issuers to purchase Moody's ratings in future sales."" These actions, it
claimed, constituted monopolization and attempted monopolization in
violation of Sherman Act Section 2.
Assuming that the plaintiff's allegations in Moody's are factually
correct, 2 do they indeed describe an antitrust violation?" As noted
5 There are six rating agencies that the SEC has approved as nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations (NRSROs), but only four are "full-service" agencies: Moody's,
Standard & Poor's Corporation, Fitch Investors Service, Inc., and Duff and Phelps, Inc.
See Public Securities Ass'n, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,114 (Sept.
29, 1995). The plaintiff in Moody's alleged that Moody's and Standard & Poor's are the
market leaders. Second Amended Complaint at 11, Moody's (No. 95-WY-2649-WD). The
plaintiff also alleged that because "under almost all circumstances" investors require ratings
from two NRSROs, Moody's rates more than 80% of the municipal bonds issued in the
United States. Id.
6 Second Amended Complaint at 3, Moody's (No. 95-WY-2649-WD).
7 Id. at 4-5. According to Moody's, it learned of the issue on the prior day and prepared
the statement then, but it "confirmed" that it would not be hired on the morning of the
issue. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) or, in the Alternative, for SummaryJudgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56,
at 12-13, Moody's (No. 95-WY-2649-WD). It issued the statement about one-and-one-half
hours after the issue went to market. Second Amended Complaint at 4, Moody's (No. 95-
WY-2649-WD).
I Second Amended Complaint at 5-8, Moody's (No. 95-WY-2649-WD).
4 Id. at 5.
50 Id. at 12.
1 Id. at 12-13.
21 Moody's was decided by the district court on a motion to dismiss, so the allegations
were treated by the court as true.
11 The district court did not consider the antitrust issues on the merits, holding instead
that the Moody's statements were protected under the First Amendment because they
were mere opinions that implied no underlying facts, true or false. Moody's, No. 95-WY-
[Vol. 66
DEMAND-INCREASING PRACTICES
above,14 the demand effects of coercion and deception are not new
to antitrust. In particular, the plaintiff's claim that the statement was
misleading and its suggestion that unsolicited ratings are inaccurate
allege a deception of investors that is reminiscent of the manipulations
of product standards condemned in a number of antitrust cases.' 5 There
are differences, though: Moody's does not sell the product that it rates-
that is, it is not itself a bond issuer-whereas the defendants in the
standard-manipulation cases are typically sellers of the products to which
the standards apply,16 and Moody's is alleged to have manipulated its
own ratings, whereas the standard-manipulation cases generally involve
a seller manipulating a standard promulgated by a trade association.
These differences may make the claims in Moody's somewhat less plausible
than those in standard-manipulation cases,1 7 but if true they still may
constitute an antitrust violation.
2649-WD, slip op. at 9-14. Even putting aside the difficulty of reconciling that conclusion
with Moody's claim that its ratings are "objective," see Memorandum of Law in Support
of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56, at 5, Moodys (No. 95-WY-2649-WD)
(describing a Moody's rating as "an objective opinion about credit risk"), the district
court's decision is almost certainly incorrect as a legal matter. The court relied heavily
on the district court decision in Massachusetts School of Law at Andove; Inc. v. American Bar
Association, 937 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir.
1997). See Moody's, No. 95-WY-2649-WD, slip op. at 11-13 (discussing Massachusetts School
of Law, 937 F. Supp. at 443-45). However, the Third Circuit in Massachusetts School of Law
affirmed the district court's decision without considering the First Amendment issue, citing
a Department of Justice amicus brief that argued that the district court was wrong on that
point. See 107 F.3d at 1037 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Massachnsetts
School of Law, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1792)); see also Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (condemning standard manipulation
without discussing First Amendment); American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydro-
level Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (same); Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 371
(7th Cir. 1990) (explicitly rejecting a First Amendment defense in a standard-setting case);
National Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1988) (accepting
possibility of antitrust liability for false advertising without discussing First Amendment).
" See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
15 Two recent Supreme Court cases are cited in note 3 supra, and many of the lower
court cases are discussed in, for example, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.4c (1994).
16 That is not always the case, however, as American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982), illustrates. See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
17 They might be less plausible for two reasons. First, the potential gain to Moody's
would be less direct than that to sellers of products whose standards are manipulated,
because any deception by Moody's would be directed at investors, whose altered investing
decisions would only indirectly cause issuers to buy Moody's services, whereas the manipula-
tion of a standard directly affects the purchasing decisions of the manipulator's customers.
Second, if it became known that Moody's manipulated its ratings, it would suffer all of
the injury from its reduced credibility, whereas a seller that manipulated a standard and
thereby injured its credibility would presumably suffer no more than from the reduced
credibility than would other sellers to whose products the standard applied. See infra text
accompanying notes 207-09.
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The plaintiff in Moody's also alleged coercion, and those allegations
too can be likened to an established antitrust violation: tying. In its
most recent exposition of tying law, the Supreme Court described the
"essential characteristic" of tying as the seller's use of its control over
one product to force the buyer to purchase another, 8 and the school
district in Moody's alleges that Moody's uses its control over bond pur-
chases to force debt issuers to purchase its ratings services. It is true that
a tying seller usually has control over the tying product because it is the
seller of that product, and the "control" that Moody's has over the bond
market consists only of its ability to make the school district's bonds
more difficult to sell. But much as a tying seller can force buyers to take
its tied product in order to have access to its tying product, Moody's is
alleged to force issuers to purchase its rating services so as to avoid
paying the high interest rates that would result from an unsolicited and
unfavorable rating. 19 Thus, although the actions alleged in Moody's are
not, strictly speaking, a tie, the Supreme Court's admonition that "[t]he
legality of [a defendant's] conduct depends on its competitive conse-
quences, not whether it can be labeled 'tying" 20 suggests that the actions
of Moody's might indeed be a violation.
It is difficult to say whether these analogies go too far. Although the
Supreme Court has condemned coercion and deception in the tying
and standard-manipulation contexts, it has provided little guidance for
the treatment of similar practices in other contexts. Indeed, commenta-
tors have argued that even in its tying cases, the Court has been unclear
about the harm it is seeking to prevent. 2' And the problem is exacerbated
because coercion and deception are outside the mainstream of tradi-
tional antitrust law. Neither involves the sort of restriction of supply,
'
8 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) ("[Tlhe essential
characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control
over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the
buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms."). The Court's most recent tying case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), focused on a specific aspect of tying law and did not provide
a similar general discussion of tying.
1 The analogy is even closer in light of the fact that a seller need not actually deny
access to the tying product alone to be guilty of a tying violation; the seller can also be
liable if it makes the tying product available alone only at a price that makes its purchase
alone impracticable. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. The actions alleged in
Moody's would parallel this condition if an unsolicited, unfavorable rating by Moody's
would raise the interest rate that an issuer would be required to pay to a level that would
make its only practicable alternative that of purchasing a Moody's rating.
2
°Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21 n.34.
21 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
365 (1978) ("Antitrust treats [tying arrangements] as utterly pernicious, despite the increas-
ingly obtrusive fact that it has found no adequate grounds for objection to them at all.").
[Vol. 66
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made possible by a source of market power, such as a horizontal agree-
ment or a large market share, that is present in most antitrust cases. Nor
does either involve the sort of long-term elimination of supply that is
the goal of predatory pricing. 22 Instead, coercion and deception exploit
consumers in quite a different way: by increasing consumers' demand
for their products, either through constraining the consumers' choices
(coercion) or through providing them with false information (decep-
tion) .21
My goal in this article is to develop an antitrust approach to evaluating
practices, like coercion and deception, by which sellers seek to increase
demand for their products. Most increases in demand are procompeti-
tive, of course. For example, when a seller improves its product, or
advertises it truthfully, demand for the product is likely to increase, as
are its output and price, yet consumers generally benefit. Perhaps because
such common practices tend to be procompetitive, some commentators
have gone so far as to argue that any practice that increases output
should be per se legal.24 But coercion and deception can also increase
22 Because coercion and deception increase the demand for a seller's product at the
expense of its competitors', these practices might, like predatory pricing, reduce the
competitors' output below a viable level, and thus eliminate them from the market. Unlike
predatory pricing, though, coercion and deception are profitable immediately; a seller
using them need not wait until some future time to reap supracompetitive profits.
'2 In a recent article, Neil Averitt and Robert Lande outline a theory of antitrust and
consumer protection law and say that both bodies of law "are intended to facilitate the
exercise of ... effective consumer choice." Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer
Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 AN'TITRUSTI L.J. 713,
713 (1997). Interestingly, they characterize coercion and deception as consumer protection
problems because, they say, they are "internal" to consumers, in the sense that they are
"market failures that take place ... 'inside the consumer's head,"' id. at 714, and "impair
the individual's ability to choose," id. at 734. However, the test I propose for antitrust
evaluation of coercion and deception would find a violation only when those practices'
anticompetitive effects extended to more than one market. For that reason, the coercion
and deception on which I focus can fairly be characterized as "external" to consumers,
in Averitt's and Lande's sense, and thus valid subjects of antitrust regulation. Cf id. at
735-40 (observing that some standard-setting activities and tying arrangements can raise
both antitrust and consumer protection concerns). That is not to say, though, that there
are not other "internal" forms of coercion and deception that are more appropriately
addressed through consumer protection law. Cf. infra note 149 and accompanying text.
2 4 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. Riv. 1, 31 (1984)
("if arrangements are anticompetitive, the output and market share of those using them
must fall."); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. Rv. 1, 19 (1977) (discussing vertical distribution
restraints and proposing that they be legal if they increase output or "perhaps" even if
they are only intended to increase output). Interestingly, though, when commentators
focus specifically on the demand issue, they often acknowledge that it does present potential
problems. See, e.g.,John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and Professional Rules: A Framework forAnalysis,
28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 301, 333 (1991) ('Joint actions that only increase demand are
assumed to increase consumer welfare. However, an agreement to disseminate false infor-
mation that increases demand could arguably reduce welfare ....").
19971
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demand and output, yet may injure consumers. In the end, a blanket
rule of legality or illegality is inappropriate: an ability to raise price
obtained by increasing demand-which I will call demand-based market
power 25-is sometimes procompetitive and sometimes anticompetitive,
and it is the task of antitrust law to determine when such practices
implicate the concerns to which the Sherman Act is addressed.
By "demand-based market power," I mean market power that is a
product of sellers' specific efforts to increase the demand for their
products-i.e., efforts that move the demand curve up and to the right.26
Such power enables sellers to sell more of their products at the same
price,27 or to sell the same number of products at a higher price. The
seller's increased demand will come primarily at the expense of its
competitors, so overall industry output may or may not increase, but
generally will not decrease. That distinguishes demand-based market
power from traditional market-share-based power, which is exercised by
restricting supply and therefore output. Demand-based market power is
more similar to market power created by "raising rivals' costs," 2s which
is also a product of specific efforts by sellers to create power, rather than
merely to exploit it. 29 But power derived by raising rivals' costs, though
it need not reduce the output of the seller that creates it, does reduce
overall industry output, and is therefore distinct from demand-based
power."
The approach to demand-based market power that I propose in this
article would treat a practice that increased demand for one product as
an antitrust violation if that practice imposed costs on buyers of some
25 "The term 'market power' refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of firms, acting
jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly
that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded." William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. Rav. 937, 937 (1981). In
one sense, all market power, even that based on market share, is demand-based, since
only a product that lacks satisfactory substitutes-i.e., that has its own unique demand, at
least to some extent-can be sold at a supracompetitive price. Cf infta note 144. But I
use the term "demand-based market power" in a narrower sense, as the next paragraph dis-
cusses.
26 In most cases, these efforts will also increase the slope of the demand curve, i.e., they
will reduce the seller's elasticity of demand. See generally infra part III.B.
27 Demand-based market power should therefore be distinguished from a decrease in
price, which may increase the output of a product but will not increase the demand for it.
2 8 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al.,
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987).
29 See infra text accompanying note 76.
.30 The differences between demand-based power and power derived from raising rivals'
costs are discussed in more detail in part III.C infra.
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other product. The "costs" that would be relevant for the purposes of
this test would be only those inherent in the second product." They
would be changes to the product that would make it less valuable to
buyers, as when a tie makes a tying product less desirable by including
with it an obligation to buy a tied product, or when a standard is manipu-
lated so that the information it provides is inaccurate. When, in this way,
costs are imposed on one product to increase demand for another-
a process I will refer to as cost shifting-the test I propose would point
to an antitrust violation. On the other hand, some demand-increasing
practices, such as product improvements, involve only one product and
thus do not shift costs; they therefore present no antitrust problem. And
other practices, like ties that create efficient package discounts, do involve
two products, but do not increase demand for one by imposing costs on
the other. On the contrary, an efficient tie increases demand for the
tied product and at the same time makes buying the tying product a more
attractive proposition (so the buyer can receive the package discount);
therefore, it also presents no difficulties under the cost-shifting test. Of
course, that a practice passes the cost-shifting test does not mean that
it could not cause other competitive problems. I offer the test not as the
only means of evaluating demand-increasing practices, but as one way
of determining when such practices can, in the words of the Supreme
Court, "foreclose[] competition on the merits. '" '
A cost-shifting test would reach results similar to the Supreme Court's
current rules for cases involving standard setting and tying. In standard-
setting cases, the cost-shifting test would focus on the costs that the
manipulation of product standards imposes on users of those standards,
which has also been the focus of the Court's close scrutiny of these
cases. 3 In tying cases, the focus of the cost-shifting test would be different
from that of current law, viewing the anticompetitive effect of a tie not
11 Costs that are not relevant for the purposes of this test include higher prices: although
the additional profits from higher prices for one product can be used to increase the
demand for another-by investing in improvements or advertising for that product, for
example-it is not the higher prices themselves that cause the increased demand. See infra
text accompanying notes 259-66.
1 The phrase is from Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984),
and is discussed further in the text accompanying note 44 infra.
33 See infra text accompanying notes 219 & 231. Although the Supreme Court in its
standard-manipulation cases has reached results consistent with liability under the cost-
shifting test, the postures of its recent cases have not required it to set out clear rules to
determine such liability. As a result, there is some lack of clarity in the rules that govern
these cases, and some lower courts have been much more deferential to organizations'
standard-setting practices than has the high court. See infra text accompanying notes
226-44. Because the cost-shifting test would add some structure to the Supreme Court's
statements, it might serve to bring the lower courts more in line with the Court's apparent
views. See id.
1997]
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as the forcing of buyers to accept the tied product, with the resulting
distortion of the market for that product, but as the imposition of costs
on buyers of the tying product. This redirected focus would not, however,
reach results dramatically different from those of current law, primarily
because the Supreme Court's applications of tying law are closer to the
cost-shifting approach than the Court's stated test might suggest. 4 Thus,
the cost-shifting test seems more or less in line with the Supreme Court's
antitrust concerns, which provides some degree of confidence in apply-
ing the test both to standard-setting and tying cases in which lower courts
appear to have deviated from those concerns 3 and to demand cases that
fit into no established antitrust categories.
The article continues in Part II with a general discussion of coercion,
deception, and other demand-increasing practices, and compares these
practices to other anticompetitive practices, particularly those addressed
by the "raising rivals' costs" theory. Part III of the article discusses com-
mentators' skepticism regarding the antitrust significance of demand-
based market power and shows that blanket dismissal of such power is
not only inconsistent with the Supreme Court's expressed views, but is
also economically unjustified. Part IV then sets out the cost-shifting test
and discusses its economic implications. Part V of the article applies the
test to a variety of cases in which coercion, deception, or other demand-
increasing practices are alleged, and shows that the test reaches results
that are intuitively sensible, though sometimes inconsistent with previous
lower court decisions. Finally, Part VI discusses the cost-shifting test in the
context of the statutory antitrust framework. Sellers' efforts to increase
demand are often unilateral, so they may not satisfy Sherman Act Section
l's requirement of an agreement, and they are sometimes made without
an apparent threat of monopoly power, in which case Section 2 may
also be inapplicable. In most cases, these difficulties can be overcome,
but some cases of anticompetitive cost shifting, like cases of oligopoly,
may escape the antitrust laws.
II. COERCION, DECEPTION, AND DEMAND-BASED
MARKET POWER
Coercion, deception, and other demand-increasing practices present
difficult problems for antitrust law because their competitive harm-if
- This claim of consistency can be only tentative, because the facts discussed in the
Court's opinions are those that are relevant to its "forcing" test, and the facts that would
be needed to apply the cost-shifting test are often not reported. See infra part V.B.1. It is
worth noting, though, that in its more recent tying cases, the Court has made statements
that seem more consistent with the cost-shifting test than with its own expressed test. See
infra text accompanying notes 183-84.
35 See infra parts V.A.I (standard setting) and V.B.1 (tying).
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any-appears not to be of the same kind as the harm caused by more
traditional antitrust violations. These practices in fact share significant
similarities with more universally condemned practices,36 but in this part
I focus on the differences. The Supreme Court's tying and standard-
manipulation cases leave unclear the harm that they are seeking to
prevent because they fail to address directly the distinction between
harm caused by increases in demand and that caused by restrictions of
supply. That distinction differentiates demand-increasing practices both
from horizontal collusive activities and from vertical exclusionary prac-
tices that raise rivals' costs.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S DEMAND CASES
The tests the Court has adopted in its tying and standard-setting cases
present at least three sources of confusion. First, the tying cases rely on
a requirement of "coercion" that the Court never defines. Second, in
its most recent tying case, 37 the Court appeared to say that buyers led
to make undesirable purchases by a lack of market information could
be said to have been "coerced," thus blurring the boundary between
coercion and deception and making it unclear why different tests should
apply to the two practices. Third, in its standard-manipulation cases, the
Court treats the unilateral actions of single members of standard-setting
organizations as acts of the organizations themselves, thus leaving unclear
to what extent unilateral acts of deception are subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
1. Coercion in Tying Cases
Although the Supreme Court has established the rule that a tie3 is
illegal when it is "coercive"-when it "force [s] a purchaser to do some-
thing that he would not do in a competitive market" 39-the Court has
not been clear about what it means by "coercion" or "forcing." In first
using these terms in tying cases, the Court seemed to associate them
with the "leverage" theory of tying, which suggested that a seller might
be able to use a tie to transform power in one market into power in
36 See infra part I.B.
37 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
38 A tie is "'an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier."' Id. at 461 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
3jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) (citations omitted).
1997]
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two. 4" Commentators subsequently pointed out that this "leveraging"
theory, at least in its simplest form, could not be correct, because to
impose the tie and thereby acquire power-in the form, say, of the ability
to charge higher prices-in the tied product market, the seller would
have to use up some of its power-and reduce prices-in the tying
product market.4 Imposing the tie would therefore result in no net gain
in power, only a transfer of it from one market to another.
The Court's view now appears to be that the "coercive" effect of a tie
consists simply in the shift of power from one market to another. In
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde," the Court said that "the
law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by
merely enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and
by attempting to impose restraints on competition in the market for a
tied product, on the other."4" That is, the point is not that tying allows
the seller to gain more power, but simply that the linking of the two
markets distorts them: "the economic effect... condemned by the rule
"I In Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), where the Court
first used these terms in a tying case, see id. at 605, 608 ("coerce"), 614 ("force"), it cited
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), a monopolization case. Griffith also referred
to "coercion" and "threats," id. at 109, but it is primarily known for its exposition of the
leverage concept, see id. at 106 (referring to a seller "expand [ing]" its monopoly) and 108
("If monopoly power can be used to beget monopoly, the [Sherman] Act becomes a
feeble instrument indeed."). In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958), the next tying case in which the Court described ties as involving "forc[ing]," id.
at 6, it also cited Griffith, as well as International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947),
which condemned terms of the defendant's machine leases that went beyond its "limited
monopoly" in its patented machines to restrain trade in salt, id. at 395-96, and United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), which referred to the defendant's block
booking of motion pictures as an "enlargement of the monopoly of the [defendant's]
copyright," id. at 157.
41 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19 (1957); BORK, supra note 21, at 365-81. Other commentators have pointed out that
ties can in fact create additional market power in some circumstances. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 516-39
(1985); Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection
Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 671-81 (1982); W. David Slawson, Excluding Competition Without
Monopoly Power: The Use of Tying Arrangements to Exploit Market Failure, 36 ANrTRusr BULL.
457, 473-77, 487-89 (1991); Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: Under-
standing the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTIRrRUST L.J. 263, 272-79 (1994); Mark R.
Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market Power: Kodak in Perspective, 73
N.C. L. Rv. 185, 213-31 (1994).
42 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
43 Id. at 14. The Court still refers to its approach to tying cases as focused on "leverage,"
but it no longer relies on the discredited extension-ofpower aspect of that analysis. See
id. at 14 n.20 ("This type of market power [in tying cases] has sometimes been referred
to as 'leverage.' Professors Areeda and Turner provide a definition that suits present
purposes. 'Leverage" is loosely defined here as a supplier's ability to induce his customer
for one product to buy a second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased
solely on the merit of that second product."') (quoting 5 PHILLU, E. AREEDA & DONALD F.
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against tying" is "that [the tying seller] has foreclosed competition on
the merits in a product market distinct from the market for the tying
item." 44 But this sort of market linkage is not coextensive with the coercive
harm that can be caused by tying arrangements. Distortion of the tied
product market does not require coercion of, or even power over, buyers
of the tying product. For example, a seller could impose a tie while at
the same time lowering the price of the tying product to fully compensate
buyers for the requirement that they accept the tied product. The tie
would cause buyers who previously did not purchase the tied product
to do so, thus "foreclos[ing] competition on the merits" in that market,
but the price decrease on the tying product would make buyers indiffer-
ent to the change, so it would not be coercive.
Tying law's market power requirement does not solve this problem,
because market power as a test for coercion is both overinclusive and
underinclusive. It is overinclusive because a seller with market power,
like a seller without it, can create a tie that buyers willingly accept. And
it is underinclusive because, at least under some circumstances, a tie can
be coercive even when the seller sells its products in a competitive market.
Both these problems typically arise when the buyer and seller have a
long-term relationship, as, for example, in franchise arrangements. In
such circumstances, a tie may be necessary to allow the seller to hold
buyers to terms of an agreement to which all buyers would agree but
from which some might defect in the absence of the tie. Thus, in franchise
cases, ties may be used to ensure quality control and prevent individual
franchisees from free riding on the franchisor's reputation and other
franchisees' investments by selling poor-quality goods under the fran-
chisor's name.4" And because a tie in such circumstances would benefit
all buyers (and the seller), no market power would be required to cause
buyers to accept it; nevertheless, the tie would be coercive to those
buyers who in its absence would defect.4 6 As a result, in the complicated
relationships that make up most of today's tying cases, the Supreme
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
1134a, at 202 (1980)).
44 Id. at 21; see also id. at 12 (stating that with illegal ties, "competition on the merits in
the market for the tied item is restrained"). The Court's use of the term "foreclosed"
echoes the Court's earlier concerns about foreclosure of the tied product market to the
tying seller's competitors. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6
(1958) (stating that ties "deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product").
In its more recent cases, as the text shows, its concern has shifted to the denial of consumers'
free choice in the tied product market.
45 See Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts,
28J.L. & EcON. 345, 349-54 (1985); see also Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near)
Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MIcH. L. RE-v. 111, 129-37 (1996).
46 See Meese, supra note 45, at 158-60.
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Court's continued use of the term "coercion," even where it seem§
inapplicable, makes it difficult to know what harm the Court is trying
to prevent, and thus makes it difficult to evaluate claims of coercion that
do not fit squarely in the tying mold. 7
2. Coercion and Deception in Kodak
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify these issues in its
most recent tying case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.4"
The plaintiffs in Kodak were so-called independent service organizations
(ISOs) that provided service for Kodak equipment; in doing so, the ISOs
competed with Kodak itself, which also serviced its own equipment. 9 The
case arose from Kodak's policy of refusing to sell parts for its equipment to
the ISOs or to equipment owners who hired them." The ISOs claimed
that through this policy Kodak "unlawfully tied the sale of service for
Kodak machines to the sale of parts. "'5 Not surprisingly, given that Kodak
was a tying case, the parties' arguments were framed in terms of coercion.
The ISOs argued that the tie forced buyers to accept Kodak's service
despite their belief that it was of lower quality than ISO service. Kodak
argued that whatever reluctance the buyers might have had to using
Kodak service was overcome by the advantages of Kodak equipment, as
evidenced by buyers' continuing willingness to purchase the equipment
(as opposed to purchasing some other brand of equipment that allowed
the use of any service provider) .5
Kodak has much in common with the franchising cases discussed above:
Kodak is like a franchisor, arguing that its customers' initial purchasing
decisions were entirely free, and the ISOs are like the franchisees, arguing
that once those initial decisions were made, customers could be coerced
into further purchases. 53 But instead of resolving this dispute by deciding
7 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
48 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
a Id. at 455.
50 Kodak sold parts only to owners of its equipment who either purchased service from
Kodak itself or performed it themselves. /d. at 458. Kodak also entered into agreements
with its outside parts manufacturers to sell parts only to Kodak. Id. There is some question
whether Kodak's policy was instituted after buyers purchased its equipment or was already
in place when buyers purchased the equipment. The Court stated that the policy was
changed, id., but Kodak claimed that the policy had always been in place for some of its
equipment. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6 n.2, Kodak (No. 90-1029). For some
implications of this issue, see part V.C.1 infra.
11 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 459.
12 Id. at 466; cf id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] rational consumer considering
the purchase of Kodak equipment will inevitably factor into his purchasing decision the
expected cost of aftermarket support.").
11 It is possible to argue that Kodak is not a good analogy to the franchise situation. Such
arguments can be based, for example, on the fact that the tying elements of franchise
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whether Kodak's tie was one that, in the words of Jefferson Parish,
"'coerce[d] the abdication of buyers' independent judgment, '' 54 the
Court said that the buyers might not have had sufficient information at
the time of their equipment purchases to form ajudgment on the matter.
The Court pointed out that buyers might have been unable to assess the
long-term costs of owning Kodak equipment (including the cost of using
Kodak service), and thus might have been led to purchase that equip-
ment, only to find that its costs were higher than they would knowingly
have incurred.5 5 The Court thus replaced the usual question of coercion
in a tying case-were buyers forced by the seller's market power to accept
unwillingly the tie?-with one of deception 56-did buyers have sufficient
information to evaluate the costs of the tie?
This reformulation of tying law's coercion requirement leaves much
unanswered .5 For example, could a franchisor be liable for coercing its
franchisees to purchase its branded products? Franchisees are often
provided extensive information about the costs of the franchise, and
Kodak addresses only the case where such information is lacking, so it
is difficult to say.5 8 And what of cases in which sellers take advantage of
information costs in other ways? Would it be a violation, for example,
for Moody's to threaten to convey misleading information to third-party
investors in order to cause a debt issuer to purchase Moody's product?
And would it matter whether it was difficult for those investors to deter-
mine whether the information Moody's provided to them was accurate?
Would it be a "leveraging" violation, as the plaintiff in Zschaler v. Claneil
arrangements are usually part of the original franchise contract, whereas the tie in Kodak
was not part of the original terms of sale for Kodak equipment. See, e.g., Alan H. Silberman,
The Myths of Franchise "Market Power," 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 181, 182-84 (1996). But the
informational issue on which the Court in Kodak focused was the difficulty that Kodak
equipment buyers faced in evaluating long-term costs at the time of their original equip-
ment purchase, see infra text accompanying notes 54-56, and that is the same problem
faced by franchisees at the time of entering into a franchise agreement. See Patterson,
supra note 41, at 249-52; Meese, supra note 45.
54 jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 (1984) (quoting Times-
-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953)).
5- Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-75.
161 use the word "deception" to point out the parallel with other cases of deception,
like the standard-setting cases discussed in the next section. 1 am not necessarily saying
that Kodak actively deceived its customers, only that those customers may in fact have
been deceived. But see infra text accompanying note 61.
17 It was this uncertainty that occasioned the greatest alarm among commentators. See,
e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural
Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1994); Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through
Imperfect Information: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. RL-v. 336, 337 (1993).
11 George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 188 (1993); Patterson, supra note 41, at 249-52.
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Enterprises, Inc.55 alleged, for a property lessor at a ski resort to use
the resort's single telephone reservation service, which it controlled, to
provide misleading information about a competitor's lodgings?60 A focus
on "coercion" in these cases provides only an incomplete picture of
them, since in each the injury to buyers seems as much the product of
deception as of coercion. Therefore, although it is possible to interpret
Kodak in such a way as to fit its informational issues into tying's coercion
framework, 6' it may be preferable to reexamine that framework itself.
3. Deception in Standard-Manipulation Cases
The Supreme Court's standard-manipulation cases, where deception
is the central issue, also present difficulties. The Court has decided two
cases of this kind,6 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.63 and
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME ),64
each involving a standard-setting organization whose standard was manip-
ulated by its members. Because of the postures in which these cases
came to the Court,65 neither is especially informative, but ASME is the
more useful of the two. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers
promulgates standards for a variety of products, and the case concerned
the exploitation of the ASME's procedures by an employee of a seller
1 958 F. Supp. 929 (D. Vt. 1997).
"'The plaintiff in Zschaler alleged that the defendant's reservation service's telephone
message misleadingly suggested that the defendants' properties were closer to the ski
facilities than were the plaintiff's properties. Id. at 935. The court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on a monopoly leveraging claim. Id. at 946.
"I The most satisfying approach, I believe, is one I have presented elsewhere: that it was
the Kodak-imposed tie itself that made consumers unable to evaluate the long-term costs
of using Kodak equipment. See Patterson, supra note 41, at 195-96. By imposing the tie,
Kodak denied buyers the benefit of future competition among service providers, tinder
which Kodak's service costs would presumably have been comparable to those of other
service providers. Instead, Kodak confined buyers to its own service, which freed Kodak
from the need to compete with other providers, and required buyers in making their
purchasing decisions to evaluate the likely fiture quality and price of Kodak service under
the monopoly conditions the tie created.
61 The Court has decided one other standard-manipulation case, Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). But the Court in Radiant Burners
focused on the additional allegation that the organization, the American Gas Association,
and its members, some of which competed with the plaintiff in selling gas burners, had
"effectuate[d] the plan and purpose of the unlawful combination and conspiracy... by
... refusing to provide gas for use in the plaintiff's [gas burners],"' id. at 658 (quoting
complaint), thus treating the case not as one involving the manipulation of a standard
but as one involving a concerted refusal to deal.
63 4 8 6 U.S. 492 (1988).
t 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
Allied Tube presented only an issue of Noerr-Pennington immunity, see infra note 70,
and in ASME the only defendant was the standard-setting organization itself, rather than
the seller that had manipulated the standard, see infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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of one of those products. The employee used the society's procedures
to cause it to send out a letter condemning the product of one of the
seller's competitors, 66 which sued under the antitrust laws. By the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, the only defendant remaining was
the ASME itself,67 and the Court decided the case by treating the
employee as acting under the apparent authority of the society. Under
this approach, the society was liable for allowing its agent to use its
standard, and hence its reputation, anticompetitively. 68
ASME left at least two important questions unanswered. First, could
antitrust liability be premised on deceptive acts, or was the ASME perhaps
liable only for its adoption of unreasonable procedures (which, in turn,
permitted the deceptive acts)? On this issue, the Court seemed to hold
the former view, since it indicated that the seller and its employee would
also be liable, 69 and they presumably were not responsible for the ASME's
rules, only for their manipulation. Second, if liability could be premised
on deception, would it require an agreement, as among the members
of the ASME, or would unilateral deceptive acts also create liability?
Again, because the Court wrote as if the individual seller would be liable,
the opinion suggests that unilateral acts of deception would be sufficient.
Admittedly, though, ASME is far from clear on either of these questions.
Allied Tube, to the extent that it can be read to speak to these issues,
seems to confirm the interpretations above, 7 but it, too, leaves unclear
whether unilateral acts of deception can create antitrust liability.
The uncertainty in ASME and Allied Tube is exacerbated by the Court's
focus in both cases on the particular problems presented by the collec-
tive action involved in standard setting. It was the agreements among
6 ASME, 456 U.S. at 560-64.
61 Id. at 574 n.13.
61 Id. at 570-74.
'9 Id. at 574 n.13 (noting that plaintiffs would normally sue corporate defendants, like
the seller involved in the manipulation, rather than a nonprofit society like ASME).
70 Allied Tube actually has little to say about these issues because the issue before the
Supreme Court in that case was limited to whether the actions of the defendant, Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp., were immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine as a petitioning of the government, since the standards at issue were routinely
adopted into law by many states. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 499 & n.3 (1988). Allied Tube does not present the question of the significance
of unilateral action, because the defendant conceded that it had conspired with other
sellers to engage in the anticompetitive acts at issue, enlisting new members for the
standard-setting organization to vote against a new standard that would have helped a
competitor of the conspirators. See id. at 497. The Court in Allied Tube did seem to agree,
though, that deception is an antitrust violation, because it said that it would be a violation
for Allied Tube to "bias the [standard-setting] process," id. at 511, suggesting that it was
its manipulation of the process to provide inaccurate information that was the problem.
See also infta note 71 and text accompanying notes 116-19.
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members of the standard-setting organizations in the cases that gave
their standards their power, and apparently for that reason the Court
focused on the standard-setting processes rather than on the actual
manipulation that caused the harm. That focus was perhaps not inappro-
priate, given the context of the cases, but it makes it difficult to assess
how the Court would treat deception in other contexts. For example,
could there be antitrust liability if a seller manipulated the tests of
Consumers Union (the publisher of Consumer Reports) or of Underwriters
Laboratories? Those entities occupy roles that are arguably similar to
standard-setting organizations, but since they are not composed of
member-competitors, their actions raise no issues of concerted action.
Antitrust liability could therefore not be premised on Sherman Act
Section 1, which requires an agreement, but it might be possible under
Section 2, if the requirements of monopolization or attempted monopoli-
zation were met. And similar issues are raised in contexts other than
standard setting.7' For example, several courts and commentators have
concluded that sellers may be liable under the antitrust laws for false
advertising. 72 Reluctant to open the courts to a rash of such claims,
though, the commentators have proposed and the courts have adopted
a number of ad hoc requirements that have little in common with other
antitrust claims or with Supreme Court precedent. This creativity is not
surprising because, despite the similarity of the competitive harm in
cases of deception, the Court has provided no general rule for the
antitrust treatment of such cases.
B. DEMAND-BASED MARKET POWER AS A
DISTINCT ANTITRUST PROBLEM
I believe that the uncertainty in the Supreme Court's demand cases
is the product of the Court's attempt to treat them like other antitrust
cases, when in fact they are quite different. The goal of coercive and
deceptive acts is to increase the demand for the seller's product, yet the
Court does not focus directly on this goal, instead emphasizing antitrust
concepts that are better suited to practices whose goals are to restrict
output. Thus, in tying cases the Court focuses on traditional antitrust
71 On this point, it is worth noting Allied Tube's observation that the court of appeals
had "determined that [the plaintiff] was awarded damages only on the theory 'that the
stigma of not obtaining [the standard-setting organization's] approval of its products and
[defendant's.] "markeling" of that stigma caused independent marketplace harm."' Allied
Tube, 486 U.S. at 498 n.2 (quoting Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817
F.2d 938, 941 n.3 (1987)) (emphasis on "marketing" added). The Supreme Court said
that it was deciding the case on the same basis. Id.
72 See infra part V.A.2.
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market power, which is of limited relevance to coercion, the Court's
expressed concern in the cases, 73 and in standard-setting cases it focuses
on the power of standard-setting organizations, though standards are
often manipulated by the acts of individual sellers, not by collective
power. Demand-based market power requires a focus redirected toward
the means of its creation.
Generally speaking, one can distinguish three sources of market power.
First, if a seller has a large market share, 74 it will often by that very fact
be able to raise price (albeit only by selling fewer products) .7 Because
the seller controls a large share of the market, if it raises price, and
therefore reduces output, competing sellers may not be able to step in
and meet, at the original, lower price, the demand created by the reduced
output; at least some buyers will therefore be forced to pay the large-
market-share seller's supracompetitive price. Even if a seller does not
have a large market share, it may still be possible for it to create market
power. One way to do this-the second source of market power-is to
raise its rivals' costs. As Professors Krattenmaker and Salop explain,
"certain firms can attain monopoly power by making arrangements with
their suppliers that place their competitors at a cost disadvantage."7 The
seller's resulting cost advantage allows it to price above its own marginal
cost. Alternatively, the seller can turn to a third source of market power:
it can alter the demand side of the cost-demand interaction that deter-
mines price.
This third source of market power, demand-based market power, is
distinct from the other two sources of market power. Most significantly,
perhaps, it differs from both in that its exercise need not result in any
reduction in output. To use tying as an example, a seller that uses a tie
to increase the demand for its tied product can increase the price for
that product while maintaining the same level of output. If the tie does
71 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
71 Because a seller's market share is a function of the differentiation of its product from
others, and because the demand-increasing practices that are the subject of this article
could be viewed as means of creating differentiated products, the practices discussed here
could be viewed as means of creating larger market shares. But the power created by these
demand-based practices is distinct from such supply-oriented sources of market share as
horizontal agreements and the simple inability of competitors to produce a sufficient
number of products to replace the reduced output of a large-market-share seller.
71 Moreover, this source of market power is not available only to single sellers; it is also
the source of power addressed by antitrust law's prohibition on horizontal agreements.
71 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 28, at 214; see also Krattenmaker et al., supra note
28, at 255 ("It is the exclusionary conduct that creates the market power being evaluated,
not the other way around.").
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not result in perfect price discrimination,7 7 output of the tying product
may decrease, but the creation of market power in one product accom-
panied by a reduction in the output of another product distinguishes
tying's demand-based market power from the other two forms." And in
deception cases, like those involving standard setting, a seller may be
able to shift buyers from its competitors' products to its own without
decreasing overall output.
Demand-based market power can be seen as complementary to the
power produced by raising rivals' costs. A seller that seeks to achieve
power through a cost advantage has two choices available to it: it can
reduce its own costs, or raise its rivals'. As Krattenmaker and Salop argue,
it is anticompetitive to choose the second approach, in which the seller
imposes costs on its competitors through their suppliers.79 A seller creat-
ing demand-based power also has two choices available to it: it can
improve its product or advertise it (truthfully), so as to attract more
buyers, or it can increase demand for its product by engaging in coercion
or deception. Here, too, the latter approaches are anticompetitive
because they impose costs on buyers of other products."' Hence, one
can see demand-based market power as the demand-side complement
to the supply-side raising-rivals'- costs analysis.
Indeed, some practices could be analyzed using either approach. For
example, one can view the manipulation of a product standard either
as an effort by a seller to increase the demand for its product or as an
effort to raise its rivals' costs by denying (or making more costly) their
access to an important input-approval for their products under the
standard."' But approval under a standard is not really an input for the
17 Several examples of price-discriminating ties that do not reduce tying product output
are described in DENNIS W. CARLTON &JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTFRIAL ORGANI-
ZArION 471-79 (2d ed. 1994).
11 One can get around this conceptual problem by focusing on the tying-and-tied-product
combination and arguing that the seller has power in the market for that combination
product and has reduced the output for it. Under this view, the seller creates market
power by defining its product in a particular way, and then exercises its (newly created)
power, which reduces the output of the combination product. Cf Patterson, supra note
41. But the ultimate question is whether the seller's actions are anticompetitive, and that
question cannot be answered by looking solely at the exercise of power. The analysis must
also examine its creation by the combination of the products, and that requires a demand-
based approach like that proposed in this article.
See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 28.
It can impose costs, for example, on the users of product standards or on the buyers
of tying products. See infra part IV.A.3.
11 Krattenmaker and Salop do not discuss cases of standard manipulation, perhaps
because their focus is on vertical arrangements, and the vertical aspects of the Supreme
Court's standards cases are not well developed. See supra part II.A.2.
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products to which the standard applies; it is instead a factor that influ-
ences consumer demand. One could also perhaps treat a tying product
as an input for sales of its related tied product, but it is not really natural
to do so, since most tied products can also be sold independently. 2 And
in other cases of demand-based market power, it is not even clear what
one would characterize as the input to which access is restricted."3
Moreover, there is an important difference in orientation between
practices that increase demand and those that raise costs: efforts to raise
rivals' costs are aimed upstream, at restricting access to suppliers, while
demand-increasing activities are aimed downstream, at increasing
demand among buyers. This is significant because the success of a seller's
efforts to raise its rivals' costs is limited by the self-interest of the suppliers
to which it seeks to restrict access. Those suppliers will cooperate with
the seller only to the extent that the seller compensates them for their
reduced sales to the seller's rivals. Most demand-increasing activities, in
contrast, are not subject to this constraint. Because an effort to increase
demand usually involves only a seller and the buyers whose demand for
its product the seller seeks to increase, there is no third-party market
82 That is presumably why, though Krattenmaker and Salop mention ties as all example
of raising rivals' costs in tile introduction to their article, Krattenmaker & Salop, sulpra
note 28, at 211-12, 216, they do not discuss them further in the article. The raising-rivals'-
costs analysis of a tie would presumably point out that a seller that imposes a tie raises its
rivals' costs by requiring the competitors to incur the costs of marketing their own versions
of the tying product or by forcing it to operate at a smaller and less-efficient scale (though
these understandings might not strictly fit into Krattenmaker's and Salop's scheme, which
focuses on arrangements with suppliers). This analysis emphasizes the tie's effects in the
tied-product market by focusing on how the tie raises costs for sellers in that market. But
where the tying seller has only a small share of the tied-product market, these effects will
be minimal. Judge Easterbrook goes so far as to say that the cases in which ties raise
rivals' costs enough to create concern "are sufficiently rare that they cannot support any
presumption against (or even suspicion of) the practices." Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTrrRusT L.J. 135, 145 (1984).
8. In the Moody's case, for example, which was introduced in the text accompanying
notes 4-11 supra and will be discussed again in the text accompanying notes 187-206
infra, the claim is that Moody's Investors Service, Inc. sought to increase its sales of bond-
rating services by suggesting to bond issuers that if they did not buy its services, Moody's
would issue, unsolicited, an unfavorable rating. Such a rating would impose costs on the
issuers, in that they would then be forced to pay a higher interest rate for their bonds.
The Moody's "threat" can thus be viewed as a means of increasing the demand for its
services, in that it offers lower interest rates (or the avoidance of higher ones) to issuers
who buy Moody's rating services. But it is not entirely clear how the Moody's threat raises
rivals' costs. The best means for the competitors of Moody's to combat the practice would
probably be to inform bond buyers that a Moody's rating is not entirely objective: the
cost of so informing bond buyers, though, is not a cost that one would normally associate
with competition in the market for bond-rating services, where the consumers are bond
issuers, not bond buyers.
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participant to impose independent limits on the seller's actions.84
Demand-increasing activities are therefore not only different from those
that raise rivals' costs, but are in some respects more dangerous.
III. OBJECTIONS TO ANTITRUST RECOGNITION
OF DEMAND-BASED MARKET POWER
Before proceeding to describe a test that will address the distinct
problems presented by demand-based market power, it is important to
consider the views of those who agree that demand-based power is differ-
ent, but disagree with the claim that it presents problems with which
antitrust should be concerned. Some of these commentators have taken
a specifically legal approach, mining Supreme Court opinions for state-
ments that they see as foreclosing antitrust consideration of demand-
based market power. Others have addressed the issue from a more
economic viewpoint, arguing that market power that is a product of
increased consumer demand is, ipso facto, a product of increased con-
sumer welfare and is therefore no concern of antitrust. However, neither
of these arguments-legal or economic-has really come to grips with
the problem.
A. LEGAL OBJECTIONS
The statement by the Court that is most often pointed to as demonstra-
ting the Court's rejection of demand-based market power is in Jefferson
a Some demand-increasing practices, it is true, do involve more or less independent
suppliers." In a case in which a seller seeks to increase the demand for its product by
influencing a product standard, for example, the standard-setting organization will have
an interest in maintaining the objectivity of its standard, and that may place limits on the
seller's efforts to disadvantage its competitors, just as in a more typical raising-rivals'-costs
situation. But demand-oriented practices like standard setting and advertising present
problems for raising-rivals'-costs analysis because they raise the costs of sellers whose
products are disadvantaged by the information provided regardless of whether that infor-
mation is accurate or deceptive, i.e., regardless of whether it benefits consumers. That is,
it is not that anticompetitive standard manipulation raises rivals' costs and procompetitive
standard setting does not, but that manipulation distorts the "true" demand for the
products, whereas the legitimate standard-setting activities do not. A demand-oriented
approach thus has advantages in this situation.
In some circumstances, of course, a seller's competitors may constrain its actions. In
cases of deception, for example, a seller's competitors may ensure that buyers receive
correct information, and in cases of coercion a seller may be constrained by its competitors'
abilities to offer alternative sales arrangements. For various reasons, though, the constraints
provided by competitors may not be entirely effective. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474 & n.21 (1992) (observing that competitors may
have neither the ability nor the incentive to inform consumers); Yongmin Chen, Equilibrium
Product Bundling, 70 J. Bus. 85 (1997) (showing that two sellers in a duopoly can each
reap higher profits if one of them ties).
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Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.s5 Jefferson Parish was a tying case in
which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital had power in the
local market for hospital services, and had used that power to require
its patients to purchase anesthesiological services from providers it had
selected.86 The court of appeals in Jefferson Parish had concluded that
though the hospital's market share was not high enough to give it market
power, the market at issue was subject to imperfections that nevertheless
permitted the defendant to charge supracompetitive pricesY The imper-
fections to which it referred, "the prevalence of third-party payment for
health care costs," '88 which might lead consumers to be indifferent as to
price, and the "lack of adequate information" about the "quality of
the medical care provided," '89 which might make consumers indifferent
among medical care providers, seem somewhat similar to the informa-
tional sources of demand-based market power discussed above.90 The
Supreme Court, however, said that though those imperfections "may
generate 'market power' in some abstract sense, they do not generate
the kind of market power that justifies condemnation of tying.""' It has
been suggested that in this statement the Court "expressly rejected the
notion that the pricing discretion from ... imperfect information can
be antitrust market power."92 But even setting aside the fact that Kodak
85 466 U.S. 2 (1984). Another statement, from United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), is also often cited on this point, but is too vague to be of much
significance, and is in any case directly contradicted by other statements in the same
opinion. The Court said in du Pont that the "power that, let us say, automobile or soft-
drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the power that makes
an illegal monopoly." Id. at 393. The Court then went on to say, however, that "[i]llegal
power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market for the product," id., and
that "[d] etermination of the competitive market for commodities depends on how different
from one another are the offered commodities in character or use, how far buyers will
go to substitute one commodity for another," id. This seems to say that product differentia-
tion can create "illegal power," so perhaps the Court in the first statement quoted above
only meant to say that automobile and soft-drink manufacturers do not have monopoly
power, i.e., power sufficient to bring Sherman Act § 2 into play, a proposition that no one
would dispute.
8 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26.
17 Id. at 27-28.
s1 Id. at 27.
89 Id. It is interesting to note that this is how the Supreme Court describes the court of
appeals' view of the imperfection, but that the Court itself describes the relevant informa-
tion not as that about hospital services, the tying product, but anesthesiological services,
the tied product. See id. at 27-28. This suggests that it is power in the tied product market
that the Court views as important, which would not be consistent with current tying law.
Cf supra note 50.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
91 Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
92 Arthur, supra note 57, at 41.
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specifically accepted antitrust market power derived from imperfect
information,93 this interpretation is too broad.
In Jefferson Parish the Supreme Court focused specifically on the mar-
ket imperfections cited by the court of appeals, and it said only that those
imperfections did not generate antitrust market power,94 not that no
imperfections could. In fact, neither of the two specific imperfections
described by the appeals court would necessarily generate demand-based
market power. The first imperfection, third-party payment for health
care costs, might, as the Supreme Court acknowledged, lead to a lack
of price consciousness among consumers because they do not pay for
their purchases.95 It would not, however, make the third-party payers
indifferent to price; on the contrary, insurers are quite capable of con-
straining the prices that they pay on behalf of their insureds. Nor would
the second imperfection, a lack of information about medical care qual-
ity, provide market power in the context of Jefferson Parish. Inadequate
information might, as the Court says, make consumers indifferent among
providers, 96 but to the extent that consumers were indifferent, the hospi-
tal's tie would not have been coercive, so that it is not surprising that
the Court found that imperfection insufficient in a tying case. It says
nothing, however, about how the Court would view market imperfections
that would permit sellers to impose a tie that buyers found burdensome,
as in Kodak.
In addition to the comments in Jefferson Parish just discussed, which
focused directly, if inconclusively, on demand-based market power, the
Supreme Court has made other statements related less directly to the
issue. These statements, though not always made in the context of
demand-related claims, have also been cited as evidence that the Court
would disapprove such claims. They were cited in this way, for example,
in Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.,9 7 a Seventh Circuit
case with an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook. The inapplicability
of the cited statements to the demand problems in Schachar, and by
extension in other demand cases, requires some understanding of the
facts of the case.
The plaintiffs in Schachar were ophthalmologists who had begun per-
forming a new ophthalmological procedure for correcting near-sighted-
ness. The defendants were an ophthalmological association and certain
91 See supra part II.A.2.
91 466 U.S. at 28.
9. Id.
9f, Id.
97 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989).
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of its members who did not perform the new procedure, but instead
used more traditional means of treating near-sightedness. The chal-
lenged actions were public statements by the association and its members
labeling the new procedure "experimental" and urging patients to
approach it with caution.98 The plaintiffs claimed that these statements
were anticompetitive because they were made without regard to the
merits of the new procedure; they argued that the statements were
intended simply to injure the business of those ophthalmologists who
performed the procedure and thereby protect the business of the oph-
thalmologists in the associationY Thus, the plaintiffs' claim was demand-
based, alleging that the ophthalmologists in the association deceptively
increased the demand for their own products at the expense of the plain-
tiffs'.
Judge Easterbrook began his analysis with a definition of market power
as a restriction of supply." He said that there was no such restriction
in supply in Schachar, observing that "none [of the plaintiffs] maintains
that the Academy prevented him from doing what he wished or inposed
sanctions on those who facilitated the work." 0' Instead, he said, "[t]he
Academy's declaration affected only the demand side of the market, and
then only by appealing to consumers' (and third-party payors') better
judgment."10 2 That, Judge Easterbrook believed, was sufficient to require
summaryjudgment: "Unless one group of suppliers diminishes another's
ability to peddle its wares (technically, reduces rivals' elasticity of supply),
there is not even the beginning of an antitrust case .. . ."I'll However,
although he cited two Supreme Court cases iii support of this proposition,
the Court has never adopted such a purely supply-oriented approach.
In the first case Judge Easterbrook cited, National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,"4 the defendant,
the NCAA, had imposed restrictions on the number of college football
98 Id. at 398; Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 1988-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,986, at 58,050-51 (N.D. 11. 1988).
" 870 F.2d at 398-99; 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,986, at 58,050-51.
10t See 870 F.2d at 399 ("Antitrust law ... condemns reductions in output that drive up
prices as consumers bid for the remaining supply.") (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-07 (1984)); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S.
1, 19-20 (1979); Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir.
1989), slip op. at 6-8; Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc.,
814 F.2d 358, 368-71 (7th Cir. 1987)).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 400.
103 Id. at 399. In the elided portion of the sentence, judge Easterbrook adds that there
is "no reason to investigate ftrther to determine whether the restraint is 'reasonable.'" Id.
1- 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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games that could be broadcast.0 5 The Court observed that, as a result
of the restrictions, "[p] rice is higher and output lower than they would
otherwise be,"'0 6 but that was simply a statement about the effects in that
case, not a general rule that output restriction is necessary to an antitrust
claim. The other case cited by Judge Easterbrook, Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,10 7 provides even less support for his
position. In Broadcast Music the issue was not even whether the challenged
practices, the creation of blanket copyright licenses for musical composi-
tions, were anticompetitive, but only whether the licenses should be
tested by the per se rule, which is intended to apply only to the most
obviously anticompetitive practices.0 8 The Court said that the per se rule
was applicable when a "practice facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease out-
put."' 19 Even if this statement were interpreted to require output restric-
tion for application of the per se rule, 0 Broadcast Music says nothing to
suggest that the same requirement would apply to the rule of reason,
which evaluates more competitively ambiguous practices on the basis of
their actual effects."' Nor has any other Supreme Court opinion." 2
15 Id. at 91-94.
6 Id. at 107. The quoted statement continues, "and both are unresponsive to consumer
preference." Id. The Court's comment about consumer preference could equally well be
applied to actions that increase demand, since the goal of such actions is exactly to affect
"consumer preference." The Court reinforced its concern regarding this issue by saying
that "[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference
in setting price and output is not consistent with the fundamental goal of antitrust law." Id.
107 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
101 See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (stating that the per se rule is applied to "agreements whose nature and necessary
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish their illegality"). The per se rule applies to price-fixing agreements, horizontal
market allocations, group boycotts, and tying arrangements. HOVEN'KAMP, supra note 15,
at 227-28. The rule as applied to ties, however, requires a showing of market power,
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9, 13-14 (1984), which gives it less
of a per se character. See PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 815 n.2
(6th Cir. 1997).
109 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20.
110 Moreover, the Court said that the practice challenged in Broadcast Music was "un-
likely to cause decreased output, one of the normal undesirable effects of a cartel," id. at
22 n.40 (emphasis added), suggesting that though decreased output is anticompetitive,
other effects can be as well.
I I am not suggesting in this article that demand-increasing practices should be evalu-
ated by the per se rule. To the extent that tie-ins are currently judged by the per se rule,
see supra note 108, I believe that current law is inappropriate. The competitive effects of
ties are too ambiguous for per se treatment. See infra part V.B.1.
112 Although Justice Scalia in his Kodak dissent defined market power in exactly this way,
as "the power to raise price by restricting output," Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 487 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), he could not point to any
opinion by the Court in support of his definition.
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Moreover, both NCAA and Broadcast Music were horizontal-restraint
cases. Even if the Court had adopted a rule that in such cases output
restriction was necessary to find an antitrust violation, it would not neces-
sarily apply in other kinds of cases. The purpose of an agreement among
sellers is to create a group with a large market share, specifically so that
the group will have the power to restrict output." 1 Demand-based power
operates through different mechanisms, so the same principles need not
apply. That is exactly why the Supreme Court, in tying cases like Jefferson
Parish and Kodak, has described the competitive problem as the "coer-
cion" of consumers; although the Court has not always been clear about
what it meant by this term," 4 its use of it acknowledges that demand cases
present unique problems. Thus, though Judge Easterbrook is correct that
the Court has on occasion referred to the anticompetitive effect of a
restriction of output, it has done so only when that was the particular
anticompetitive mechanism alleged in the case that it was considering.
Judge Easterbrook also relied on Sherman Act Section l's requirement
that practices challenged under that section be "in restraint of trade"
by arguing that the Academy's actions did not "restrain" trade because
they did not prevent ophthalmologists from performing the new ophthal-
mological procedure. 15Judge Easterbrook's apparent claim here, which
is really a variation on his output restriction argument, is that any manipu-
lation of the ophthalmological association's standard-setting process
does not present an antitrust problem unless the resulting standard is
enforced in some way against the disadvantaged sellers. That is, a
"restraint" in the standard-setting process would not be an antitrust
problem unless there were a corresponding restraint in the market for
the product to which the standard applied. Here again, though, Judge
Easterbrook's citation to the Supreme Court is unconvincing.
Judge Easterbrook relied on Allied Tube,1"' focusing on the Court's
statement there that the members of the standard-setting organization
M3 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
14 See supra part II.A.1-2.
",i Schachar, 870 F.2d at 397.
116 He also cited two lower court decisions, Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. Ameican
Petroleum Institute, 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988), and Clamp-All Cop. v. Cast ron Soil Pipe
Institute, 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988), but neither supports his claim. Judge Easterbrook
says that Consolidated Metal Products "holds that when a trade association ... does not
constrain others to follow its recommendations, it does not violate the antitrust laws."
Schachar, 870 F.2d at 399. But Consolidated Metal Products required coercive conduct only
for a per se violation of the antitrust laws. 846 F.2d at 292. Under the rule of reason, the
court said, a violation could have been established through evidence either of coercion
or of anticompetitive intent, such as "bad faith" or the "desire to suppress innovative
products." Id. at 294-95. Similarly, the court in Clamp-All said that standard-setting activity
could run afoul of the antitrust laws if it "serves no legitimate purpose" or "is unnecessarily
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involved, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), "agreed 'not
to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products."1117 It
may be true that the members of the NFPA had such an agreement
(though Judge Easterbrook silently removed the Court's reference to it
as "implicit"' 8), but that was not the basis on which the Court decided
the case. On the contrary, the Court's decision was based on the effects
of the NFPA's standard on demand, not supply: the "marketplace harm"
at issue in the case was caused by the "stigma" of the NFPA's disapproval,
not by any agreement among NFPA members. 19 In Schachar, then,Judge
Easterbrook should have allowed the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove
similar demand-based marketplace harm.
In summary, although a number of Supreme Court statements have
been said to deny the antitrust significance of demand-based market
power, those statements cannot fairly be read so broadly. Rather than
adopt a grand theory, the Court has decided cases presenting demand
issues on their facts. Thus, in Jefferson Parish, where the facts did not
present a competitive concern, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim
of demand-based market power, 20 but in Kodak, where the facts were very
different, it decided that demand effects could create market power.12 1 Of
course, that the Supreme Court has accepted the possibility of demand-
based market power does not mean that it was justified in doing so,
and commentators have argued that demand-based market power is
inconsistent with the economic goals of antitrust. As the next section
shows, however, quite the reverse is true.
B. ECONOMIC OBJECTIONS
The goal of antitrust law is now almost universally seen as an economic
one: to promote consumer welfare.112 Therefore, demand-based market
harmful." 851 F.2d at 487. These cases are discussed further in the text accompanying
notes 226-44, infta.
17 Schachar, 870 F.2d at 399 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,
486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988)).
"1 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500.
"9 The Supreme Court said that it was "decid[ing] the case as it was framed by the
Court of Appeals," which had "determined that [the plaintiff] was awarded damages only
on the theory 'that the stigma of not obtaining [NFPA] approval of its products and [the
defendant's] "marketing" of that stigma caused independent marketplace harm.'" Id. at
498 n.2 (quoting Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 941
n.3 (2d Cir. 1987)).
11o See supra text accompanying notes 85-96.
121 See supra part II.A.2.
122 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (stating that the legislative
record "suggest[s] that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescrip-
tion.'" (quoting BORK, supra note 21, at 66)); but seeAtlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
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power's place in antitrust law will ultimately depend less on past Supreme
Court statements, which are always subject to revision, than on the eco-
nomic implications of such power. A number of commentators have
argued that these implications are not of antitrust significance. Some
have addressed the issue only briefly, others-responding particularly
to Kodak-at more length, but in the end none of them makes the
economic case for dismissing demand-based market power.2
One of the earlier attempts to take a comprehensive view of antitrust
market power is William Landes's and Richard Posner's 1981 article,
"Market Power in Antitrust Cases." u2 4 Landes and Posner "define market
power in economic terms" 25 by reference to the Lerner index, "which
measures the proportional deviation of price at the firm's profit-maxiniz-
ing output from the firm's marginal cost at that output. '"126 As they show,
the Lerner index is equivalent to the reciprocal of the firm's elasticity
of demand, the amount by which the demand for the firm's product
would decrease in response to an increase in the product's price.
27
Under this definition, demand-based market power qualifies as market
power, as Landes and Posner acknowledge. They observe, for example,
that sellers can lower their products' elasticities of demand by establish-
ing strong brand identities. 28 Nevertheless, they reject the conclusion
that the sellers therefore have market power: "Even if firms succeed in
reducing the elasticity of demand for their brands in this way, they will
not have any monopoly profits if there is competition among the firms,
and consumers will benefit from the better quality and greater variety
Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990) ("The Court, in its haste to excuse illegal behavior in the
name of efficiency, has cast aside a century of understanding that our antitrust laws are
designed to safeguard more than efficiency and consumer welfare ... ") (footnotes omit-
ted) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also infra note 186.
123 A similar critique can be found in Warren S. Grimes, Mhen Do Franchisors Have Market
Power? Antitrust Remedies for Franchisor Opportunism, 65 AN-rITRUST L.J. 105, 112-23 (1996).
124 Landes & Posner, supra note 25.
121 Id. at 938.
16 Id. at 939.
127 Id. at 939-41. Elasticity of demand is calculated by dividing a change in a product's
price into the change in demand caused by that price change (with both terms expressed
as percentages, to eliminate any effects of their absolute magnitudes). Id. at 940-41 n.8.
Thus, a product whose demand changes only little with price will have a low elasticity of
demand, and a product whose demand changes greatly with price will have a high one.
And the Lerner index, because it is the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand, reverses
this relationship: products with inelastic demand have high Lerner indices-indicaing
that profit is maximized at prices well above marginal cost-and products with elastic
demand have low Lerner indices-indicating a profit-maximizing price near marginal cost.
12s See id. at 956-57.
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of products.' ' 2 9 But a lower elasticity of demand shows that there is not
competition among the firms, at least in the sense in which the Lerner
index measures competition. If the Lerner index is greater than zero,
the seller can earn supracompetitive profits, even if not "monopoly"
profits. Coke and Pepsi compete vigorously against each other, but each
sells at a price higher than its marginal cost.3 0 If one wants to reject
demand-based market power, one must show that the Lerner index is an
inappropriate measure of market power, at least in the demand context.
One possible means of doing so is suggested by Landes's and Posner's
claim that with strong brand identities "consumers will benefit from
the better quality and greater variety of products." 131 Professor Hay has
addressed this issue more fully. 32 He uses as his example restaurants,
which, he observes, are not perfect substitutes for each other-another
way of saying that they have managed to create demand for their prod-
ucts, and lowered their elasticities of demand.'33 Hay says that restaurants
therefore "will maximize profits by charging prices that exceed the rele-
vant marginal costs."'134 (In other words, they will have Lerner indexes
greater than zero, indicating market power.) He says, though, that restau-
rants acquire the ability to price supracompetitively "simply by doing a
better job in pleasing customers" and that this "does not signify the kind
of market power the antitrust laws ought to be concerned about.""' The
reason, he says, is that consumers subject to this sort of market power
will switch to other products if the seller with market power does not
continue to please them. 3 , But that is not necessarily so.
Professor Hay begs the question by presenting the issue as if it only
involved sellers that were "doing a better job in pleasing customers." In
fact, a seller can increase the demand for its product through a wide
variety of practices, from improving the product, to advertising (truly
129 Id. at 957. Interestingly, Judge Posner in a recent case seemed to acknowledge that
this statement might be incorrect. See Khan v. State Oil Co. 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir.
1996) ("[S]uppose further that Union 76 is a sufficiently distinctive and popular brand
to give the dealers in it at least a modicum of monopoly power."), rev'd, 1997 U.S. LEXIS
6705 (U.S. Feb 18, 1997) (No. 96-871).
11o See Ellen Neuborne & Mary Motta, A Peek Behind the Price Tag: Cereal Makers Not Only
Ones Milking Profits, USA ToDAY, June 13, 1996, at 1B (for soft drinks, product costs are
30.4% of the price, and marketing costs and profits 69.6%; for beer, product costs,
including marketing, make up $2.55 of average six-pack price of $4.01).
1I See supra text accompanying note 129.
132 George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807 (1992).
'13 Id. at 814-16.
Id. at 814.
' Id. at 815.
16 Id.
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or falsely), to manipulating a standard that applies to the product. (A
restaurant owner, for example, might manipulate its rating in the Zagat
Restaurant Survey.) If consumers could costlessly obtain perfect informa-
tion about the product alternatives available to them, and otherwise had
free choice among those alternatives, we could perhaps be confident
that any demand-based market power that a seller achieved was a result
of its "doing a better job in pleasing customers." In fact, though, consum-
ers do not have perfect information, which is why informational market-
ing practices-for example, advertising and standard setting-exist. 7
And consumers do not always have free choice among products; sales
practices like ties do in fact exist.
For these reasons, we cannot be confident that, because a consumer
has not switched to another product, the product the consumer is cur-
rently using best meets his or her needs. And without that confidence,
we cannot be sure that the supracompetitive price that the consumer is
paying as a result of the increased demand is procompetitive. Therefore,
we need some other means of evaluating demand-based market power,
and it isjust such a means that I propose in the next section of this article.
Alternatively, one could give up the task of deciding whether demand-
based market power is anticompetitive and choose instead to evaluate
whether, assuming it is anticompetitive, the seller is in a position to use
the power to do a significant amount of harm. This is the approach
proposed by Professor Klein in the wake of the Kodak decision."38 He uses
as his example breakfast cereals rather than restaurants, hypothesizing a
seller of breakfast cereal that faces an elasticity of demand of 2, and
thus can price its cereal at twice its marginal cost,' but has only a small
share of the breakfast cereal market. 4 ' Klein says that in this situation
the seller's power will be limited to setting its own cereal's price; it "will
have no ability to control the market price." Klein therefore argues (as
does Hay) for the use of market share as the sole test of market power. 4'
137 More generally, only if a consumer's expected cost of obtaining intormation about
alternative products is less than the expected benefits (in lower price or higher quality)
of switching to them, will it make sense for consumers to seek out that information. If
the costs of acquiring information exceed the expected benefits of the information,
consumers will continue to use their current product; they will never learn of the other
products that would better meet their needs.
51 Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak, 3 Sue. Cr.
ECON. REV. 43, 76 (1993).
199 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
140 Klein, supra note 138, at 76.
141 ld. at 71-85; see also Hay, supra note 132, at 816 ("[T]he ability to price above marginal
costs should not be considered antitrust market power unless it is attributable to an absence
of competition as indicated by a substantial market share.").
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This, however, is the tail wagging the dog. Market share has long been
used in antitrust as a measure of market power only because supracom-
petitive pricing is difficult to measure; in the absence of the ability to
measure power from pricing information, market share is used as a
sometimes-accurate proxy for market power.1 42 But under any accepted
definition of market power (even Professor Klein's own 4'), four sellers
(say), each with 25 percent of a market, have market power if they are
pricing supracompetitively. Indeed, the usual understanding in antitrust
law is that supracompetitive pricing in the presence of (imperfectly)
competing products is evidence that the high-priced product is in a
market of its own.14 4 Klein can, of course, redefine the term "market,"
but he should present a strong justification for doing so. 145
The justification he offers is that "when courts find a firm has market
power, they must mean a substantial amount of market power.1 46 But
a substantial amount of market power does not necessarily require a
high market share. In the example used above, of four sellers each with
a 25 percent market share, the sellers' prices could be 10 percent above
their marginal cost; or they could be twice their marginal cost, as Profes-
sor Klein hypothesizes; or they could be ten times their marginal cost.
Regardless of the amount by which prices exceed marginal costs, Profes-
sor Klein would not view those higher-than-cost prices as representing
"substantial" market power so long as the sellers have small market shares
142 See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) ("Since the
purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether
an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, 'proof of
actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,' can obviate the need for an
inquiry into market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects."' (quoting 7
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 1511, at 429 (1986)).
143 "Although all firms in the real world deviate from the perfectly competitive model,
one should define the degree of antitrust market power possessed by a firm in terms of
the degree of deviation from the perfectly competitive model or the degree of the firm's
ability to price above its marginal cost." Klein, supra note 138, at 73 (footnote omitted).
" The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, for example, define a market by determining
the smallest set of products for which a "small but significant and nontransitory" price
increase can be imposed. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.0 (1992), repinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104.
The Guidelines state that in most contexts it will interpret a "small but significant and
nontransitory" price increase as a 5% increase lasting "for the foreseeable future." Id.
§ 1.11. Under this test, even a single restaurant that could profitably raise its price by 5%
would be in a market of its own. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
145 Cf Hay, supra note 132, at 816 (acknowledging that "to some extent, this approach
simply shifts the battle to one of market definition").
146 Klein, supra note 138, at 55 (quoting DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 738 (1989)).
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individually (though perhaps a large one collectively 47 ). Yet he would
view a single seller with a large market share pricing significantly above
marginal cost as having "substantial" market power. He does not explain,
though, why the "substantialness" of market power should turn on the
number of sellers exercising it.
The fundamental problem here is that a buyer paying a supracompeti-
tive price does not care whether the seller attained the ability to charge
that price by acquiring a large market share or by creating increased
demand for its product. Nor should antitrust law. 48 However, it may make
sense for antitrust law to distinguish between procompetitive demand
increases and anticompetitive ones, just as it does between procompeti-
tive and anticompetitive means of achieving large market shares. In
Professor Klein's breakfast-cereal market, any supracompetitive pricing
is presumably a result of more-or-less truthful advertising, and I suggest
that it is the procompetitive source of the cereal sellers' market power,
not the number of sellers exercising it, or their individual market shares
that explains why it does not constitute an antitrust problem. The situa-
tion would be very different if one of the cereal sellers had maintained its
147 The competitive effects of some trade practices can depend on the collective market
share of all sellers engaging in them. For example, under certain circumstances exclusive-
dealing agreements can be anticompetitive if they foreclose a large proportion of the
relevant market; in those circumstances, the effect of, say, a 100% foreclosure is the same
regardless of whether it is a product of one seller with a 100% share or four sellers, each
with a 25% share. See STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAw 303-07 (1993).
In an analogous way, the harm produced by supracompetitive pricing by four sellers with
25% shares is the same as that produced by one seller with the entire market. (It may,
however, be difficult to fit the former case within the statutory requirements of the Sherman
Act. See infra part VI.)
4 Professor Thomas Arthur disagrees, but for practical, rather than theoretical, reasons.
Arthur, like Klein, believes that market power should be of antitrust concern only when
it is "substantial," and he argues that it should be considered "substantial" only when both
the overall size of the market and the seller's share of it are significant. Arthur, supra note
57, at 28-30. His rationale for this requirement is that only when a significant number
of buyers are affected will the benefits of enforcing the antitrust laws exceed the costs of
enforcement. Id. at 30. There are two reasons why this claim does not provide sufficient
reason to dismiss demand-based market power. First, it is only a claim: Arthur offers no
empirical evidence for his view of costs and benefits. Without such evidence, his proposal
of a size-of-market test appears to be based purely on speculation, especially when one
considers that a particular antitrust enforcement action has deterrent effects that benefit
markets beyond that in which the action takes place. Second, Arthur offers no reason why
his size-of-market test should be applied only to cases involving demand-based market
power, not to all antitrust cases. It seems that the costs of litigating the two kinds of cases
would be comparable, so perhaps he believes that the benefits from enforcing the antitrust
laws in cases of demand-based market power are less than the benefits of enforcement
in cases involving output restriction. That, however, would be to claim that demand-based
market power is not as anticompetitive-rather than just not as "substantial"-as other
market power.
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25 percent market share and supracompetitive pricing by systematically
preventing new entrants from receiving, say, a consumer-recognized
"Bug-Free" seal of approval of the Cereal Manufacturers' Association.
Thus, neither the legal nor the economic reasons that have been
advanced for wholesale dismissal of demand-based market power from
antitrust concern are convincing, and antitrust law should take on the task
of distinguishing between procompetitive and anticompetitive means of
increasing demand. Once that task is accomplished, it might be that
more limited and focused objections to antitrust scrutiny of particular
forms of demand-based market power would be convincing. Richard
Craswell has argued, for example, that certain sources of demand-based
market power-advertising is an example-are already regulated by
expert agencies, so that questions of institutional competence might
suggest excluding them from antitrust scrutiny. 49 But even for those
sources of demand-based market power, antitrust should only defer to
another body of law after the nature and extent of the antitrust harm
is determined. In the next part of this article, I propose a test for making
that determination.
IV. A TEST FOR DEMAND-BASED MARKET POWER
The test I propose for evaluating demand-based market power is funda-
mentally different from the tests courts have previously used. Specifically,
I propose a test that focuses not on harm in the market in which demand
is increased, but on harm in any other market in which the seller exerts
its efforts to create the demand increase. For example, in evaluating a
tie, the test proposed here would focus not on harm in the tied product
market but on harm in the tying product market. The reason for this
approach is that one cannot look at a particular increase in demand and
determine whether it is procompetitive or anticompetitive. At bottom, it
makes no sense to call a particular level of product demand either
procompetitive or anticompetitive; that is why assessments of market
power usually take demand as given.' 5 But if a demand increase is created
by some practice that has effects in some other market, those effects
149 In his classic article discussing the consumer-protection implications of tying agree-
ments, Craswell argued that those consumer protection issues would be better handled
outside antitrust courts. See Craswell, supra note 41, at 697-700. His reason for this recom-
mendation, though, was that antitrust law was designed to handle issues of market power,
rather than consumer protection. The point of this article is that even these consumer-
protection problems do generate market power, at least as that term is understood by econo-
mists.
IS{J For example, Easterbrook has said that in evaluating the competitive significance of
changes in output, one should "[h]old other things, such as demand, constant." Easter-
brook, supra note 24, at 31.
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may be either procompetitive or anticompetitive, and thus may be used
to judge the demand increase itself.
A. THE PROPOSED TEST: SHIFTING THE COSTS
OF INCREASING DEMAND
When a seller seeks to increase demand for a product it sells and the
seller also sells' another, related product, it can sometimes shift the
costs of increasing the demand for the former product to the latter.5 2
I believe that such cost shifting is the source of anticompetitive harm
in cases involving demand-based market power, and therefore propose
it as a general test for evaluating such power. More precisely, I propose
that cost shifting be used as a screen in evaluating demand-increasing
activities,just as preexisting market power is used as a screen in evaluating
supply-restricting activities.15 That is, if a demand-increasing activity does
not involve a shifting of costs, it should not create antitrust liability. If,
on the other hand, a demand-increasing activity does involve cost shifting,
it should be subject to further antitrust scrutiny, though it would not
thereby be conclusively established as anticompetitive.
1. Cost Shifting
A seller can incur a variety of different sorts of costs in order to help
it sell its product. These costs might, for example, be advertising costs
for the product, or they might be the costs of improving it so that it
meets a product standard. They might also be, as in a tie, the costs of
sales terms for one product that encourage (or require) buyers to buy
another. Regardless of the specific nature of the costs, if the seller of,
say, product B can impose them on buyers of product A rather than B,
the seller can achieve an increase in the demand for B, and do so for
free, while many of its competitors will have to pay for a comparable
increase. As a result, the playing field will be tilted in the seller's direction.
It is exactly this problem that the Supreme Court spoke of in Jefferson
151 Actually, the seller need not sell the related product; it need only exercise some degree
of control over it, as sellers sometimes do over product standards. See supra part II.A.2.
152 In tying cases, the costs of increasing demand for the tied product are reflected in
the discounts offered on the tying product; these discounts are required to compensate
buyers for the requirement that they purchase the tying seller's tied product. See infra part
V.B. 1. In standard-setting cases, the costs are the loss of objectivity for the standard itself.
See infra part V.A.].
1-13 See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Proof of
market power, then, for many courts is a critical first step, or 'screen,' or 'filter,' which
is often dispositive of the case.") (footnote and citations omitted); Grappone, Inc. v.
Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 797 (1st Cir. 1988); Valley Liquors, Inc. v.
Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1987); Easterbrook, supra note 24,
at 14-23.
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Parish when it expressed concern about maintaining "competition on
the merits."'54
Of course, shifting costs to product A will often make it more difficult
to sell A, so it will not be an effective strategy for all sellers. It can 'work,
though, in at least two circumstances. (Each of these possibilities will be
discussed in more detail below; here the important point is just that this
sort of cost shifting is possible.) First, even if a seller sells both A and
B, it can sometimes benefit from shifting costs from B to A if the costs
will have less of an impact in selling A than they would in selling B.
Kodak is an example. 155 If Kodak's service prices were supracompetitive,
buyers might not have been willing to purchase Kodak service in single
transactions, where they could compare Kodak's prices with those of its
competitors. But by tying its service to its equipment,156 Kodak forced
buyers to decide on their service provider once and for all at a time
when it was more difficult for service costs to be determined. Therefore,
those costs might not have had the impact on Kodak equipment sales
that they would have had on service sales in the absence of the tie.
Second, a seller of product B might be able to shift costs to some other
seller's product A. This may seem implausible, but standard-manipulation
cases like ASME and Allied Tube are examples.157 In these cases, an indi-
vidual seller is able to manipulate the product standard offered by an-
other entity, the standard-setting organization. By doing so, a seller is
able to increase the demand for its own product (B), while impos-
ing costs, both short-term and long-term, on users of the standard (A). 158
The short-term costs are those imposed on buyers who are led to purchase
151 See supra text accompanying note 44.
I See also supra part II.A.2.
156 See supra note 51.
'57 See supra part II.A.2.
151 One might object that a standard is not a product itself but is merely a part of, or
information about, the products to which it applies. That is, one might view a standard
as akin to advertising. But the two are quite different, primarily because a standard, unlike
advertising, is not applicable only to a single product from one seller but is intended to
provide objective information about a range of available products. A standard is thus more
akin to an information source like Consumer Reports magazine: it seeks to attract users who
will pay for it (perhaps indirectly), and it may have to contend with competing information
sources. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION,
STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION (FINAL STAFF REPORT 1983) [hereinafter STANDARDS
AND CERTIFICATION].
Furthermore, many standards reflect not just an effort to provide information about
products, but also an attempt to change their characteristics. Standards of this kind set
forth the characteristics that buyers would like products to exhibit, and sellers can then
choose whether to conform their products to the standard. In a sense, then, the standard
is a source of, or perhaps an impetus for, product improvements. When a standard of
this kind is manipulated, buyers may be denied not only a source of objective information
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less-than-optimal products because of the manipulated standards. The
long-term costs are those imposed on buyers by the lessened credibility
of the standards if the manipulation becomes known; that lessened
credibility will require buyers to incur costs to confirm the information
provided by the standards or gather their own product information.
When these sorts of cost shifting are effected, they will be anticompeti-
tive. By shifting costs from one product to another, the seller distorts
competition in both markets. This sort of distortion has long been the
subject of antitrust condemnation in tying law, and the Supreme Court
has recently made clear that it is specifically the market-linking effect-
the effect on which a cost-shifting test focuses-that is the reason for its
condemnation. 5 9 There is therefore reason to think that the Court would
look favorably on such a test. In any event, as the next two sections show,
a cost-shifting test appears to be well suited to distinguishing between
procompetitive and anticompetitive demand-increasing practices.
2. Demand-Increasing Practices That Do Not Shift Costs
To begin with an example that is obviously not anticompetitive, one
way for a seller to increase the demand for its product is to improve the
product. Sellers, of course, frequently do improve their products, and
when they do, they raise the products' prices to reflect their improved
quality (as well as any increased costs). Rarely or never, though, would
a seller shift the costs of improving one product to another. 160 There
would be no reason to do so, because buyers would presumably be willing
to pay for the improvements,1 61 and the seller might even tout the higher
price as a signal of the product's higher quality. 62 Therefore, the
increased demand created by product improvements would generally
about the products available to them, but also the improvements that the standard would
have encouraged.
In any event, whether a standard is considered a product or not, the important point
is that there are very real costs imposed when a standard is manipulated, and that those
costs may be imposed on more buyers than just those that are deceived by the manipulation.
59 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
161 A seller might, of course, use the profits from one product to finance development
of another. But doing so would not impose costs on buyers of the former product, who
would presumably pay the profit-maximizing price regardless of how the seller used its
profits. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; infta text accompanying notes 259-66.
161 Even if the seller miscalculated and made improvements that cost more than buyers
were willing to pay for them, the seller would not shift costs. The seller would presumably
be charging the profit-maximizing price for its other products already, so to raise the
price of those other products to pay for the mistakenly undertaken improvements would
reduce the seller's profits, and thus would be counterproductive.
612 See A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING
AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974); A. Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions,
Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).
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not cause cost shifting and would be screened out as a matter of no
antitrust concern.
A similar analysis applies to advertising, even though there the competi-
tive effects are not so universally admired. A seller would not spend more
on advertising than it could recoup in sales of the advertised product,
and if the advertising paid for itself, there would be no reason to shift
its costs to another market.' 63 Moreover, this is typically true whether
the claims made in the advertising are true or false; in either case the
seller expects the advertising to raise the price of the product enough
to pay for itself. As a result, demand-based market power that is a product
of advertising-true or false-typically does not involve cost shifting and
thus should not be subject to antitrust scrutiny."4 This does not mean,
I should emphasize, that I would exclude false advertising from any
scrutiny; it means only that I agree with other commentators 6 5 that it
should not be reviewed under the antitrust laws.
Before discussing circumstances that do involve cost shifting, it is worth
pointing out that the test's exclusion of product improvements and
advertising should allay some concerns about antitrust treatment of
demand-based market power.'" 6 To accept that some forms of demand-
based market power can be anticompetitive is not to subject all demand-
increasing activities to antitrust scrutiny. For example, the breakfast-
cereal and restaurant examples discussed by Professors Klein and Hay' 67
would not, under the cost-shifting test, be targets of antitrust attack. But
that is so because the demand for those products is a result only of
product improvements and advertising, neither of which involves cost
shifting, not because it is self-evident that the demand is a result of how
well the products satisfy consumers. In any event, product improvements
' But 4. BORK, supra note 21, at 317 ("Advertising and promotion can be better under-
stood if they are viewed as products or outputs in themselves.").
64 As described in part V.A.2 infra, there might be exceptions to this rule in unusual cir-
cumstances.
115 See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 1984) ("This would
be a species of unfair competition, like stealing a competitor's trade secret or using false
advertising to divert a competitor's customers to oneself; but none of these things are
antitrust violations; unfair competition, as such, does not violate the antitrust laws." (citation
omitted)) (Posner, J.); Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d
397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[W]hen a trade association provides information ... but does
not constrain others to follow its recommendations, it does not violate the antitrust laws."
(citations omitted)) (Easterbrook, J.); but see Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and the
Flow of Consumer Information, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029 (1991) (arguing that the antitrust
laws should be applied to the dissemination of false information and to the withholding
of information desired by consumers).
"' See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 57.
167 See supra part III.B.
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and advertising have seldom prompted antitrust challenges; the real test
of the cost-shifting approach comes in the kinds of cases in which anti-
trust violations are actually alleged.
3. Demand-Increasing Practices That Can Shift Costs
Standard-setting activities may or may not involve cost shifting. For
instance, if a seller were to improve its product to conform with a
preexisting standard, the costs of doing so, like the costs of product
improvement generally,' 68 could be recovered through higher prices
charged for the product. But a seller could also seek to have its product
meet a standard not by improving the product but by altering the stan-
dard. In some cases, this might be procompetitive: if the new standard
reflected the needs of consumers better than did the old one, consumers
would not be hurt; in fact, they would benefit. 69 But if the standard
were altered (manipulated) so that it became deceptive or was otherwise
less valuable to its users, the change would impose costs on them, either
in purchases of products that the users believed would meet their needs
and did not, or in the expense of gathering more information to replace
that eliminated from the standard. 170 Alteration of a standard, therefore,
whether it makes the standard more or less useful to consumers, affects
costs not only in the product market, but in the market for the standard
as well. Under the cost-shifting test, then, alteration of a standard would
be subject to antitrust scrutiny. 7 '
This attention to users of the standard appears to conform to the
Supreme Court's approach in its standard-manipulation cases. As dis-
cussed above, 172 in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp. (ASME) 17 1 the Court found the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, a standard-setting organization, liable for harm caused by the
manipulation of its standard. The plaintiff in ASME was a seller of a
product to which one of ASME's standards applied, so one might have
expected the Court to focus on injury to buyers in that product market.
It did not do so, however, instead focusing on the standard-setting process
and on harm to users of the ASME's standard.174 This might seem a
118 See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
IS9 See STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION, supra note 158, at 49-58.
170 See id. at 58-64; see also supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
171 That is, because it involves cost shifting, it is subject to further evaluation of its overall
competitive effect. See infra part W.A.
17 See supra part HI.A.2.
1- 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
174 The Court's approach in ASMEis especially telling, in that it imposed liability despite
the fact that ASME did not itself sell the products to which its standard applied. The
Court rejected the ASME's argument that since its agents had not acted to benefit it, and
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distinction not worth making, since the injury to users of the ASME's
standards would seem to be identical to the injury they suffer from being
led to buy the wrong product. But the Court's concerns were not limited
to the injuries caused by the particular instance of manipulation chal-
lenged in the case. Instead, it justified its imposition of liability more
generally, on the ground that it would encourage the ASME to ensure
the objectivity of its "system of codes and interpretative advice," and
thus would "benefit[] both ASME and the public whom ASME attempts
to serve through its codes."'75
This approach is a sensible one, because the fact that (some of) the
costs of altering a standard are borne by customers of all sellers of
products to which the standard applies makes the incentive to alter the
standard greater. Because a seller that alters a standard presumably
chooses to alter it in a way that precisely favors the seller, it will benefit
from the standard's deviation from objectivity. (Other sellers may also
benefit, or may lose, depending on how their products match up with
the altered standard.) And the only possible downside for the altering
seller would be that if the loss of objective information from the standard
became widely known to buyers, they would cease using the standard.
But even then, the altering seller would lose no more than its competitors,
because all would be competing equally in a market now lacking a
standard." 6 This is quite a different situation from that of a seller that
is discovered to be producing false advertising, because that seller is
likely to suffer all the loss of credibility itself when the deception is
discovered. Thus, the manipulation of a standard brings much the same
benefits to a seller as does false advertising, but with lower (or no) risk.
That makes the seller more likely to engage in the anticompetitive activity,
and supports the use of a cost-shifting test as a screen for anticompeti-
tive effect.'77
since it did not in fact receive any benefit from the manipulation, it should not be liable.
Id. at 573-74. The Court observed that though ASME might not sell the products to which
its codes apply, it "does derive benefits friom its codes," id. at 576; therefore, since it was
damage to those codes that was of concern, liability could rest simply on the harm to them.
17, Id. at 567.
17M This might not quite be true. If the maniptilating seller had a larger market share
than its competitors did, it might have more (supracompetitive) profits to lose than it
competitors did. One might therefore view a claim of standard manipulation more skepti-
cally when the seller accused of the manipulation has a large share of the market for the
standardized product (assuming, of course, that the seller attained its large market share
before the manipulation).
177 Moreover, the collective-action problems in improving a standard suggest a similar
conclusion. A seller that, by itself, succeeds in making a standard more objective (i.e.,
more closely aligned with consumers' concerns) will rarely reap all the benefits of the
change. It will do so only if its own product is the only one whose conformity with
consumers' needs is under-represented by the pre-change standard in the way that the
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Finally, consider the applicability of the cost-shifting test to tying
arrangements. 17 A seller that imposes a tie increases the demand for
the tied product by imposing a restraint in the market for the tying
product. The question for the cost-shifting test, then, is whether the
increase in the demand for the tied product B involves any shifting of
costs to the buyers of tying product A. This question can best be answered
by examining more specifically what a seller must do to impose a tie.
Imagine that, prior to imposing a tie, a seller is selling (what will be)
the tying product at the product's profit-maximizing price. To impose
the tie, the seller must adopt two new sales practices: 179 it must (1) offer
the tying product at a price lower than its profit-maximizing price' to
buyers who agree to purchase the tied product; and (2) refuse to offer
the tying product alone (to buyers who decline the tie), or offer it
alone only at a price high enough above its profit-maximizing price to
discourage its purchase alone.' Tying law has traditionally focused
change addresses. Since that unique relationship between a single seller's product and a
change to a standard is probably the exception rather than the rule, it is probably appro-
priate in general to be skeptical of individual sellers' efforts to change standards. It seems
that in such cases there would be a good chance that the seller is seeking to conform the
standard not to consumers' needs but to its own product.
178 The application of the test to ties is discussed in more detail below. See infta part V.B. 1.
179 This description of a tie as the presentation to buyers of two alternatives, both less
desirable than their earlier position, is much the same as philosopher Robert Nozick's
well-known definition of "coercion." See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE,
AND METHOD. RIGHTS AND THEIR FOUNDATIONS 242 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994) (1969).
Nozick defines a coercive act as one in which one party (which I will call the seller)
changes the alternatives available to a second party (the buyer) in such a way that the
buyer would prefer not to have had the alternatives changed (quite apart from which
alternative the buyer chooses). Id. at 260-67. This definition distinguishes a coercive act
from an offer: a coercive act makes all the buyer's available alternatives worse than those
available before the act, whereas an offer leaves the buyer no worse off than before the
offer was made. The application of this definition to a tie is straightforward. If both of a
buyer's post-tie alternatives (buying the tying product and thereby accepting the obligation
to also buy the tied product, and doing without the tying product) are worse than the
opportunity that would be available to the buyer in the absence of the tie (buying the
tying product at its profit-maximizing price), the tie is coercive.
IS0 In general, a tying seller must lower the price of its tying product to compensate
buyers for the tie. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41. In some cases, however, no
such lowering of price is necessary, as if the tie serves only a price discrimination function,
or if its costs are not apparent to buyers. See infta text accompanying notes 301-14 and
part V.C.1.
sI Although a few courts have held that there is no tie if the tying product is available
alone (on any terms), most courts recognize that the adoption of that approach "would
eviscerate tying scrutiny, even under the rule of reason, for any seller could tie with
impunity simply by setting a sufficiently large package discount [or, to put it another way,
by charging a sufficiently high price for the tying product alone]." 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA
ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
T 1758b, at 343-44 (1996) (footnote omitted). Therefore, as Professors Areeda, Elhauge,
and Hovenkamp describe, the courts generally ask "whether the discount has an effect
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almost exclusively on the former of these practices, but the latter is
equally important, and in fact the two practices harm different classes
of buyers.
Practice (1) injures buyers who buy the tying seller's tying product
and are therefore forced to buy its tied product as well, when they would
prefer to buy that product from some other seller (or not at all); it is
these buyers that are the traditional concern of tying law. For those
buyers, though, there is no cost shifting (or only formal cost shifting),
because they buy both A and B. That is, because they buy the product
whose demand the tie is intended to increase, any costs they suffer are
not shifted, in any real sense, to buyers of some other product. In a
sense, these buyers are like, for example, buyers of a product whose
price is increased as the result of some improvement that they do not
care about: they would prefer not to pay more for the change, but by
doing so they acknowledge that the product's cost is not too high.
8
The buyers injured by practice (2) make no such acknowledgment.
These buyers are those who refuse the tie, but would buy the tying
product at its profit-maximizing price if it were offered alone; they are
therefore denied the tying product as a result of the seller's imposition
of the tie. This denial imposes a cost on them if they are unable to
replace the tying product with an equally attractive product from some
other seller. Moreover, they-unlike the buyers who accept the tie-do
not signal their acceptance of the tying seller's tying arrangement by
purchasing the tied products. Therefore, the seller's efforts to increase
demand for its tied product impose costs on these buyers in the market for
the tying product. Under the cost-shifting test, then, tying arrangements
appear to have the potential for competitive harm, and should be subject
to antitrust scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has at times expressed concern about the plight
of these latter buyers, despite its usual focus on buyers who comply with
the tie. In Jefferson Parish,'8" where the defendant hospital had used its
services to impose a tie of anesthesiological services, the usual tying law
focus on harm in the tied product market would have suggested an
examination of effects in the market for anesthesiological services. That
was indeed the Court's focus in its per se discussion, where actual compet-
itive impact is not at issue. But when the Court turned to a rule of reason
similar to an outright refusal to sell tying product A separately." Id. 1758a. The cost-
shifting test takes a somewhat different approach. See infra text accompanying notes 276-78.
182 This ignores the possible informational effects of ties, which are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 328-31 infra.
'
83 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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inquiry, where anticompetitive effects must be shown, it looked for those
effects in the hospital services market and among buyers who refused the
tie, observing that "there [was] no evidence that any patient who was
sophisticated enough to know the difference between two anesthesiolo-
gists was not also able to go to a hospital that would provide him with
the anesthesiologist of his choice."" 4 This focus on harm to buyers who
do not comply with a tie is exactly right, I believe, and is the focus of
the cost-shifting test.
In sum, because standard-setting activities and tying present the poten-
tial of cost shifting, they require further scrutiny under the antitrust
laws. Specifically, when particular instances of these activities are chal-
lenged, their actual competitive effects must be evaluated, under the
traditional rule of reason. That is, the cost-shifting test does not complete
the analysis; it simply identifies certain practices in which a defendant's
conduct is unlikely to be anticompetitive, as a market-share screen identi-
fies circumstances in which a defendant is unlikely to be able to restrict
output. Those practices that remain, which are those that do shift costs,
may be anticompetitive, and for those practices, the cost-shifting test
counsels further inquiry. The next section describes the form that inquiry
might take.
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF OUTPUT RESTRICTION
Cost shifting distorts both the market from which costs are shifted
and, especially, that to which the costs are shifted. In general, the form
this distortion takes is a reduction in demand for the product to which
costs are shifted. 18 The source of this reduction in demand is a change
that makes the product less desirable, either because-in the case of
deceptive practices-the product provides less accurate information or-
in the case of coercion-the product saddles the buyer with an obligation
to purchase another product. In either case, the result of the demand
reduction may be a lessening of consumer surplus, and this may be
anticompetitive.18 6
184 Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
185 The cost shifting on which this article focuses includes only those costs that make a
product inherently less desirable, not, for example, a raising of the price of one product
to fund development of another. See supra text accompanying note 31 and infra text
accompanying notes 259-67.
186 Consumer surplus is the area below a product's demand curve (i.e., the curve repre-
senting the utility that consumers derive from the product) and above its price. See MIT
DICTIONARY OF MODERN EcONOMics 79 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986). It represents
the consumers' gain from their purchases of the product. Producer surplus, in contrast,
is the area above a product's supply curve (i.e., the producers' cost curve) and below its
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1. An Analysis of Moody's
These points can be clarified with an example. Consider again the
Moody's case.8 7 Moody's is an appropriate choice because it presents
aspects of both deception and coercion. As described earlier, the plaintiff
in Moody's, a bond issuer, alleged that when it decided not to use the
services of the defendant Moody's, a debt-rating service, Moody's made
negative comments about the issuer and threatened to issue an unsolic-
ited and unfavorable rating of its creditworthiness, with the goal of
forcing it and other issuers to purchase rating services from Moody's. 188
These allegations implicate two distinct markets. The first is the focus
of the plaintiff's allegations: the market in which debt issuers hire services
like Moody's to rate their creditworthiness. The second relevant market
is that in which bond buyers use credit ratings in order to determine
whose bonds to buy; these investors stand to be deceived if, as the plaintiff
alleged, unsolicited ratings issued by Moody's are inaccurate. Thus, the
plaintiff alleged that Moody's sought to increase the demand for one
of its own products-bond-rating services-in a way that would have
imposed costs on users of another product-bond ratings.
Figure 1 represents conditions in the market in which debt issuers
purchase Moody's rating services. The figure shows hypothetical industry
demand and marginal-cost curves facing Moody's before it applied the
pressure alleged by the plaintiff; these curves are D,d,,,7 and MC, respec-
tively. If we assume that Moody's has no power in this market,8 9 it will
be able to price only at marginal cost MC,"'31 providing a producer sur-
price. See id. at 342. It represents the producers' gain from sales of the product. There is
a debate among antitrust scholars over whether consumer surplus is the only proper goal
of antitrust law, or if total surplus (consumer and producer) is the better measure. Compare
Robert 1-1. ILande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982), with BORK, supra note 21,
at 110-12 (arguing that "income distribution effects ... should be completely excluded
from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity"). In the text I will focus
on consumer surplus, but I will also discuss producer effects in the notes. See infra notes
192 & 200.
7 See supra text accompanying notes 4-11.
i See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
"8' In fact, the plaintiff in Moodys alleged that Moody's rates "more than eighty percent
of all municipal bonds issued in the United States." See Second Amended Complaint at
I l,Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-I v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., No. 95-WY-2649-
WD (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 1997). But, in general, a seller that seeks to increase demand for
its product need not have preexisting power in the market for that product. For example,
tying sellers typically have no power in the tied product market prior to imposing a tie.
The principles illustrated by the figure apply in either case.
111 That is, Moody's, like other producers lacking market power, would he able to sell
none of its rating services at any price above MC.
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Figure 1. The Market in Which Demand Is Increased
plus' 91 of zero. If, however, Moody's were able to force issuers to purchase
its ratings, as the plaintiff alleged, it could create demand like that shown
by Dm.. 92 The increase in demand to D,, would result in a marginal-
revenue curve of MR,, and Moody's would price at P,,,, providing an
output of Q. Producer surplus would increase from zero to BCDE.
The important question, of course, is what are the overall competitive
effects of the increase in demand for Moody's services? The answer to
that question is unclear from Figure 1, for at least two reasons. First,
although the consumer surplus for Moody's customers after the demand
increase is ABE, it is difficult to know what it was before the increase.
The pre-increase surplus for the buyers subject to the increase would
have been the sum of the differences between their positions on the
demand curve Di~d, and MC, but their (former) positions on Di,,,,,,,, are
191 For the definition of producer surplus, see note 186 supra.
192 Part or all of D,. could in tact lie above Di,,d,,,,, but that would not alter the consumer
surplus effects discussed in the text. It is true that if D,, lay all or in part above D,,,,,,,,,,, total
surplus might increase, but that increase would be of little import, given the issues discussed
in the text accompanying notes 194-95 infra.
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unknown. One can, it is true, assume that a particular buyer's pre-
increase demand on Di,,Iy was less than, or at least not more than, the
buyer's post-increase position on Din. But even so, the demand increase
could cause either an increase in surplus-if, say, the buyer whose post-
increase demand was D, had a pre-increase demand of D2-or a decrease
in surplus-if the buyer's pre-increase demand was D3 .191
A more fundamental difficulty, though, is that using Dm to calculate
consumer surplus is misleading. If the plaintiff's allegations are correct,
D. represents how much issuers are forced (coerced) to pay, 94 not the
actual competitive level of demand. The competitive level of demand
would be the portion of Dind,,ly that corresponds to the buyers represented
on D.; a possible representation of the demand of these buyers is shown
in Figure 1 as D,.111 Thus, D. represents the actual demand of the issuers
influenced by Moody's-the quantities they truly want to purchase-but
those issuers purchase D. to prevent Moody's from issuing inaccurate
ratings. The actual post-increase consumer surplus is therefore not ABE
but (FGE - GBH); the area ABGF is not truly a gain to consumers, and
GBHis a loss to them.
19 6
The problem lies in determining whether the plaintiff's allegations
are true-whether in fact Dm is not the "true" demand. But proof that
demand has been altered by coercion would be difficult. Buyers like the
plaintiff in Moody's would testify that they purchased, or would purchase,
Moody's ratings services unwillingly, 197 but even if they were correct,
Moody's could counter that any pressure buyers felt was a result of
Moody's successful effort to develop acceptance of its ratings among
investors, not of any improper manipulation of its ratings. Such an
argument should not be easily dismissed, because competition policy
generally seeks to encourage practices that increase demand; if possible,
therefore, antitrust law should avoid any test that turns on disputes about
"I The buyer's post-increase surplus would be D, - P., which is greater than the pre-
increase surplus if the buyer's pre-increase demand was D2, which is D 2 - MC, but less
than the pre-increase surplus if the buyer's pre-increase demand was D3, which is D 3 - MC.
194 In another sort of case, like a standard-manipulation one, it could represent how
much buyers are deceived, rather than coerced, into paying.
"I This ignores buyers who buy the product independently of any coercive effect, but
because the demand of those buyers does not change as a result of the demand-increasing
practice, it can be ignored in evaluating the practice's competitive effect.
19' GBH must be subtracted because it is an amount that consumers pay, but would not
if they were not coerced by the threat of disparagement. It is therefore an amount they
spend, but for which they receive nothing in return; it is a loss.
117 In fact, the plaintiff in Moody's did not purchase Moody's services. It would presumably
offer evidence that other issuers did, or that it or other issuers would feel pressure to do
so in the future.
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why buyers made the purchases they did. Such difficulties can be avoided
by turning to Figure 2.
Figure 2 represents conditions in the market in which bond buyers
purchase Moody's ratings. D, and MR. represent Moody's demand and
marginal-revenue curves prior to its alleged coercive practices. Thus,
Figure 2 assumes that prior to the challenged actions Moody's had market
power198 and was able to price above its marginal cost, at P., providing
a producer surplus of PQRS and a consumer surplus of NPS. The figure
also shows, as Dm and MP&, the demand and marginal-revenue curves
that might result if, as the plaintiff alleged, Moody's issued inaccurate
unsolicited ratings, and if bond buyers became aware that Moody's issued
such inaccurate ratings. (The implications of bond buyers remaining
unaware of the issue of such ratings are considered below. 99 ) Demand
I:
IM~
MR.
Qm Q o
Figure 2. The Market to Which Costs Are Shifted
198 As discussed in part IL.B.1 supra, a seller need not in fact have power in the market
shown in Figure 2 to increase demand for the product in the market shown in Figure 1.
But assuming that it has market power in Figure 2 makes the figure clearer.
'99 See infra text accompanying notes 201-06.
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for Moody's ratings would be lower, as would be the market power of
Moody's, which would be able to price only at P,. 20 1
If a decrease in demand (and output) like that shown in Figure 2
could be proven, the danger of condemning the practice that produced
it would be much less than in the case of a demand increase, because
decreases in output, unlike increases, are generally anticompetitive. In
Moody's, proof of a decrease would require proof that investors, as a
result of the issuance by Moody's of inaccurate ratings, reduced their
use of Moody's ratings, or that Moody's could only maintain the same
level of output at a lower price. The plaintiff in Moody's could, for
example, offer a survey of investors that indicated that, as a result of
Moody's actions, they switched to use the ratings of Standard & Poor's
or some other service. This might be difficult, however, because the
reduction in demand shown in Figure 2 might not in fact occur at all
if investors were not aware that the unsolicited ratings that Moody's was
issuing were inaccurate. 2 1 In other words, though demand would drop
to D. if buyers were aware of the inaccuracy, it might remain at Do, or
at some intermediate level, if the inaccuracy remained secret or if some
other factor prevented demand from decreasing. 20 2
210 The figure also shows a reduction in output, to Q_. One might think that an increase
in output would be necessary, because if output decreased, the seller's surplus would also
decrease and the seller would not engage in the practice. But the seller could be willing
to take a decreased surplus in Figure 2, because the same practice that causes that decrease
also provides it with an increased surplus in Figure 1. This point has important implications
if producer surplus is considered a valid goal of antitrust. In Moody's and other cases, like
tying cases, in which the seller of the products in both Figures 1 and 2 is the same,
producer surplus is likely to be increased, because otherwise the seller would not engage
in the practice. (In other cases, like those involving standard manipulation, the decreased
surplus in Figure 2 is shared by all sellers, not suffered solely by the one engaging in the
demand-increasing practices, so the seller may engage in those practices despite an overall
decrease in producer surplus. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.) But to the extent
that output is maintained by the deception of buyers, it is inappropriate to consider the
producer surplus that results from that output as a benefit that antitrust should encourage.
201 It also might not occur if investors had always been aware that unsolicited Moody's
ratings were inaccurate, or if the accuracy of Moody's ratings were irrelevant to investors
(perhaps because, whether the ratings are accurate or not, they affect the price of issued
debt). In either case, the unsolicited ratings would impose no costs on investors, and a
cost-shifting test would find no antitrust violation.
202 In Moody's one such factor is the widespread statutory requirement that a bond issue
be rated by either Moody's or Standard & Poor's. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para.
425/6(b) (Smith-Hurd 1996) (state may enter into various financial arrangements with
"persons whose debt securities are rated in the highest long-term categories by both
Moody's Investors Services, Inc. and Standard & Poor's Corporation"); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 175, § 63, 16(3) (1996) (insurance companies may invest in "corporate obligations
maturing in one year or less which at the date of the investment are rated A or higher
by Standard & Poor's or A or higher by Moody's").
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Yet even if output were maintained, consumer surplus would still drop,
from NPS to (TUS - UPV).201 The mechanism here would be similar to
that described above for Figure 1, with the difference that the issuers in
Figure 1 would know what their true demand was but would be forced
to buy more, whereas the investors in Figure 2 would buy more because
they would not be aware of the true nature of the product they were
purchasing. In other words, where the buyers in Figure 1 were injured
by coercion, those in Figure 2 would be injured by deception. Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff in Moody's might still be able to prove anticompetitive-
ness. It could, for example, survey investors after providing them with
information about the inaccuracy of unsolicited Moody's ratings to deter-
mine the true demand level. It might also be able to show directly that
investors interpreted the Moody's statements regarding it as implying
underlying facts about its creditworthiness that were not true.2 1°4 The
problem with that approach from the cost-shifting perspective, though,
is that it would show only that one Moody's rating was inaccurate, not
that Moody's had injured investors more generally. But the plaintiff
could perhaps avoid this problem by proving that Moody's systematically
used ratings in the way it alleged-by showing, for example, that unsolic-
ited ratings by Moody's were different from solicited paid-for ratings of
issuers whose financial situations were comparable; this would show an
imposition of costs on investors using Moody's ratings. 2 115
In the end, then, as this Moody's example shows, reductions in output
play a major role in evaluating the competitive effect of demand-based
market power, though that role is somewhat different than in cases of
market-share-based power. Specifically, an output reduction in Figure 2
is important,2 6 but its implications are not the same as when output is
reduced through an exercise of market-share-based power. When a seller
with a large market share limits its output, price rises as a result. In
213 UPV must be subtracted from consumer surplus as a product of deception, just as
GBH in Figure I must be subtracted as a product of coercion. UPV is an amount that
consumers pay but would not if they had full information. See supra note 196.
204 This seems to be the approach that the plaintiff is taking. See Second Amended
Complaint at 5-6, Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., No.
95-WY-2649-WD (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 1997):
The Moody's statement and its repetition in the Dow Jones statement were
materially false, misleading and derogatory in that they state, imply, and convey
the impression that the School District's financial condition was not credit-
worthy .... and that this statement was based on current information concerning
the School District and an analysis sufficient to support that conclusion and
equivalent to the analysis performed by [Standard & Poor's] and Fitch.
20, But see supra note 201.
"06 The evaluation of demand-based power focuses on Figure 2 because, as discussed in
the text accompanying notes 194-97 supra, although Figure 1 reveals an output increase
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Figure 2, an output decrease is likely to be accompanied by a decrease in
price, because it is a result of a decrease in demand, not supply. Neverthe-
less, despite that price decrease, the decrease in output can reduce
consumer surplus, and therefore can be anticompetitive. Furthermore,
the discussion of Figure 2 shows that deceptive practices may be anticom-
petitive, even if they do not result in a decrease in output, because output
may be maintained only by deception. As a result, a cost-shifting test
would evaluate the competitive effects of the practices alleged by the
plaintiff in Moody's by evaluating their effect on the output of Moody's
ratings, a reduction in output being anticompetitive, with the proviso
that the plaintiff should also be given the opportunity to show that
output was artificially maintained by the seller's practices.
2. Application of the Analysis to Other Practices
A similar approach can be used in other sorts of demand cases, though
it sometimes requires some modifications. Standard-manipulation cases,
for example, differ from Moody's in that the sellers in Figures 1 and 2-the
manipulating seller and the standard-setting organization, respectively-
are different, whereas in Moody's the seller (Moody's) is the same in both
figures. That does not change the focus of the evaluation of competitive
effect, which remains on output in Figure 2, but it does complicate the
task of determining what the output effects are. As mentioned above,20 7
standard-manipulation cases, like other cases that can be characterized
as involving efforts to raise rivals' costs, involve a "supplier" that has an
interest in preventing decreased sales for its product. In a standard-
manipulation case, this supplier is the standard-setting organization,
which has an interest in preventing the manipulation of, and the resulting
decreased demand for, its standard. A standard-setting organization
might therefore respond to an instance of manipulation with changes
in its procedures to prevent similar future instances and in order to
reassure users of its standards. In ASME, in fact, just such corrective
efforts were made by the ASME, the standard-setting organization in
that case.208 These efforts suggest an acknowledgment by the ASME that
the incidents that gave rise to that case might have created concerns
among users of the ASME's standards, and that it sought to address
those concerns by ensuring that similar manipulation would not happen
as a result of the demand increase, its competitive effect is uncertain because the increase
in demand is a result of the seller's coercive (or deceptive) practice.
107 See supra text accompanying note 81.
201 American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 n.15
(1982).
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again.""15 And to the extent that the ASME's changes did indeed reassure
its standard users, output of its standard might not decrease, but that
would not mean that the manipulation was not anticompetitive. On
the contrary, the changes might be viewed as a more or less impartial
determination that costs had been imposed on the standard users and,
at least in the absence of some alternative explanation for them, might
make a finding of liability on the manipulating seller seem more appro-
priate.
For tying cases, the analysis is also analogous, but not identical, to that
for Moody's. Moody's itself involved coercion, but in it the classes of buyers
in the two markets were entirely distinct (though they were all Moody's
customers). In tying cases, the analysis must be different because the
class of buyers to which costs are shifted is, for the most part, the same
as the class of buyers who purchase the product whose demand is
increased. The former group are the buyers of the tying product, repre-
sented in Figure 2, and the latter are the buyers of the tied product,
represented in Figure 1. The demand relationships between these two
products are therefore closer than between the two in Moody's, and cost
shifting between them is correspondingly more difficult.
As discussed above,""t' if a seller forces buyers of its tying product to
take also its tied product, it usually must lower its price on the tying
product. As a result, output of a tying product is more likely to be
maintained than is output of the corresponding products in other
demand cases."' Ties are therefore less likely to be anticompetitive, at
least from a cost-shifting perspective."' But the lower price that tying
209 The ASME's changes are not proof that its standard users were injured, however. A
standard-setting organization might seek to improve its procedures even in the absence
of any belief that its past procedures had caused any actual problems.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
211 In this respect ties differ both from Moody's and from cases of standard manipulation.
Moody's need not necessarily lower its price on debt ratings as a result of coercive activities
in the market for ratings services, because Moody's customers in the two markets are
distinct groups. The bond buyers that use Moody's ratings may not be aware of Moody's
activities in the other market, so they may not be aware that the ratings they use may be
inaccurate. The same is true for users of standards.
112 However, ties might also be condemned for other reasons. It is often pointed out,
for example, that tying arrangements can be a means of price discrimination, the charging
of different prices to different customers, which the antitrust laws forbid through the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13. Price discrimination has procompetitive as well as
anticompetitive effects, see F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAl. MARKET STRUCTURE
AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 494-508 (3d ed. 1990), so it is not clear that antitrust law
is wise to condemn it. In any event, to the extent that the condemnation of tying arrange-
ments is justified as an effort to prevent price discrimination, the condemnation should
focus directly on that harm, and should condemn only ties that cause such harm.
Tying might also be anticompetitive to the extent that it foreclosed a substantial portion
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sellers offer on the tying product may not be sufficient to compensate
all buyers for the tie. Some commentators seem to claim that the decrease
in price for the tying product must necessarily compensate buyers for
the tie, and that therefore output of the tying product will not decrease
as a result of the tie; they claim, that is, that Pm in Figure 2 will drop
sufficiently so that Q, will equal Q . 213 That need not be so, however.
The tying seller will lower P. until its marginal revenue is equal to its
marginal cost, but the output at which that will occur depends on the
two pre-demand-increase demand curves (in Figures 1 and 2) and on
the relationship between them.2 14 It is quite possible that the seller could
maximize its profits by pricing the tying product at a level that left
some buyers inadequately compensated for the tie. Those buyers would
therefore decline to purchase the tying seller's tying product, and its
output would drop. This output reduction would be an initial indication
that the tie was anticompetitive. At the same time, though, the tie might
provide benefits (such as a package discount) that would lead new buyers
to purchase the tying product, thus lessening, and perhaps even eliminat-
ing, the drop in output. The net effect of the tie can be assessed by
determining whether its output-enhancing effects could be obtained
while avoiding its output-reducing ones, as will be discussed in the next
part of the article.
V. APPLYING THE TEST
In this part of the article, I apply the analysis outlined in the last
section to a variety of cases in which claims of demand-based market
of a market to competing sellers of the tied product, and thus made it unprofitable for
those competitors to remain in the market. See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,
and Exclusion, 80 AM. EcON. REv. 837 (1990). The exit of the tying seller's competitors
from the tied product market might then give the tying seller significant power in that
market, and it could act anticompetitively there. But these issues of foreclosure and
exclusion would be better pursued under antitrust's law regarding exclusive-dealing
arrangements, which focuses specifically on these issues. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 46-47 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213 In effect, these commentators contend that D.n, the post-tie demand curve for the
tying product, does not look like the curve in Figure 2, but instead is either SPWor XYW.
If D, were SPW, the tying seller would not need to lower the price of the tying product
at all, but would simply appropriate all the pre-tie consumer surplus, NPS. If D,, were XYW,
the seller would have to lower the tying product's price to P,, again appropriating NPS
(and sacrificing the pre-tie producer surplus SPYX in the tying product, but presumably
recovering it in sales of the tied product). To the extent that these commentators are
correct about the post-tie demand curve, they are also correct that the tie does no harm
(beyond the effects of price discrimination, which are discussed briefly in note 212 supra).
They do not, however, show that any post-tie demand curves actually take the form they
claim-they assume it.
214 MR,, is not defined only by D, for the tie, because the tying seller's marginal revenue
from the tying product is defined not only by its revenue on the tying product but also
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power have been made. These cases are divided into three categories.
First are cases involving claims of deception, like cases alleging standard
manipulation and false advertising. Second are cases involving coercion,
including both tying cases and monopoly leveraging claims made against
Microsoft Corporation. Finally, the third section applies the cost-shifting
test to two Supreme Court demand cases that have engendered much
controversy and that combine elements of both coercion and deception:
Kodak and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.'21
A. CASES OF DECEPTION
1. Standard Setting
As described above,2 1' under the cost-shifting test, a seller's use of a
standard-setting process would violate the antitrust laws if it reduced the
amount of accurate and objective information provided by the stan-
dard.217 The problem, though, as is probably clear, is that the cost-shifting
test's focus on whether costs to users of a standard are increased or
decreased provides no independent means of making that determina-
tion. In the end, the competitive effect of a seller's efforts to change a
standard cannot be determined without knowing whether the seller
made the standard more or less useful to consumers. This conclusion
may seem unhelpful, since it requires that the antitrust significance of
standard-setting activities be determined by an inquiry into the substan-
tive legitimacy of the standard itself, an inquiry that it might seem
courts are ill-equipped to make. In fact, though, this sort of evaluation
would be necessary regardless of what test were proposed; any test Must
determine whether on balance a particular standard-setting activity has
benefits outweighing its costs."'8 Therefore, it is exactly such a test that
the Supreme Court proposed in Allied Tube when it said that to be
by the tied-product revenue that results from the tie. This results in a complex relationship
between the two products, but one that may result in more profits for the seller with a
tie. See, e.g., John S. McGee, Compound Pricing, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 315 (1987).
215 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
"6 See supra text accompanying notes 168-77.
17 The standards on which this section focuses are those, like the ones in ASME and Allied
Tube, that purport to provide information about product characteristics that consumers find
important. Other standards serve instead to ensure compatibility among different sellers'
products; some of the competitive implications of standards of this kind are described in
part V.B.2 infra (discussing Microsoft's marketing practices).
"8 In a previous article, relying on a more traditional analysis not incorporating the
present cost-shifting rationale, I advocated a similar approach to standard manipulation.
Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust Liability for Collective Speech: Medical Society Practice Standards,
27 IND. L. REv. 51, 90-105 (1993).
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procompetitive, standards must be "based on the merits of objective
expert judgments."12 9
The application of this test is relatively straightforward in cases like
ASME and Allied Tube, where individual sellers manipulated the proce-
dures of independent, well-respected standard-setting organizations. 220
It also seems reasonably easy to apply in other cases where specific, more
or less objective information is at issue. For example, in Schachar v.
American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.,221 a case that was discussed ear-
lier,22 2 the claim was that statements made by the standards organization
were intended to reduce the demand for a procedure performed by the
plaintiffs by describing it as "experimental," despite "the allegedly proven
safety and efficacy of the procedure." 223 The defendants were the govern-
ing members of the organization, 224 rather than one or a few renegade
members, as in ASME and Allied Tube, but that does not alter the nature
of the problem: the test should still be whether the information the
organization's statement conveyed was accurate and useful to consumers.
As outlined above, then, the plaintiff should have been permitted to
establish an antitrust violation through a survey of consumers that showed
that the information was misleading.225
In other cases, a plaintiff might be able to show that a standard-setting
organization's procedures, rather than the substance of its standards,
imposed costs on consumers. For example, in Consolidated Metal Products,
Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute226 the plaintiff claimed that it sought
approval of its product from the American Petroleum Institute (API),
but that the API's processes took so long that by the time the product
was approved, the plaintiff had suffered serious injury from the (interim)
219 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988).
210 The respect that these organizations were accorded by consumers indicates that their
procedures were generally successful in producing standards that were useful to their
consumers. One could imagine, however, a sort of "sham" standard-setting body, designed
not to provide useful information to consumers, but to exclude competitors. See LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 248 (1977) (discussing the possibility
of such "sham" standards programs). Circumvention of the procedures of that sort of
"standard-setting organization" might in fact benefit consumers.
221 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
2-. Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,986, at 58,050-51, 58,054 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
224 The defendants were members of the American Academy of Ophthalmology's board
of directors. Id. at 58,050.
22 Seesupra text accompanying note 204. Cf Schachar, 870 F.2d at 400 ("If such statements
should be false or misleading or incomplete or just plain mistaken, the remedy is not
antitrust litigation but more speech-the marketplace of ideas.").
226 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988).
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lack of approval. The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claim, primarily
because the plaintiff "offer[ed] no evidence that its customers were
coerced by API or otherwise constrained to buy only [approved] prod-
ucts."2 2 7 Yet, as discussed above, coercion is not necessary-legally or
factually-for standards to cause injury to competition. " 8 If the API's
denial of approval to the plaintiff's product was unjustified, as the court
seemed to acknowledge, and as its eventual approval seemed to indi-
cate,229 the API's delay injured consumers, because they were misled by
the absence of approval.2" "
This general approach seemed to be sanctioned by the Supreme Court
in Allied Tube, where it said that private standards must not only be
based on objective judgments, but must also be determined "through
procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased
by members with economic interests in stifling competition." :2' Neverthe-
less, in Consolidated Metal Products it would perhaps have been going too
far to impose antitrust liability on the API as a result of the slowness of
its procedures. There was apparently little or no evidence that approval
was delayed by the plaintiff's competitors232 ; the delay (of slightly less
than two years) seems instead to have been due to the time it took
for the API to resolve several legitimate questions about the plaintiff's
product.233 That is not to say that delays could never create antitrust
liability. One can imagine an organization whose procedures routinely
delayed approval of new products for years, and the adoption and mainte-
nance of such procedures would seem as valid a source of antitrust
liability as the procedures of the ASME, which allowed one of its members
to exploit its reputation. The important point is that the focus of the
inquiry should be on the costs of the delay to users of the standard,
227 Id. at 296.
'2 See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
229 On the other hand, the committee responsible for considering the plaintiff's product
included among its members users of the product as well as sellers, Consolidated Metal
Products, 846 F.2d at 287 n.1, which makes manipulation of the standard seem less likely.
210 The court said that it was undisputed that API approval had "great value," yet it
seemed unwilling to draw the conclusion that consumers were injured, suggesting instead
that the injury was only to the plaintiff. Id. at 292-93.
291 Allied Tube & Condtit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988). In
making this statement, the Court cited its earlier criticism of the procedures at issue in
ASME, which it said provided no "meaningftul safeguards" against self-interested activity.
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570-73
(1982).
212 Originally, several competitors were apparently defendants, but the plaintiff did not
appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment for them. Consolidated Metal Products,
846 F.2d at 288.
23' See id. at 286-88.
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because it is only there that the reasonableness of the delay can be
evaluated, by balancing the interim inaccuracy of the standard against
the costs of speedier action, which might also result in inaccuracy. Users
of an inaccurate standard suffer costs as a result of the inaccuracy regard-
less of whether their use of it is voluntary or coerced.
A case that straddles the line between substance and procedure is
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute.234 In that case, the plaintiff
Clamp-All Corporation manufactured and sold pipe couplings in compe-
tition with members of the defendant trade association (CISPI). Clamp-
All brought several claims against CISPI, but the one most relevant here
was a claim that CISPI anticompetitively influenced the standard-setting
activities of the American Society of Sanitary Engineers (ASSE) .23 Judge
Breyer described the circumstances:
[A] t Clamp-All's request, the ASSE formed a subcommittee to write a
hubless coupling standard. Clamp-All proposed a four-tier standard
(rating couplings by their ability to withstand varying levels of water
pressure). Initially, when only one CISPI representative was present,
the subcommittee recommended a three-tier standard (which was also
beneficial to Clamp-All). CISPI then decided to offer a single tier stan-
dard, which both the CISPI and Clamp-All couplings would have met.
It wrote its members and urged them to attend the next meeting. At
that next meeting, with six CISPI members attending out of a total of
sixteen, the subcommittee changed its mind and voted for CISPI's
proposed standard. The ASSE eventually decided not toaccept its sub-
committee's recommendation, and it took no further action.3 6
Judge Breyer said that these facts were not similar to those in Allied
Tube,237 but under a cost-shifting analysis the cases look identical. In both
cases plaintiffs alleged that competing sellers had taken actions that
denied consumers information that would have reduced demand for
those competing sellers' products. In Allied Tube the information con-
cerned the plaintiff's product's conformance to the relevant standard;
this information was presumably valuable to consumers, and the Court
condemned the defendant's efforts to suppress it.238 In Clamp-All the
information denied to consumers was that which would have been con-
2134 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.).
235 Id. at 481.
231 Id. at 488-89.
237 Specifically, he said that CISPI, unlike Allied Tube, had not "'packed' the meeting
by hiring lay voters in numbers that unfairly gave it overrepresentation," and that there was
no "concrete evidence that the submission of CISPI's proposal caused (or even influenced)
ASSE's decision not to adopt any standard." Id, at 488. In light of the description accompa-
nying note 236 supra, the distinctions between the cases do not seem so clear as to justify
the directed verdict that Judge Breyer affirmed.
2M See supra note 70 and text accompanying notes 219 & 231.
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veyed by the rejected four- and three-tier standards.2 39 This information,
Judge Breyer said, would have been "beneficial to Clamp-All."240 If so,
the information would have been useful to consumers, since there was
no suggestion that the Clamp-All-supported multi-tier proposals were
in any way misleading. And because the information would have led
consumers to buy fewer products from CISPI members, CISPI members
had every incentive to suppress the proposed multi-tier standards, so as
to preserve the demand for their products. They even seem to have
"stacked" the meeting at which the vote occurred, 241 as the defendant
in Allied Tube did.2 42 Nevertheless, the court expressed no interest in
comparing the substantive merits of the Clamp-All and CISPI propos-
als. 243 This is somewhat surprising, given that elsewhere in the opinion
Judge Breyer defended CISPI's promotion of its own standard as "provid-
ing information" to consumers. 2 4 In making this inquiry into the substan-
tive informational effects of the CISPI standardJudge Breyer was entirely
in accord both with the Supreme Court's views in Allied Tube and with
the cost-shifting test. He should have conducted a similar inquiry into
the informational effects of CISPI's actions on the ASSE standard.
2. Advertising
As discussed above, 245 advertising generally does not present cost-shift-
ing problems, because the costs of advertising-true or false-are gener-
ally borne by buyers of the product advertised. Therefore, most antitrust
challenges to false advertising could be rejected under a cost-shifting
approach. Although such challenges have usually failed in any event, it
seems desirable to address them under a test that is also applicable to
related antitrust claims, rather than, as is currently often the case,
through ad hoc tests that have little in common with other antitrust cases.
An example of the application of such ad hoc tests is American Profes-
sional Testing Service, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Professional
Publications, Inc.246 In this case, the plaintiff, the seller of Barpassers bar
review courses, accused the defendant, which sells BAR/BRI courses, of
219 851 F.2d at 488-89.
240 Id. at 489.
241 See supra text accompanying note 236.
242 See supra note 70. "Stacking" should always be a concern because it suggests that a
standard is being chosen through voting power, rather than through expert judgment.
24.- The court contented itself with the observation that the evidence did not "show[] a
significant abuse of ASSE's procedural standards or practices." Clamp-All, 851 F.2d at 489.
24 Id. at 487.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
246 108 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1997).
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misleading potential customers of Barpassers. Specifically, the plaintiff
claimed that when its parent company was in financial trouble, BAR/
BRI distributed fliers at law schools falsely suggesting that Barpassers
"might not be able to continue to offer its bar review courses." 47 The
case was tried to a jury, which found BAR/BRI liable. 4 Nevertheless,
the district court granted BAR/BRI judgment as a matter of law, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The court of appeals acknowledged the introduction by Barpassers of
survey evidence suggesting that students might have been misled by
BAR/BRI's fliers, and the court even referred to the fliers as "false
advertising," but it said that there was insufficient evidence that the
students were "'clearly likely' to rely" on the advertising or that it was
"not readily susceptible to neutralization" by Barpassers.249 The court
adopted these two requirements from Professor Areeda's antitrust trea-
tise. 511 Professor Areeda recommended these additional hurdles for anti-
trust claims predicated on false advertising because, he said, advertising
usually does not implicate the market power concerns central to antitrust
law. 251 That may well be true, but the additional burdens that he proposed,
and that the court in Harcourt adopted, also seem to have little relation-
ship to market power or other more general antitrust considerations. 212
One might therefore prefer in a case like Harcourt to apply a more
general approach, like the cost-shifting one. Because the only injuries
caused by the BAR/BRI statements seem to have been those suffered by
buyers led to purchase some other bar review course, rather than the
Barpassers one, there seems to be no shifting of costs from the market
in which demand is affected-that for bar review courses-to any other.
In this respect, false advertising differs from standard manipulation:
247 Id. at 1150.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 1152.
20 Actually, Harcourt relied on a similar Second Circuit case, National Association of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, Inc. v. Ayerst Laboratories, 850 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1988). See
Harcourt, 108 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Ayerst Laboratories, 850 F.2d at 916). But Ayerst Laboratories
had relied solely on Professor Areeda's treatise. See 850 F.2d at 916 (citing 3 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 738a, at 279 (1978)).
251 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 250, 738a, at 279 ("The key problem here is the
difficulty of assessing the connection between any improper representations and the
speaker's monopoly power.").
252 One could perhaps interpret the "not susceptible to neutralization" requirement as
one that asks whether the defendant has some sort of advertising power that the plaintiff
lacks. Even applying that interpretation, though, the "advertising power" would be in a
market for information, not in the product market on which antitrust typically focuses.
Cf infra part V.A.2.
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although standards normally have an existence apart from the products
to which they apply, so that the manipulation of a standard injures not
only those buyers who are misled by the manipulation but also those
who learn of it and therefore avoid the standard, or even other standards
from the same organization, false advertising generally injures only those
who are misled by it.
A different conclusion might be reached in other cases involving
advertising, however. For example, in Twin Laboratories, Inc. v. Weider
Health & Fitness2n3 the parties were producers of competing nutritional
supplements for bodybuilders, and the defendant, Weider Health &
Fitness, was also the publisher of "what [were] universally acknowledged
to be the two leading magazines in the bodybuilding field. '254 After
several years of publishing advertisements for the plaintiff's products in
its magazines, Weider ceased accepting the plaintiff's advertising. The
plaintiff sued under Sherman Act Section 2, but the court rejected its
claims, holding that the plaintiff had failed to show that its inability to
advertise in Weider's magazines was a "severe handicap." Although this
may have been the correct resolution of the claim under the essential
facilities theory under which the plaintiff sued, 255 it does not address the
cost-shifting issues. By denying the readers of its magazines access to
information about the plaintiff's nutritional supplements, Weider
imposed costs on them, and apparently did so to increase the demand
for its own supplements. 256 It is not clear why the antitrust laws should
permit such practices: Weider's action used its monopoly power in maga-
zines, 257 and did so in a way that allowed it to profit from that power
253 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990).
2" Id. at 567. The plaintiff alleged that Weider's magazines made up 66% of all sales
of bodybuilding magazines. Id. at 569.
255 The most common statement of the elements of an essential facilities claim is the
following: "(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility." MCI Communica-
tions Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), quoted in Twin Laboratories,
900 F.2d at 568-69. Twin Laboratories relied on a gloss that required that the "'denial of
[the essential facility's] use inflict[] a severe handicap on potential [or current] market
entrants.'" 900 F.2d at 568 (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (alteration in Twin Laboratories)).
216 Weider did not contend that it would have been unprofitable to publish the plain-
tiff's advertising.
257 See supra note 254 and accompanying text. Weider need not have possessed monopoly
power to shift costs, and thus to be seen to have acted anticompetitively Linder the cost-
shifting test. However, the plaintiff would probably have been unable to show that it
suffered injury from being denied access to Weider's magazines if Weider had not possessed
some degree of market power. Cf infra text accompanying notes 291-313 (discussing
market power as a requirement for tying injury). And in any event, since Weider's refusal
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while exploiting its magazine readers in a way that was probably less
likely to attract competitors than if it had directly raised prices for its
nutritional supplements.1 51
Another antitrust claim involving advertising was presented by Aqua-
therm Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.IM5 The claim in Aquatherm
was that Florida Power & Light (FP&L), the electric utility company for
a large portion of Florida, misled swimming pool owners regarding the
electricity required for electric swimming pool heaters. 6 , Aquatherm,
the plaintiff, is a manufacturer of solar-powered pool heaters, and it
claimed that the estimates that FP&L gave to pool owners of the electricity
required by non-solar-powered heaters were too low, and that those
estimates increased demand for the non-solar-powered heaters at the
expense of Aquatherm's solar heaters.2 6 ' FP&L's goal in making the
misleading estimates, Aquatherm says, was to increase the demand for
FP&L's electricity. 6 2 The plaintiff alleged that FP&L's actions violated
Sherman Act Section 2.
The court dismissed Aquatherm's claims on the ground that FP&L
did not compete in the market in which Aquatherm alleged harm, that
for pool heaters.2 63 It is not clear why the fact that FP&L did not sell in
that market should be decisive, if FP&L had the incentive to distort the
market and if in fact it caused harm there, as Aquatherm alleged. How-
ever, the case could also have been dismissed on cost-shifting grounds.
to accept the plaintiff's advertising was a unilateral decision, the plaintiff's claim was
brought under Sherman Act § 2, which requires monopoly power. See infra part VI.B.
251 See infra part VI.B (discussing monopoly leveraging). A somewhat similar analysis
could be made of the recent allegations, currently being investigated by the Justice Depart-
ment, that Frito-Lay Corporation acts anticompetitively by insisting that grocery stores
provide it with more shelf space than it can use effectively. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Gilpin, U.S.
Examines Competition in Snack Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1996, at 31; Martin Zimmerman,
Struggle for Shelves: Paying for Favorable Display Pits Small Chipmakers Against Giant Frito-Lay,
DALLAS MORNINGo NEWS, June 18, 1996, at ID. Frito-Lay's reason for doing this, the
allegations contend, is to prevent its competitors from being able to effectively market their
goods, which helps preserve the market share of Frito-Lay's own products. See Zimmerman,
supra. One could analyze these claims by treating shelf space as analogous to advertising
in Weider's magazines; then Frito-Lay would be disadvantaging grocery store customers
by distorting the allocation of shelf space, in a way similar to Weider's disadvantaging of
its magazine readers by distorting the advertising in its magazines. This analysis is perhaps
less immediately compelling as applied to Frito-Lay because grocery shelf space is not so
clearly a product separate from Frito-Lay's snack foods as Weider's magazines are distinct
from its nutritional supplements, but the basic cost-shifting principles are the same.
251,1971 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
2310 Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint at 3-5, Aquathern (No. 92-1047-Civ-Orl-22).
261 Id. at 5.
2 ,2 Id. at 2.
If" 971 F. Stipp. at 1427, 1432-33.
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The plaintiff alleged that FP&L "use[d] its monopoly profits [in the
electricity market] to underwrite the [advertising] campaign," 264 which
seems to suggest that FP&L was increasing the demand for electricity
among a subset of its customers-pool owners-by imposing the (adver-
tising) costs of doing so on all its customers . 26 But this is not cost shifting.
The costs on which the cost-shifting test focuses are those that make the
product in the market to which the costs are shifted less valuable to
consumers. This lessening in value, which may be the result of a loss of
credibility (as in standard manipulation) or an obligation to purchase
a second product (as in tying), causes a reduction in demand, which in
turn causes a loss of consumer surplus. 266 No such lessening in value was
present in Aquatherm: regardless of the use to which FP&L put its profits
from the sale of electricity, the value of that electricity to consumers
remained the same.
267
264 Id. at 1432. Somewhat similar allegations were made in the amicus brief filed in the
Justice Department's case against Microsoft Corporation, where the amici claimed that
Microsoft uses its monopoly operating system profits to subsidize its efforts in other markets.
See Memorandum of Amici Curiae in Opposition to Proposed Final Judgment at 42, 44,
53, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.) (No. 94CV10564), rev'd, 56
F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
265 Alternatively, one could say that FP&L increased the demand for electricity by impos-
ing costs on buyers who were led by its statements to purchase non-solar-powered pool
heaters. But those buyers would be the same ones who would create the increased demand
for electricity, so there would be no shifting of costs to a class of buyers who did not
purchase the product whose demand was increased. (That is, there would be no shifting
of costs for the buyers of non-solar-powered heaters, in the same way that there is no
shifting of costs for buyers who comply with a tie. See infra text accompanying note 275.)
If, instead of making favorable comments about non-solar-powered heaters, FP&L had
made unfavorable comments about solar-powered ones, the analysis would have been
more difficult. (Recall that such unfavorable comments about a competing product were
made by BAR/BRI in Harcourt.) In that case some buyers might have been led not to buy
solar-powered heaters and some of those buyers might have chosen to go without heaters
entirely rather than to buy non-solar-powered ones. Because those non-buyers could there-
fore have been injured by the statements, yet not have contributed to the increased demand
in electricity, the increase in demand could be viewed as shifting costs to them. A cost-
shifting test might therefore suggest liability in these circumstances. (in Harcourt there
was only one product market involved, so there was no cost shifting; in Aquatherm two
products-electricity and pool heaters-are involved.) I am not aware, however, of any
case in which a seller of one product has attempted to increase demand for it by making
disparaging comments about a product in another market.
266 See supra part IV.B.
267 To make out a claim along cost-shifting lines in Aquatherm, one could perhaps argue
that FP&L's alleged false advertising imposed a cost on FP&L customers of reduced
credibility for FP&L. This argument might make out a cost-shifting claim in principle, but
the claim should only be accepted if consumers really depended on FP&L as a source of
information, so that a loss of credibility for it injured those consumers. That sort of
dependence on FP&L was in fact alleged by the plaintiff, see 971 F. Supp. at 1432 (describ-
ing the plaintiff's claim that "FP&L is 'viewed by consumers as being especially knowledge-
able and credible in opining on energy matters"'), and it might be more plausible in
other circumstances. For example, Microsoft is alleged to announce its products far in
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B. CASES OF COERCION
1. Tying Arrangements
The best way to present the implications of the cost-shifting approach
for tying cases is to compare it with the Supreme Court's current
approach. Under current law, a tying claim has four elements: 268 (1)
there must be separate tying and tied products; (2) the purchase of the
tying product must be conditioned on the purchase of the tied product;
(3) the seller must have sufficient power in the tying product market to
coerce the buyer's purchase of the tied product; and (4) the tying
arrangement must foreclose a substantial volume of commerce. The
fourth of these elements is in most cases merely formal,269 but the other
three have rough analogs2711 in the three elements of a cost-shifting test,
which would ask whether (1) the imposition of the tie caused some
buyers to forgo purchase of the tying product; (2) the tying seller could
have provided the tying product alone on terms that would have
increased its profits on that product (and lessened the injury to buyers);
and (3) the buyers forced to forgo the tying product suffered injury as
a consequence.
Before comparing the elements of these two approaches, an important
difference that the cost-shifting approach would make in the structure
advance of the time at which they actually become available, in an attempt to dissuade
buyers from buying the products of its competitors. See generally Robert Prentice, Vaporware:
Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1163 (1996). It might be the case that such announcements, to the extent they are
false, disadvantage not just buyers led to wait longer than they expected for Microsoft
products, but also other buyers who no longer believe that they can rely on Microsoft for
usefil information about product availability dates; if so, these "vaporware" allegations
might make out a cost-shifting claim.
"'I The Court has not explicitly set out its test in these (or any other) terms, but its
recent cases have required these four elements. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984) ("[A] tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate
product markets have been linked."); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992) ("A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14 ("[W]e have con-
demned tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability-usually called 'market
power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive
market.") (citations omitted); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16 ("[W]e have refused to con-
demn tying arrangements unless a substantial volume of commerce is foreclosed thereby.")
(citations omitted). Other formulations of the test are possible, see, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra
note 15, § 10.1, but "[i]n operation, the tests are roughly similar," id.
2' The requirement demands only that the absolute quantity of commerce foreclosed
be substantial. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962) (apparently
finding $60,800 sufficient).
27) The elements in the two tests are differently ordered, as will be made clear in the
discussion below.
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of tying litigation should be noted. Under current law, the injury of a
tie is perceived to be the forced purchase of the tied product from the
tying seller, so competing sellers of the tied product can claim injury
from the loss of the sales preempted by the tie. Under the current test,
those competitors need only allege that the tying seller has market power
sufficient to coerce buyers and need not in fact produce any buyers who
actually claim to have been coerced by the tie; 271 this makes it rather
easy for competitors to bring tying claims, even where no competitive
injury to buyers is apparent.272 The cost-shifting approach eliminates this
problem because under it the relevant injury to competition is not to
buyers who accept the tie, but to those who do not. The injured buyers
are free to make purchases from any of the tying seller's competitors,
so there is no harm to those competitors. Consequently, competitors of
the tying seller could not bring tying claims under a cost-shifting theory;
such claims could only be brought by (potential) customers of the tying
seller, whose injuries would more likely be the result of anticompetitive
practices. 27 Competitors could, however, continue to bring exclusive-
271 This is most apparent in cases that infer coercion from a contract requiring purchase
of the tied product. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 449-50 (3d Cir.
1977). See also 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 181, 1753, at 295 ("Thus, once the requisite
agreement or conditioned sale appears, whether the agreement or condition caused buyers
to purchase the defendant's tied product rather than a rival's is not at issue.") (footnote
omitted). But cf Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 ("Tying arrangements need only be con-
demned if they restrain competition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not
otherwise be made.").
272 The problem with competitor suits, of course, is that a tying seller's competitors in
the tied product market are injured even by ties that are efficient, and therefore willingly
accepted by buyers. Because they suffer real injury from these ties, competitors are led to
sue, though the injury is only to them, not to competition. See generally Edward A. Snyder
& Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff 90 MICH. L. REv.
551 (1991); William H. Page & Roger D. Blair, Controlling the Competitor Plaintiff in Antitrust
Litigation, 91 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1992) (responding to Snyder & Kauper).
Similar problems exist for buyers, but to a lesser extent. Under current law, buyers who
would have bought the tied product in any case might claim to have been coerced. And
they might in fact believe they were coerced, because if the tying product were available
at a lower price with the tied product, they might feel that they were forced to take the
tied product to receive the discount. The fallacy in this reasoning, of course, is that the
discount might only be available because of cost savings or other efficiencies provided by
the tie. See infra text accompanying notes 275 & 280-92. Under the cost-shifting test, these
buyers could not sue, because the injury of concern to the cost-shifting test is that to
buyers who refuse the tie. To be sure, buyers who would not have bought the tying product
from the tying seller in any case might claim to have been prevented from doing so by
the tie, and these buyers could sue under the cost-shifting test. But this danger seems no
greater than the one under current law, and it may even be that because buyers who do
not deal with the tying seller-as those who buy the tying product elsewhere do not-
might be unaware that the tie exists, the danger of spurious suits tinder the cost-shifting
test would be less.
273 Some potential plaintiffs fall into both categories, i.e., they are customers of the tying
seller as well as its competitors. In fact, a large number of recent cases involve such
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dealing claims, in which the relevant injury is the foreclosure of some
portion of the tied product market to the tying seller's competitors. 74
The first element of the cost-shifting test-requiring that the plaintiff
show that the tie caused buyers to forgo the tying product-is similar
to the requirement of current law that access to the tying product be
conditioned on purchase of the tied product. However, it would not be
enough under the cost-shifting test that buyers be forced to buy the tied
product to receive the tying one-it would be required that some buyers
refuse the tie. This requirement has the advantage of helping ensure
that the tie actually is coercive by excluding ties whose terms are accepted
by all buyers. A tie that is universally accepted may be so because it offers
buyers an economical way to purchase the two products or because it
eliminates a more costly alternative that the seller would otherwise use,
such as establishing and enforcing contractual quality control protec-
tions; 115 a tie that is in fact coercive would presumably prompt at least
some buyers to reject it. Of course, it is possible that a tying seller's tying
product could be so valuable to buyers that all of them would accept
the tie rather than be denied that product, and it might seem inappropri-
ate to exclude such ties from antitrust scrutiny. But this problem is less
severe than it might seem.
If all buyers bought the tying and tied products in the same proportion,
the seller could generally accomplish the same effect as that produced
by the tie by simply raising the price of its tying product.271 6 Therefore,
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992);
see also supra text accompanying notes 48-52 (discussing facts of Kodak). Under the cost-
shifting approach, these plaintiffs would be permitted to sue only for the injuries they
suffered as customers; that is, they could sue for injuries suffered by the tying seller's
denial to them of the tying product, but not for injuries they suffered from lost sales of
the tied product (unless those injuries were the same).
271 See lefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 44 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (observ-
ing that "[w]hether or not the [case's alleged tying] contract is characterized as a tie
between distinct products, the contract unquestionably does constitute exclusive dealing").
The advantage of handling competitor claims tinder the exclusive-dealing rubric is that
when only a small portion of the tied product market is foreclosed, such claims could
easily be dismissed. See id. at 45-46.
11 . See supra text accompanying note 45. In either of these cases a tie might be necessary
even if all buyers would willingly purchase both products at the tied-together price. In
the case in which there are economies in selling both products together, a tie might be
necessary because without it some buyers might seek to buy the tying product, by itself,
at the price that reflects the economies of selling it with the tied product; if enough
buyers did this, the economies might be eliminated. And in the case in which a seller
uses a tie in lieu of more costly contractual protections-of quality, for example-the tie
may be necessary because, though the improved quality benefits all buyers, in the absence
of the tie some might free ride on the others' efforts.
276 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 77, at 473-74. This may not be true if the seller
has market power in both the tying and tied products, id. at 471-72, but tying sellers
usually have power only over the tying product.
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in those circumstances it seems that little anticompetitive harm would
be caused by the tie. Where, instead, buyers purchased the tying and
tied products in different proportions, the tie would serve a price discrim-
ination function, charging the most to those who purchased the largest
quantities of the supracompetitively priced tied product. But perfect
price discrimination is arguably procompetitive, and is at worst competi-
tively ambiguous, injuring some buyers but benefiting others, so it is not
clear that these ties would be anticompetitive, either. 77 In any event, the
buyers who would suffer the most from a price-discriminating tie would
in most cases be those who would derive the most value from the tying
product,278 so that if those buyers refused the tie, they would be best
positioned to challenge the tie under a cost-shifting test.
The second element of the cost-shifting test asks, if the plaintiff has
shown that it was denied access to the tying product, whether the injury
was a result of "coercion," or cost shifting. More specifically, it asks
whether the tying seller has sacrificed profits on its tying product by
refusing to sell it alone, or by setting its price when purchased alone
artificially high, in order to gain profits on the tied product. This element
picks up some of the concerns of the element of the current test that
asks if the tie involves two truly independent products. If there is not
demand for each of two products independently, it will not be economi-
cal to sell them separately. In that case, although the tying product's
price might be high if it were purchased alone (assuming it were available
at all), the high price would be a result of diseconomies of scale, not
of coercion by the seller. Of course, this is all a matter of degree, 7' and
the real difficulty comes in developing a principled test for cases in
which it is unclear whether the source of a higher price is diseconomies
or coercion.
277 In any case, the fact that a tie is not condemned under the cost-shifting test proposed
here would not preclude a claim based specifically on the tie's price-discrimination effects.
See generally 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 1711 (1991).
27s It is conceivable that a seller could create a tie that would impose high costs on
buyers that valued the tying product little. Then, even if those buyers refused the tie, they
would have little incentive to sue. But if the mismatch between costs and tying product
valuation in such a tie applied to many of the seller's customers, the tie would be ineffective,
and would presumably be short-lived. And if the mismatch applied only to a few customers,
the tie would do little harm (because the denial of the tying product would impose only
small costs on those customers).
279 Therefore, the cost-shifting test does not offer the illusory promise of answering the
two-product question through the sort of formal line drawing that sometimes consumes
tying cases under current law. See 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 181, T 1741a,
at 177 (1996) ("Courts often decide whether two allegedly tied items 'really' constitute a
single product as if the question involved metaphysics, intuition, or some other abstract
inquiry divorced from the aims of tying law.").
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At a minimum, it seems that a plaintiff who has shown that a seller
discontinued access to the tying product alone (or made it prohibitively
expensive) after instituting a tie should be seen to have made a prima
facie case on this point. However, it might be that creating and selling
the tying-and-tied product combination would raise the cost of producing
and selling the tying product alone. Suppose that selling the tying prod-
uct A by itself involved some fixed costs, so that when fewer of A were
sold alone, the costs of selling it rose. This might have been the case,
for example, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States."' In Times-
Picayunethe government sued a publisher of both a morning and evening
newspaper over the publisher's requirement that those who advertised
in one of its papers advertise in both. The government claimed that the
publisher was using its morning paper, which had no competition, as a
tying product to force purchases of advertising space in its evening paper,
which competed with another newspaper 2' The publisher defended,
however, by arguing that running the same advertisements in both its
papers substantially reduced its costs, 22 which suggests that buyers might
have accepted the package arrangement willingly. Although the pub-
lisher apparently did not argue that running a large proportion of com-
mon advertisements in both papers raised costs for advertisements that
ran only in the morning paper, it seems likely that some portion of the
layout costs for advertisements printed only in the morning paper would
have been independent of the number of such advertisements, so that
fewer advertisements would have resulted in higher costs for each one.
In a case like this, it seems that a seller should be able to defend
against a tying claim by arguing that after institution of the tie, it can
no longer sell the tying product alone at a price that buyers find attrac-
tive.25 3 At least under the cost-shifting approach, the purpose of tying
law should be to prevent sellers from raising prices specifically to cause
buyers to accept a tie; it should not be to force sellers to market their
products in any particular way. If many buyers prefer to buy the tying
and tied products together, and there are too few buyers who want the
280 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
211 Id. at 596-97.
112 Id. at 623. Although the Court awarded judgment to the publisher, it did not rely
explicitly on the publisher's claim of reduced costs. See id. at 611-14 (stating that to
advertisers morning and evening readers are "fingible customer potential," so that the
Times-Picayune's 40% overall market share and its monopoly position among morning
readers were insufficient).
2" A similar point is made by Professor Meese, who points out that in the situation in
which a franchisor uses a tying requirement to prevent its franchisees from free riding
on the franchisor's quality reputation, "while the franchisor may 'offer' franchise contracts
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tying product by itself to make it economical to offer it alone, the seller
should not be forced to do so, even if it sold it alone prior to offering
the products together.284
If the tying seller has never sold the tying product alone, and particu-
larly if none of its competitors has, either, 85 the plaintiff might find it
difficult to prove that such sales are practical. But this is as it should be:
if the seller (and other sellers) have always tied two products together,
there is a good chance that the tying is efficient. On the other hand,
even in these circumstances, a buyer could perhaps sometimes show that
a seller could offer the products separately. Consider, for example, a
tying seller that sold its tying and tied products together at price Pblh
and had a cost of producing its tied product of CQd, and assume that
the seller could increase the sales of its tying product by selling it, by
itself, at P,1 h - Ctvd. In such a case, offering the tying product alone would
increase the seller's profits, so that it is difficult to see why the seller would
not do it, except to artificially increase the demand for its tied product.
Although an argument along exactly these lines has been made in
tying litigation on at least one occasion, in Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc.
v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,211 it was rejected, in large part because the
that do not include such a requirement, it will do so only at a price higher than any
franchisee is willing to pay." Meese, supra note 45, at 133 (footnote omitted).
21 The burden of proof on this issue should be on the seller, though. The seller has
access to the relevant information, and the task of proving these conditions, when they
exist, should be small. One might be concerned that putting this burden on sellers
would discourage them from offering possible tying products alone, for fear that if they
discontinued doing so, their actions would have to be justified. But this disincentive already
exists: sellers may currently avoid offering their products separately in the hope that they
will be viewed as one and thus excluded from tying scrutiny. See 10 AREEDA Etr AL., Supra
note 181, at 1762d.
285 If the tying seller has never sold the tying product alone, but its rivals have, a plaintiff
could perhaps point to the rivals' prices for the tying product to argue that the tying seller
could price it similarly. But the sellers' cost structures might differ sufficiently to make
that approach inaccurate. It seems, then, that at the least the plaintiff should also be
required to make an initial showing that the tying seller's costs are no greater than those
of the sellers to which it seeks to compare it.
286 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y.), reargument denied, 926 F. Stipp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As
described by the court in Ortho Diagnostic, the plaintiff's expert, Janusz Ordover
assumed that a hypothetical defendant sells a system comprised of two products,
A and B. It has competitors in the sale of A, but not B. Its marginal cost for each
product is $10. It sells a package consisting of both A and B for $100, and it sells
B alone for $95. On these assumptions, the defendant would make $85 profit
by selling a unit of B alone, but only $80 by selling a package unless there are
cost savings uniquely attributable to selling the package. Since the hypothetical
defendant would "lose" $5 of profit by selling the package as opposed to selling
B alone, . . . this pricing therefore arguably is unlawful ..
926 F. Supp. at 373.
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plaintiff offered insufficient evidence of the defendant's cost structure. 8 7
This would probably always be a problem, cost information being notori-
ously elusive, so it may be unwise to allow plaintiffs to force courts into
this inquiry without requiring them to overcome some initial hurdle. In
fact, Professors Areeda, Elhauge, and Hovenkamp propose a similar cost-
based test, and include as part of it just such a hurdle. Their test would
require defendants to disprove the cost condition discussed above, but
only after the plaintiff had met an initial burden of showing that a large
proportion of buyers had accepted the tie.218
Professor Areeda and his colleagues intend this burden to indicate
when a tie is likely to be coercive.2 89 As a test for coerciveness, though,
it seems overinclusive, since it is possible that many, or all, buyers could
accept the tie willingly. In these circumstances, where the tying seller
has never sold the tying product alone, I would instead include a market
share test in the plaintiff's initial burden. The danger, discussed below,
211°
that a market share test might understate the seller's power by neglecting
buyers who were injured by declining the tie, is relatively small here,
especially when buyers have no non-tying sellers to which to turn. There
is still some danger that market share would overstate the degree of
coercion exercised by a seller, because many of its buyers might accept
the tie willingly, but a seller with a large market share will at least present
217 The Ortho Diagnostic court "assume [d] arguendo that the preceding hypothetical exam-
ple would raise an issue tinder Section 2," id., but it rejected the argument on the facts
of the case, which were considerably more complicated. Id. at 373-77.
28 See 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 181, 1758b. A somewhat similar view is taken tinder
current law because courts generally ask whether the tying seller's "pricing structure makes
purchase of the tying and tied products together the only viable economic option." See,
e.g., Ortho Diagnostic, 920 F. Supp. at 471 (collecting cases). But as Professors Areeda,
Elhauge, and Hovenkamp say, this test is "too extreme" because it would condemn only
ties that coerced all buyers. 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 181, at 345-46; see also Or/ho
Diagnostic, 920 F. Supp. at 471 n.23. Instead, they "tentatively suggest that separate sales
below ten percent presumptively indicate a de facto tie." 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note
181, at 346. Although this test is characterized as a presumption (and they would allow
it to be rebutted by a showing of cost savings), it appears that when it is not met, they
would not allow a plaintiff to try to show that a pricing structure was coercive. Id. at 348
[T] he b test of a high proportion of bundled purchases must be satisfied before
a package discount should be deemed a presumptive tie. Absent such a prior
finding of a presumptive tie, defendant's costs are not at issue. Thus, a package
discount is not a tie merely because the defendant fails to show matching or
larger cost savings.
Id. (footnote omitted). I do not include such a hurdle for the plaintiff, because I do not
find 90% so greatly different from 100%.
281 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 181, 1758b, at 345 ("[A] trivial proportion of separate
sales shows that the package discount is as effective as an outright refusal to sell product
A separately.") (footnote omitted).
29" See infra note 292.
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the potential of coercive action. Given that the cost-shifting approach
allows only buyers, not competing sellers, to sue, the danger of spurious
suits with this approach seems sufficiently low, and in any event no
greater than under current law.
Finally, the third element of the cost-shifting test requires a showing
of injury from the tie's denial to the plaintiff of the tying product. This
element of the test is the analog of the third element of the current
test, the requirement that the seller have market power in the tying
product market. The difference between the two requirements is that
the cost-shifting approach focuses the inquiry on the particular form of
market power that is especially relevant to tying. As discussed above, ' l
a tie can be imposed without market power. The significance of market
power in a cost-shifting analysis of tying cases turns not on its importance
in imposing ties, but on its implications for injury to buyers who refuse
them. 292 Buyers denied the tying product are injured only when there
21 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46 & 178-81.
2Obviously, these two things are related. Market power does aid in imposing a tie to
the extent that buyers who would otherwise refuse the tie have no alternative to which
they can turn, and therefore accept the tie. But because these buyers are difficult to
distinguish from buyers who willingly accept the tie, the cost-shifting test focuses on buyers
who refuse, and the significance of market power for them is in their injury ftom refusing
it. See supra text accompanying notes 271-73.
Moreover, even to the extent that market power is relevant in imposition of the tie, it
is not appropriate to use the post-tie market share that current law typically uses, for two
reasons. First, the tying seller's post-tie share of the tying product market includes buyers
who willingly accept the tie, and the seller's power over those buyers is irrelevant. Second,
the seller's post-tie market share does not include buyers who refise the tie and are
therefore denied the tying product, yet those buyers are as subject to the seller's power
as the buyers who are forced to accept the tie.
To clarify this point, consider a seller that produces two products, A and B, and that
sells them at their competitive prices, C., and C1, respectively. Suppose that the seller can
produce and sell A and B together at a cost of less than C, + Q,; the seller therefore also
offers A and B at prices lower than C and CB, but only to buyers of both. Now, suppose
that under these circumstances-which involve no tie-100 buyers buy both A and B ftom
this seller; 200 buy only the tying product, A, from it; and 200 buy the tying product ftom
other sellers. Then suppose that the seller discontinues selling A alone, and that the result
is that 50 of the 200 buyers who previously purchased only A from it now buy both A and
B, and 150 switch to other sellers. What is the relevant market share measure? Current
law would say 30%, which is the post-tie fraction of the sales of A made by the tying seller.
But the effect of the unavailability of A fell only on those buyers who bought A alone,
and of those the seller's share was 50%.
One can just as easily construct an example in which current law overstates the seller's
power. For example, suppose that befotre the seller ceased selling A alone, when A was
still available at CA, 200 buyers bought both A and B from it; 100 bought only the tying
product, A, from it; and 200 bought the tying product from other sellers. Then, when the
seller ceased selling A alone, 50 of the 100 buyers who previously purchased only A from
it began to buy both A and B, and 50 switched to other sellers. In this example, current
law would say that the seller's market share was 50%, but the seller's share of those on
whom the effect of the unavailability of A would fall was only 33MA%.
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are no substitutes for the tying seller's tying product, 9 a condition which
indicates that the seller has market power, though not necessarily a large
market share. 94
In some cases, the importance to buyers of the tying seller's tying
product might still be satisfactorily measured by market share, though
not necessarily the same share measure that would be used under current
law. For example, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,295 dis-
cussed above,29 6 one could measure the acceptability of substitutes for
the defendant publisher's morning newspaper by looking to the percent-
age of individual advertisements that appeared in each newspaper. This
measure seems appropriate because it presumably reflects the impor-
tance advertisers attach to reaching the buyers of each of the newspapers.
The Court in Times-Picayune used a different market share measure,
focusing on each newspaper's share of advertising revenue; that measure
would have understated the morning paper's power if advertisers
believed it was essential, or nearly so, to advertise in that paper. In fact,
the Court's measure indicated a post-tie market share of 40 percent for
the defendant, but approximately 82 percent of advertisements appeared
in the morning paper even prior to the tie, suggesting that the Court
underestimated the paper's importance. 97 An analogous approach
would also be appropriate in other cases, as in recent allegations that
Hasbro, Inc. requires game stores that carry its popular games, like
Monopoly, to also carry other of its games. 298 Hasbro argued that it does
-- Similar considerations would apply in non-tying cases. For example, assuming that
Moody's issued inaccurate unsolicited ratings, as the plaintiff alleged, Moody's should be
able to defend the case against it by showing that investors who no longer purchased its
ratings because of their inaccuracy were able to switch to Standard & Poor's or other
alternatives. This defense would only apply, however, to those buyers who knew of the
inaccuracy of the ratings. Moody's could not use this defense for those buyers who were
unaware of the inaccuracy of the ratings, but would have ceased using them had they
known. The defense is therefore more suited to cases of coercion, like tying cases, than
to cases of deception.
21 Of course, to the extent that substitutes are not available for the tying seller's tying
product, that product is in some sense in a market by itself, in which the tying seller must
have a large share. See supra note 144. But sellers of functionally similar products are often
viewed as being in the same market, even if the product of one seller is so much more
useful to buyers that the other sellers' products are unsatisfactory substitutes. This is
particularly true in those cases in which a product is preferred only by certain buyers.
295 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
296 See supra text accompanying notes 280-82.
291 Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 611-12 (using 40% as morning newspaper's share), 619
(giving figures showing that between 76.8% and 88.4% of advertisements appear in the
morning newspaper).
211 See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), appeal
docketed, No. 97-7545 (2d Cir.). Although the opinion cited dismissed the plaintiff's com-
plaint, the court did not make clear how it resolved this claim.
[Vol. 66
DEMAND-INCREASING PRACTICES
not have market power because it has only a small share of the game
market,9 9 but it seems likely that game store owners find that carrying
Monopoly and other popular games is more important than the market
share of those games would suggest. A better measure of the power that
control over those popular games gives Hasbro might therefore be the
percentage of stores that carry them.""'
Another case that suggests a need for a conception of market power
particularly oriented toward tying, this one with traditional market shares
that are very small, is Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc.""
In Parts and Electric the defendant, Sterling Electric, a manufacturer of
electric motors, required its distributors to buy a minimum number of
its motors as a condition on the right to buy parts for them."" The
plaintiff, a distributor, sold many parts for Sterling motors,t"" but was
warned by Sterling that if it did not sell more motors, its right to buy
both parts and motors would be terminated. Despite "steering customers
toward Sterling electric motors even though [it] would have recom-
mended other brands if its access to Sterling parts were not in jeop-
ardy,"' 4 the distributor failed to meet its quota and was terminated. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed ajury verdict for the plaintiff, but only because
Sterling had failed to preserve some of its better arguments, and Judge
Posner dissented strongly. He pointed out that Sterling's shares of both
the motor and motor parts markets were less than one percent, and
said that its tie of parts and motors could therefore not have been
anticompetitive.105
But Sterling could have acted coercively despite its small market share.
It is true that if Sterling had sought to impose its motor sales requirement
before the distributor had ever sold Sterling motors or parts, it probably
could not have done so; the distributor would have turned to another
motor manufacturer. 36 But in fact the distributor was an established
2 See id. at 902-03.
'00 Alternatively, game store owners could be surveyed to determine how important they
believe it is to carry the popular games.
301 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1987), 0/inion after remand, 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988).
302 Id. at 714.
303 It was the largest national distributor of Sterling parts. Id.
304 Id.
305 Parts and Electric, 866 F.2d at 236 (Posner, J., dissenting).
3015 Even if Sterling motors had particularly strong acceptance among some buyers, that
would be unlikely to translate into a greater profit opportunity for the distributor; the
manufacturer would presumably keep that profit for itself. See Meese, supra note 45, at
130 (arguing that a franchisor with market power would use its power to raise price, not
to impose tying requirements).
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seller of Sterling parts, so that denial of those parts to it denied it the
benefits of the expertise and customer relationships that it had built
up 0 7 That expertise and those relationships were unrelated to Sterling's
market share, but the threat of the denial of their value to the distributor
nevertheless gave Sterling leverage with which to coerce Sterling's pur-
chase of its motors. Moreover, the eventual denial of Sterling parts to
the distributor harmed not only it but also the many users of Sterling
motors who had previously bought their parts from the plaintiff, because
those users were forced to go elsewhere for parts and their alternatives
were presumably less desirable (as evidenced by their earlier patronage
of the plaintiff).308
Commentators have objected that, although sellers in positions like
Sterling's certainly possess power over their dealers, the power they
possess is not antitrust market power.30 9 This position seems to rest on
an assumption that the buyer-in Parts and Electric, the distributor-
could have protected itself against the seller's exploitation by contract,
and thus avoided its injury.310 As will be discussed below in the context
307 That is, the distributor's investments gave Sterling the power to, as Professor Craswell
says, opportunistically exploit it. Craswell, supra note 41, at 674-75; see also Benjamin Klein
et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65
MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981).
311 A similar point can be made about injury in the tied market, for motorsJudge Posner
said that "[s]ince the objective of the tying doctrine is to protect competition in the tied
market, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has enough market power, present or
prospective, in that market to make the tie-in a threat to competition." 866 F.2d at 235
(Posner, J., dissenting). Even beyond the fact that the Supreme Court in its tying cases
has never required market power in the tied product market, judge Posner's claim that
Sterling's practices caused no harm in the motor market is incorrect. The majority noted
that as a result of Sterling's tie, the plaintiff distributor (prior to its termination) "began
steering customers toward Sterling motors even though, absent Sterling's warning, it would
have recommended other brands." Id. at 229. This no doubt caused the distributor's
customers either to buy Sterling motors for higher prices than they would have paid absent
the "steering," or to buy Sterling motors when others would have better met their needs.
In either case, Sterling gained market power, even if its market share remained low; this
was possible because the market power was based on demand, and demand-based market
power does not require a large market share.
3'o See Klein & Saft, supra note 45, at 356 ("Postcontract... , a franchisor can use the
threat of termination to 'hold up' a franchisee that has made a specific investment in the
marketing arrangement. However, this potential economic power has nothing to do with
market power, tltimate consumers' welfare, or antitrust.").
.1o See Meese, supra note 45, at 153 ("[l]t should be noted that any such argument
assumes that the franchisee has failed to protect itself ex ante from those actions-threats
of termination, hold up of products, and the like-that constitute 'market power' under
the regime established by Kodak.") (footnote omitted); see also Klein, supra note 138, at
49-52 (arguing that the absence of contractual protections is evidence that the potential
for exploitation is small).
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of Kodak, though, this sort of contractual protection will not always be
possible because information about the costs of a possible tie will not
always be available."' But even when the costs of a possible tie can be
anticipated, as they perhaps could have been in Parts and Electric, it may
not be efficient to negotiate contractual protections against the tie.
When the form of a tie (as distinguished from its costs) is difficult to
anticipate, contractual protections would require negotiation regarding a
variety of unlikely-to-occur possibilities. In Parts and Electric, for example,
there was no suggestion that Sterling's policy was a commonly used
one, 312 so for Sterling's distributors to have obtained contractual protec-
tions against it would presumably have required that they negotiate for
protections against a multitude of potentially burdensome but unlikely
tying arrangements (parts to motors, popular parts to unpopular parts,
etc.) that Sterling might have imposed. Although that might have been
possible, it would have been costly. 1' Therefore, to effectively require
such negotiations, by denying Sterling's distributors the right to chal-
lenge practices like Sterling's, would probably be less efficient than to
allow such claims and require Sterling to negotiate for the particular
ties that it wishes to impose. Thus, in the same way that ties should
sometimes be permitted because they eliminate the need for the buyer
and seller to enter into complicated contractual relationships to protect
the seller, 314 they should sometimes be forbidden because to permit them
31 See infia part V.C.l.
312 Even when a practice is a commonly used one, contractual protections against it may
be prohibitively expensive for buyers to obtain. See infra part V.C.I.
313 In other cases, the contractual point is a stronger one. For example, in firanchising
arrangements, where federal law requires that franchisees be provided information regard-
ing the costs of the franchise, it may be that the absence of a contractual protection
against a particular act by the franchisor could be interpreted as an indication that the
franchisee does not perceive that act as coercive. See Patterson, supra note 41, at 249-52.
On the other hand, even an explicit contractual reference may not be enough to show
acceptance by a buyer. For example, in Sinith Machinery Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290
(10th Cir. 1989), the defendant Hesston Corporation, a manufacturer of farm equipment,
had entered into distributorship contracts with its dealers requiring them "to 'order, keep
on hand and display a representative sample of each type of Hesston products [sic.'" Id.
at 1291 (quoting contract). When Hesston was acquired by Fiat Trattori S.p.A. of Italy, it
sought to market a Fiat tractor tinder the Hesston name. To that end, it demanded that
the plaintiff, Smith Machinery Co., carry the Hesston-Fiat tractor, and when Smith refused,
Hesston terminated it as a dealer. Id. It would be reasonable tinder these circumstances
to treat Smith as having willingly accepted the obligation to cary "each type of Hesston
product" that was a Hesston product at the time it signed the distributorship contract,
but it seems unreasonable to treat it as having accepted any obligation to carry the Fiat
tractors, since it could not have anticipated at the time of contracting that they would be
sold tinder the Hesston name.
"I See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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would be to require complicated contractual arrangements to protect
the buyer.
2. Microsoft's Marketing Practices
Several of the marketing practices of Microsoft Corporation have been
challenged under the antitrust laws, both by the Justice Department and
by Microsoft's competitors. Two of Microsoft's practices will be examined
here. The first challenged practice is one alleged in the now-famous
amicus brief filed on behalf of three anonymous software companies in
the Justice Department's case against Microsoft.315 The amici claimed,
among other things, that Microsoft moved software functions from its
operating system to its application programs in order to disadvantage
competitors who had designed their own application programs to use
the operating system functions that Microsoft moved.' 16 The competitors
were disadvantaged because they were required by Microsoft's action to
develop their own software to perform the former operating system
functions and to incorporate that new software into their application
programs. 1 17 Assuming that these allegations are correct, and that their
result was to increase demand for Microsoft's application programs at
the expense of its competitors', the question is whether Microsoft's
actions were anticompetitive. Under the cost-shifting test, this question
would be answered by determining whether Microsoft's action imposed
costs on consumers of Microsoft's operating system-costs that Microsoft
recouped through increased demand for its application programs.
Microsoft's actions certainly made its operating system less valuable
to its users, or at least to those of them that used the application programs
of Microsoft's competitors. After Microsoft's software change, consumers
could only use application programs that incorporated the former oper-
ating system functions; prior to the change, when those functions were
in the Microsoft operating system, consumers' choice of application
programs was broader. It is possible, of course, that the change had
some countervailing benefit for consumers. It might, for example, have
made the operating system smaller, which would have allowed consumers
who owned computers with less memory to use it. The cost-shifting test
" Memorandum of Amici Curiae in Opposition to Proposed Final Judgment, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995) (No. 94CV10564), rev'd, 56 F.3d
1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
116 Id. at 62. For instance, Microsoft's operating system might include a program that,
say, word-processing programs could use to read inputs from a keyboard. If Microsoft
were to move such a keyboard-reading program from the operating system into its own
word-processing program, other sellers of word-processing programs would have to write
their own keyboard-reading programs.
317 Id.
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suggests that evaluating the implications of Microsoft's actions for the
application program market requires balancing these effects in the oper-
ating system market.""8
The second instance of possibly anticompetitive activity by Microsoft is
a practice alleged by Netscape Communications, Inc., one of Microsoft's
competitors. In a letter to the Justice Department, Netscape claimed
that Microsoft pressured personal computer sellers (OEMs) to make use
of Microsoft's World Wide Web browser more likely by "offering OEMs
discounts on the license price of the Windows operating system if the
OEM not only continued to feature the Microsoft browser on its desktop,
but also made competitors' browsers far less accessible to users."' 1 Net-
scape claimed that this alleged arrangement increased demand for Micro-
soft's browser. Evaluating this claim under the cost-shifting test again
requires determining whether Microsoft's practice increased demand
for one product-its Web browser-by imposing costs on purchasers of
some other product-in this case, personal computers with the Windows
operating system. It seems clear that it did: if OEMs complied with
Microsoft's terms, and made other vendors' browsers less accessible than
they would otherwise have been,"" buyers of the OEMs' computers would
have suffered.32
1
It is important to note, though, that it is essential to the buyers' injury
that Microsoft made access to other vendors' Web browsers more difficult;
it would not be sufficient that it made access to its own browser easier.
318 Although this balancing approach might seem similar to the balancing that is always
involved under the rule of reason, it is actually different. Under the rule of reason, all
of the anticompetitive effects of Microsoft's practice, in all markets, would be balanced
against all of its procompetitive effects. In contrast, the approach proposed here focuses
specifically on the shifting of costs to the operating syslem market, so it requires balancing
only the effects in that market. Although this task would not be easy, it would perhaps
be less difficult than an approach like the (more general) rule of reason that would
require balancing effects in different markets.
319 Letter from Gary L. Reback to Joel Klein, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Interna-
tional/Policy Matters, Department of Justice (Aug. 12, 1996), reprinted in 27 ANTITRUST
L. & EcoN. Rav. 97 (1996). Specifically, Netscape claims that the OEMs get the discounts
only if they do not put an icon for Netscape's browser on their computers' desktops. Id.
Microsoft denies these allegations, seeStatement of Microsoft Corporation (Aug. 22, 1996)
(copy on file with author), and I offer them here only as an illustration of possible cost-
shifting or demand issues.
321 If Microsoft did in fact pay the OEMs not to put icons for its competitors, browsers
on the desktop, it presumably did so because otherwise they would have.
.2 One might say that it is not Microsoft, but the OEMs, that impose these costs on
consumers. But it is difficult to see why if Microsoft sets terms for its sales to OEMs that
disadvantage consumers, its actions are any less anticompetitive than if it set anticompetitive
terms for direct sales to consumers. The problem in either case is that Microsoft has set
terms for one of its products that impose costs on the buyers of that product (but make
tip for those costs by increasing the demand for another Microsoft product).
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Microsoft practices analogous to this latter possibility have also been
challenged, however. For instance, when Microsoft introduced its own
Internet service, the Microsoft Network, it placed an icon for that service
on its Windows 95 desktop. Competing Internet service providers claimed
that by placing its own icon, but not theirs, on the desktop, Microsoft
made it more likely that consumers would use Microsoft's service. They
claimed, that is, that by placing its icon on the desktop of its operating
system, Microsoft created demand-based market power for its own
Internet service. Microsoft's action no doubt did increase the demand
for its Internet service, but it probably did not do so by shifting costs.
Although users of Windows 95 might have preferred to have icons of
all the (major) Internet services on their desktop, they presumably pre-
ferred to have Microsoft's icon than none at all, so although their (poten-
tial) surplus was reduced, they still benefited from the arrangement.322
Microsoft's competitors might acknowledge that Microsoft did not
hurt its operating system users directly, but argue that it hurt them
indirectly by giving Microsoft an advantage that would allow it to compete
with a lower-quality Internet service.3 23 This argument would arguably
122 Cf supra text accompanying note 186 (discussing the implications of a transfer of
surplus from buyers to seller). Note, though, that there are some circumstances that would
support a cost-shifting claim here. It might be, for example, that OEMs that include
Microsoft's Web browser are less likely to include the browsers of Microsoft's competitors,
even if those competing browsers are preferable. It might even be that some computers
sold by OEMs have insufficient memory to include more than one browser, so that a
Microsoft requirement like the one alleged would make it impossible for OEMs to also
provide competing browsers. And if Microsoft were to integrate its browser with its operat-
ing system, it might be more difficult to use competing browsers with Microsoft's operating
system. These possibilities may be explored in the recent action brought by the Justice
Department against Microsoft. See Petition by the United States for an Order to Show
Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should Not Be Found in Civil Contempt,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 94-1564 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 20, 1997); Bryan Gruley
et al., U.S. Sues Microsoft Over PC Browser, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1997, at A3.
121 It is worth noting that even to the extent that Microsoft's operating system power
might allow it to market successfully products that are of lower quality than those of its
competitors, its success in doing so might have a compensating benefit: so-called network
externalities. Network externalities are benefits to users of a product that result from the
product's use by many others. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. EcON. Riv. 424 (1985); John E. Lopatka & William
H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic
Theory in Antitrust Decision Making, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 317 (1995). For example, Micro-
soft's application programs are of more value to their users if they are widely used because
then all their users are able to exchange software in compatible formats and because more
vendors will make software that can be used with the programs. Some commentators have
pointed out that in some markets, particularly those relating to computer software and
the Internet, network externalities are sufficiently important so that only one product is
likely to succeed. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28
CONN. L. Rav. 1041, 1056 (1996). Nevertheless, before these markets settle on a single
winning product, there can be a period of competition among several products, which
can result in considerable wasted investment by buyers in the eventual losing competitors.
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make out a claim that Microsoft's practice could impose costs on buyers,
but it would not allege that costs were shifted. It would only be users of
the Microsoft Internet service who would suffer if it was of poor quality.
The costs of that lower quality (if it existed) were therefore not shifted
from buyers of the product whose demand was increased.124 In effect,
the users of the Microsoft Internet service would have been in a position
similar to that of buyers who accept a tie; those buyers may lose potential
benefits from the arrangement, but, in the absence of deception, they
are not the victims of cost shifting.
C. OTHER DEMAND CASES
1. Kodak
As described above, 315 the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc.32' held that a tying case could be predicated
on a lack of information in the tying product market. The tie in Kodak
was Kodak's requirement that owners of its equipment who wanted to
buy replacement parts also use its service organization. Kodak argued
that this tie could not have imposed anticompetitive terms on its buyers
because, if it had, buyers would have ceased buying Kodak equipment.
But the Supreme Court pointed out that buyers would switch from Kodak
equipment only if they were aware of the fact that the requirement that
they use Kodak service would impose supracompetitive costs on them,
and that in fact it was extremely difficult to calculate long-term service
costs. A tying claim was therefore possible, despite Kodak's lack of power
to coerce buyers to accept its equipment, because the claim could instead
be grounded on the possible deception of buyers as to the costs of the
tie. As I suggested in the discussion above, this conclusion leaves unclear
much about the proper analysis of Kodak-like tying claims.
The cost-shifting test provides an analysis that avoids the difficult-
and, I would argue, pointless-task of precisely categorizing the actions
Id. at 1059. Therefore, to the extent that a seller could create sufficient early demand for
its product to "tip" the market in its direction, some of this wasted investment could be
avoided. In that case, even if the product on which buyers settled were less satisfactory
than another that they rejected, buyers might benefit fiom the simple fact of having, early
in this process, collectively chosen one product, rather than continuing (as a group) to
use a variety of them. Cf Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, theJustice Department, and
Antitrust Theoy, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 621, 638 (1996) (observing that "maybe [Microsoft's]
present large market position is socially beneficial rather than the opposite"). This may
be an important demand effect in these markets, but it does not involve cost shifting, so
it is beyond the scope of this article.
-321 See supra text accompanying note 178 (discussing analogous effect in tying cases).
3'2 See supra part II.A.2.
326 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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alleged by the plaintiff as either coercive or deceptive. The cost-shifting
test simply asks whether costs were imposed on buyers of some product
other than that for which the seller sought to increase demand. In Kodak,
therefore, the test asks whether, if the plaintiff was correct that Kodak
used a tie to force service purchases by buyers who were unable to
determine the long-term cost of those services, buyers of equipment
(and parts) would have suffered from the tie. As in the discussion above
of Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc.,327 one might first
seek to answer this question by determining whether buyers could easily
have anticipated a tie like Kodak's and contractually protected themselves
from it. If so, the fact that they did not do so suggests that any injury
that the buyers suffered from the tie might have been compensated in
the price that the buyer paid for the product. Thus, in Kodak this
approach would suggest that if parts-to-service ties were common in the
industry, Kodak might have charged less for its equipment to compensate
buyers for the possibility that it would later impose such a tie.
A case like Kodak, however, presents a problem for this sort of analy-
sis.328 Even if Kodak's customers might have anticipated the possibility
of a parts-to-service tie, the difficulty of determining the long-term costs
of Kodak service might have made it difficult for buyers to know how
much compensation to demand for the tie.129 Indeed, Kodak itself might
also have been uncertain about the financial implications of the tie,
which would have made negotiations regarding it more difficult still. As
a consequence, it may be unreasonable to expect buyers to protect
themselves when, as in Kodak, information about the costs of the tie "is
difficult-some of it impossible-to acquire at the time of purchase. '3 0
It is important to note that the difficulty here is not one that is inherent
in the market, so that the tying seller should not be held responsible
for it. On the contrary, the tie itself, by committing the buyer to one
supplier, the tying seller, denies the buyer the benefits of competition
.27 See supra text accompanying notes 301-14.
321 To use Professor Craswell's terminology, Kodak presents not only the possibility of
opportunism, cf supra note 307, but a possibility of fraud or surprise. Craswell, supra note
41, at 672-74. In either case, the problem is the buyer's inability at the time of the original
purchase to protect itself by contract from later forced purchases in a related market; the
cost-shifting test's focus on injuries in a market other than the one in which the coercion
takes place allows a focus directly on these contractual difficulties.
s2q Even in the absence of a tie, of course, buyers might have found it difficult to
determine the long-term costs of owning Kodak equipment because Kodak's parts prices
would in themselves have been difficult to anticipate. In the absence of the tie, though,
there would have been no "contract" on which Sherman Act § I liability could have
been based, but see infra text accompanying notes 375-82, and no "monopolization" for
§ 2 liability.
.0 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473.
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among different suppliers, and gives some degree of unpredictable pric-
ing discretion to the tying seller."'
Moreover, as a result of these informational difficulties, the cost-shift-
ing test in a case like Kodak would not necessarily find injury only to
buyers who refuse the tie. In more typical ties, the cost-shifting test
focuses on buyers who refuse the tie, primarily because of the difficulty
of distinguishing between buyers who accept the tie because it is advanta-
geous to them and those who accept it because they are forced to do
so by the seller's market power."' Where there are information costs,
however, buyers may accept the tie willingly, but later find that if they
had known its true costs, they would have refused it. This possibility that
buyers might be misled makes it appropriate, I believe, to consider
also those buyers under the cost-shifting test. The lack of adequate
information may cause them to mistakenly purchase the tying product,
in the same way that the users of a manipulated product standard may
continue to use it if they are unaware of the manipulation. In each case,
the deception can cause the output of the product to which costs are
shifted to be artificially maintained, so the test should incorporate the
possibility of that deception.
2. Aspen Skiing
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,333 the defendant's
practices, variously considered by the Supreme Court as possibly a "refusal
to deal,'34 "exclusionary, ''3"1 or "predatory, "1336 were in fact aimed at
increasing the demand for its product. The plaintiff and defendant both
operated ski mountains at Aspen, Colorado; the plaintiff operated one
mountain and the defendant three. For a number of years, the plaintiff
and defendant had cooperated in offering all-Aspen tickets that allowed
skiers to ski at any of the four mountains; skiers bought such a ticket
for six days, for example, and then could choose which mountain to ski
on each day. The plaintiff's claim arose when the defendant ceased
cooperating in offering this all-Aspen, four-mountain ticket (and made
it difficult for the plaintiff to create such a ticket itself), and instead
began offering a three-mountain ticket, which gave skiers admission only
331 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Cf. Chen, supra note 84 (describing how,
in a two-seller market, tying by one seller can allow both real) supracompetitive profits).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 178-84.
333472 U.S. 585 (1985).
314 Id. at 608 n.38, 600-03.
315 Id. at 605.
111; Id. at 605, 610-11.
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to its mountains. 3 7 As a result, the plaintiff's share of the Aspen skiing
market "declined steadily" and it challenged the defendant's actions as
monopolization under Sherman Act Section 2.338
The defendant's actions in Aspen Skiingwere intended to increase the
demand for skiing at its mountains-specifically, to increase the number
of days that skiers spent at its mountains-rather than to restrict the
supply of skiing. It accomplished this goal through a means similar to
the "coercion" in tying cases: 339 it presented buyers with new purchasing
alternatives, each of which was less desirable than they buyers' previous
choice. Whereas skiers previously could ski all of the Aspen mountains
with the four-mountain ticket, the defendant's change in policy pre-
sented them with three less-desirable options: they could (1) buy the
three-mountain ticket and ski only the defendant's mountains; (2) buy
the three-mountain ticket and pay extra for days spent skiing the plain-
tiff's mountain; or (3) buy tickets each day for whichever mountain they
chose to ski, thus forgoing the package discount. The defendant's policy
was presumably successful in causing a sufficient number of buyers to
choose option (1) to make the policy profitable.
To analyze the defendant's policy using the cost-shifting approach,
one must ask whether the defendant increased the demand for its own
product by shifting costs to buyers of some other product. In this case,
one could ask whether the defendant increased the demand for skiing
days at its mountains by imposing costs on buyers of multi-mountain
"destination" tickets. The defendant did impose costs on those buyers;
indeed, that its practice made Aspen destination tickets less satisfactory
to skiers was an important focus of the Court's opinion.3 4 0 One might
object to this analysis by suggesting that day skiing and destination skiing
are not in fact distinct products. But this objection is belied by the
fact that, at the same time as the defendant's policy made the Aspen
destination ticket less attractive, it increased the demand for skiing days
at its own mountains; that is, the defendant increased the demand for
one of its products at the expense of another, much as a tying seller
increases the demand for its tied product at the expense of its tying
one. 341 The demand for skiing at the defendant's mountains was coerced
s37 Id. at 591-4.
38 Id. at 594-95.
33 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
340 See 472 U.S. at 605-07.
941 The Court seemed to view the markets as distinct, observing that "[w]ithout a conve-
nient all-Aspen ticket, [the plaintiff] basically 'becomes a day ski area in a destination
resort."' Id. at 594. Indeed, a view of destination skiing as a separate product provides a
possible explanation of why the Court did not find it necessary to question the parties'
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by the defendant's power to force skiers to accept the less-desirable
three-mountain Aspen destination ticket, 4 2 just as demand for a tied
product is coerced by a tying seller's power to force buyers to accept a
less-desirable tying product (i.e., one that includes the obligation to
purchase the tied product). The condemnation of the defendant's policy
could therefore have been justified on cost-shifting grounds.
This analysis focused on buyers who bought the defendant's product,
rather than, as with the coercion in typical tying cases, focusing on buyers
who resisted the coercion.34 3 As with Kodak, though, deception as well
as coercion played a role in Aspen Skiing. The Supreme Court observed
that at least some buyers purchased the defendant's three-mountain
destination ticket, only to be surprised to find on arriving at Aspen that
they could not use that ticket at the plaintiff's mountain. 4  These buyers,
at least, were injured by the defendant's actions, despite having "volunta-
rily" chosen their purchases. It should also be noted that the plaintiff
in Aspen Skiing was a proper party to pursue the action. It was observed
above that in tying cases, the view that the harm of cost shifting occurs
in the tying product market makes competing sellers of the tied product
inappropriate plaintiffs.3 5 In Aspen Skiing, however, the plaintiff was not
only a seller of the product whose demand was altered-day skiing-
but was also injured by the change in the market to which costs were
shifted-destination skiing-because it was denied its previous share of
sales in that market.
VI. DEMAND-BASED MARKET POWER AND THE STATUTES
Even if cost shifting were acknowledged to be an anticompetitive
means of creating demand-based market power, it would not necessarily
be an antitrust violation. Condemnation under the antitrust laws also
requires that the practice at issue fall within the terms of an antitrust
statute. For Sherman Act Section 1, that means that the practice must
cooperation in offering the all-Aspen ticket. See Kenneth L. Glazer & Abbott B. Lipsky,
Jr., Unilateral Refusals to Deal Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 63 ANTIrRUST L.J. 749, 798
(1995) (discussing the anticompetitive potential of the joint selling arrangement in Aspen
Skiing). If destination skiing is a separate product, the parties' cooperation in providing
it might be permissible under the same rationale as the joint creation of new products
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
342 Presumably some skiers refused the three-mountain ticket, switching instead to other
skiing destinations. According to the opinion, though, many skiers accepted the three-
mountain ticket but were unhappy about it. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605-07.
*3 See supra text accompanying notes 271-73.
'4 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 606-07.
341 See supra text accompanying notes 271-73.
1997]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL[
be a "contract ... in restraint of trade""3 46; that is, the practice must in-
volve an agreement. Sherman Act Section 2 does not require an agree-
ment, but it condemns only monopolization and attempts to monopo-
lize, 347 so it applies only when sellers possess considerable market power.
The first section below discusses practices, like standard setting and
tying, that have traditionally been pursued under Section 1. As others
have observed,34 it is only in certain circumstances that these practices
fit well within the terms of the statute, and a focus on cost shifting
as the harm to be prevented in these cases helps clarify when those
circumstances exist. The second section then discusses unilateral cases,
which must be pursued under Section 2. Some such practices may create
sufficient demand-based market power to constitute the "dangerous
probability" of monopoly required for an attempt-to-monopolize claim
under Section 2, but practices that do not could only be pursued under
the controversial "monopoly leveraging" theory, and then only if the
seller had monopoly power in the market to which costs were shifted.
A. DEMAND-INCREASING AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 1
Standard-manipulation cases can be broadly divided into two catego-
ries: those in which the alleged manipulation is the act of several members
of the standard-setting organization, and those in which it is the act of
only a single member. The former category presents no difficulties in
applying Section 1. It includes cases like Clamp-AllP4 9 and Schachar,3 50 in
each of which the plaintiff alleged that its product was denied approval by
members of a standard-setting organization seeking to avoid competition
with the plaintiff. In these cases, if the members of the organization
have indeed cooperated to exclude the plaintiff, they have entered into
an agreement, and the legality of their actions, so far as their effect on
demand goes, should depend on whether they imposed costs on users
of the standard.3 5'
M6 15 U.S.C. § 1.
311 15 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 also condemns conspiracies to monopolize, but such conspira-
cies would generally also be condemned by § 1.
311 See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
592 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The Court attaches liability in this case
on the dubious notion that [the defendant, a standard-setting organization] somehow has
conspired' with [a competitor of the plaintiff].").
11" See supra text accompanying notes 234-44.
11", See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
351 The defendants' actions would meet § l's requirement of an agreement regardless
of whether they shifted costs, but the cost-shifting test must be applied to determine if
the agreement is anticompetitive.
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In other cases, though, where the manipulation is the product of only
a single seller, the presence of an anticompetitive agreement is less
clear.352 The problem is illustrated by American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME). 51 As described above,' 54 in ASME
the manipulation of the standard of the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Inc. (ASME) was the act of several individual co-conspirators,
all of whom were affiliated in some way with a single competitor of the
plaintiff.35 So far as the case indicates, the ASME itself was a victim, not
a participant, in the manipulation of its standard. 56 It seems inappropri-
ate to pursue such a case under Section 1 merely because the standard
that the single seller manipulated is the product of an agreement, particu-
larly because, as discussed earlier 3 57 the manipulation reduces the value
of the standard, a result at odds with the goals of (most of) those who
created it.
Nevertheless, it may be fair in at least some cases to hold a standard-
setting organization responsible for the manipulation of its standard,
even if the manipulation itself is the act of only a single member of
the organization. If, for example, the organization does not provide
procedural mechanisms sufficient to protect the standard from manipu-
lation, it might be reasonable to view the organization as at least in part
responsible for the manipulation. This was basically the Supreme Court's
theory in ASME, where it held the ASME liable on an apparent authority
theory, observing that standard-setting "organizations can react to poten-
tial antitrust liability by making their associations less subject to fraudu-
lent manipulation. '3 5 Although that is no doubt true,359 one might still
be concerned, as the dissent was,3" that imposing liability on standard-
352 This issue was touched on briefly earlier. See supra text accompanying note 69.
-153 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
154 See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
355 Since these individuals were all affiliated with a single seller, the concerted action
among them would presumably not be an agreement for the purposes of § 1. See Copper-
weld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (deciding that entities with
a "unity of interest" cannot conspire for the purpose of Sherman Act § 1).
356 The jury in ASME apparently concluded that the ASME had ratified the interpretation
in the letter, but that is not the basis on which the Supreme Court decided the case. See
456 U.S. at 564-65. The dissent says that the co-conspirators "acted solely for the benefit
of [the plaintiff's competitor] and against the interests of ASME." Id. at 592 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
7 See supra text accompanying notes 168-77.
3 ASME, 456 U.S. at 574 n.13.
119 Indeed, the Court noted that the ASME had adopted new procedural protections in
response to the suit against it. Id.
"I See id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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setting organizations has the potential to chill procompetitive standard-
setting activities.
In these circumstances, the cost-shifting test can be used to help deter-
mine when imposing liability is appropriate. No one, it is probably safe
to say, would argue that a standard-setting organization need take no
precautions to ensure that its standard is not manipulated. 6' The ques-
tion, instead, is one of degree: how much should the organization spend
to protect the integrity of its standard? The answer, presumably, depends
on the harm that manipulation of the standards might cause362 ; it
depends, that is, on the costs that manipulation would impose on users
of the standard. This, of course, is exactly the focus of the cost-shifting
test, which is therefore useful not only for determining whether manipu-
lation of a standard is anticompetitive, but also for determining whether
avoiding potential anticompetitive effects is cost-effective. Specifically,
the inquiry should be whether the efforts made by the organization to
protect its standard keep the potential harm of manipulation (that is,
the cost of manipulation multiplied by its likelihood) less than the
benefits provided by the standard. If the standard's benefits do outweigh
its harms, the standard-setting organization's promulgation of it is pro-
competitive. If not, the market would be better off without the standard,
and it would be appropriate to condemn the organization's actions in
creating the competitive danger.3 3
Tying cases also sometimes present difficulties in determining whether
anticompetitive agreements are involved. The difficulties in fact parallel
the cost-shifting analysis: on the one hand, buyers who comply with the
tie typically enter into an agreement to do so,364 but, under the cost-
361 Even the dissent in ASME seems to be more concerned with the fact that a judgment
against the society will subject it to treble damages than with the basic idea of imposing
liability on it. Id. at 579-84 (Powell, J., dissenting).
962 It also, as will be shown below, depends on the procompetitive benefits that the
standard provides. One could certainly argue that the precautions should depend on
other criteria-the ASME dissent argued against antitrust liability because the ASME, it
said, had neither the ability to control its standard-setting process or the financial resources
to pay a treble-damages award, id. at 593 (PowelI,J., dissenting). However, it is the benefits
and harm that the standard provides to the market that seem the relevant antitrust con-
cerns.
I6 One could imagine a case in which the costs of preventing the possible competitive
harm of a standard would be greater than the harm itself. In that case, the standard-
setting organization should have no obligation to try to prevent the harm; to do so would
not be cost-effective. This situation would be similar to that of a tie justified by quality
concerns, where only if the seller's costs of achieving the quality goals by some other way
than tying are greater than the costs of the tie itself is the tie justified. See supra text
accompanying note 275.
11 Actually, some buyers who comply with the tie may enter into no agreement to do
so. See infra text accompanying note 373.
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shifting test, injury to buyers who comply with a tie does not give rise
to antitrust liability;3 6 on the other hand, buyers who refuse to comply
with the tie, for whom forced compliance presumably would be anticom-
petitive, enter into no agreement with the seller. As a result, it could be
argued that there is no buyer injured by an agreement, and thus no
basis for liability under Section 1. But courts have allowed plaintiffs who
have themselves refused to enter into a tying agreement to sue on the
ground that other buyers have entered into agreements with the tying
seller, so that there exist agreements sufficient to bring Section 1 into
play.366 This seems reasonable because even a buyer who refuses a tie is
injured by the tying agreements into which the seller enters with other
buyers, since it is the success of those agreements that permits the seller
profitably to refuse to sell the tying product alone.16 7
365 That is not to say that the buyers could not find themselves exploited by the agreement,
but that could be seen as a contract problem, not an antitrust one. See Queen City Pizza,
Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1061-62 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that
the economic power of the defendant-franchisor derived from the franchise agreement,
and was thus contractual) (citing Klein & Saft, supra note 45, at 356), aff'd, 124 F.3d 430
(3d Cir. 1997); see also Patterson, supra note 41, at 249-52. And the tie could be condemned
on some ground other than cost shifting, such as price discrimination. See supra note 212
and accompanying text.
-166 Surprisingly, this issue seems to have been addressed directly by only one court. See
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 814 (lst Cir. 1988)
("A plaintiff need not have actually consented to the purchase of the tying and tied
products in order to bring a claim under the Sherman Act.") (citations omitted); see also
10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 181, 1770b (1996) (noting absence of cases); but cf Warner
Management Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 962-64 & n.8 (N.D.
III. 1982) (stating that a potential buyer has standing to bring a tying claim if it can prove
that it would have bought the tying seller's products "but for the tie," but that where there
is no agreement there will be no cause of action). However, many tying claims are brought
by terminated dealers or franchisees, and the courts routinely consider these claims under
§ I despite the post-termination lack of a tying agreement.
367 Professors Areeda, Elhauge, and Hovenkamp acknowledge this possibility, 10 AREEDA
ET AL., supra note 181, 1770d, at 446 n.17, but they believe that would-be buyers in these
circumstances will rarely be injured by declining the tie, id. 1770d. They reach this
conclusion by beginning from the position that would-be buyers will rarely pay more than
the tying seller's "effective price" for its tying product, where the "effective price" is the
tying seller's "nominal price for the tying product plus the above-market portion, if any,
of the tied product price." Id. at 1770d, at 446. It is unclear, though, why the seller's
supracompetitive mark-up on the tied product should be incorporated in a baseline tying
product price used to measure the non-complying buyer's damages. If it is other buyers'
willingness to accept the tie that allows the seller to charge that supracompetitive mark-
up, it is a product of the tie and might not exist at all in its absence.
The Tenth Circuit recently expressed views consistent with the position I advocate here,
though in a slightly different context. In Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997), the court overruled earlier Tenth Circuit cases that had held
that the agreement requirement of § 1 required an agreement between sellers, and that
the tying agreement itself, between the tying seller and its buyers, was not sufficient. See
id. at 1145 (overruling City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641 (10th
Cir. 1992), and McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988)). The issue in
Systemcare was thus one of what kind of agreement is sufficient for § 1, rather than of
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In some cases, though, the seller does not enter into an agreement
with any buyer. An example of such a case is Service & Training, Inc. v.
Data General Corp.3 1" The plaintiff in Service & Training brought a tying
claim that was somewhat similar to the claim in Kodak,369 alleging that
Data General required owners of its computers to use Data General as
a service provider if they wanted access to a sophisticated diagnostic
software program .3 71 Data General provided the software to owners of
its equipment who performed their own service,3 71 so it was feasible to
provide the tying product independently of the tied repair services. But
the court in Service & Training determined that the plaintiff had not
shown the existence of any agreement. That some computer owners
used Data General service, and thus received access to the software, it
said, was "consistent with a conclusion that.., customers independently
concluded that they preferred Data General services using [the diagnostic
software] over [third-party] services that do not use [the software] "372;
that is, the court concluded that owners were not "forced" to comply
with the tie, but willingly accepted its terms. And the court said that the
owners who performed their own service, to whom Data General also
provided its software, entered into no agreement regarding repair ser-
vices, because they had no need for such service . 73 Finally, as to the
owners whom the cost-shifting test would view as injured by Data Gener-
al's policy-those who wanted to license Data General's software and at
the same time use a third party's service-the court said that the refusal
to license the software was "nothing more than a unilateral decision by
Data General. '3 7
4
whether the plaintiff must be a party to the agreement, but the court's rationale seems
to speak to the latter point as well. Its focus was on whether tying agreements "deprive
the market of 'independent centers of decisionmaking'" and "'increase[] the economic
power moving in one particular direction,"' d. at 1143 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)), and tying agreements have that
effect regardless of whether the plaintiff in a particular lawsuit is party to one. Therefore,
a plaintiff injured by others' agreements that "increase the economic power moving in
one particular direction" should be able to challenge such agreements even if it is not
party to one.
:8 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
36" See supra part II.A.2.
-7 963 F.2d at 683.
371 Id. at 684. Kodak was also willing to provide its tying product (parts) to self-servicing
equipment owners. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
458 (1992).
172 963 F.2d at 687 (citing Times-Picayute Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
605 (1953)).
37. Id. at. 686.
,74 Id.
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The absence of any agreement between Data General and its buyers
should not have been dispositive, however, because Data General, like
defendants in some other similar cases, 75 did enter into other agreements
that made the tie possible. Specifically, in the licenses for its software,
Data General provided that the software's use was "limit[ed] ... to repair
and maintenance of specific computer hardware," i.e., the hardware
owned by the licensees, 76 thus preventing the licensees from using the
software to offer repair services to other owners of Data General hard-
ware. The court addressed this issue only briefly, observing that the
license restriction was valid under copyright law.3 77 That is not clear,
however: antitrust law places limits on the protections of intellectual
property law, 78 and the balancing of the two bodies of law requires
more consideration than the Service & Training court gave it.379 Most
significantly, Data General's limiting of its licenses to particular equip-
ment might not have been in its interest if it had only been interested
in maximizing its licensing profits, the legitimate purpose of its copyright
protection. If that had been its only goal, it seems likely that Data General
would have offered its licensees less restrictive terms, possibly at a higher
price, which would have permitted the licensees to provide repair services
(using the software) in competition with Data General itself. The limita-
tion seems to have been a sensible strategy only because it enabled
Data General also to gain more profits in the repair service business; it
therefore may have gone beyond the bounds of copyright law and
become an agreement to effect a tie, which the court should have con-
demned.
To illustrate this point more generally, consider a seller that would
like to impose a tie but cannot because there are other sellers of the
.175 See infra notes 379 & 380 (discussing similar arrangements in Kodak); see also Warner
Management Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 964 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (stating that the distributor's refusal to comply with the tie would otherwise leave
it without a cause of action, but that an alleged agreement between the sellers of the tying
and tied products "brings the case within the ambit of the Sherman and Clayton Acts").
376 Id. at 690.
377 963 F.2d at 690.
378 The limitations are reflected primarily in the "patent misuse" doctrine, see HOVEN-
KAMP, supra note 15, § 5.5b, but the issues for copyrights and trademarks are similar. Id.
§ 5.5d. Indeed, the same court of appeals that decided Service & Training has adopted a
broad "copyright misuse" doctrine. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970
(4th Cir. 1990).
37 In responding to a similar argument from Kodak regarding somewhat analogous
restrictions, see infra note 380, the Ninth Circuit said that "Kodak's argument that its
tooling and engineering clauses were routine and legal is irrelevant. Legal actions, when
taken by a monopolist, may give rise to liability if anticompetitive." Image Technical Servs.,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,908, at 80,407, 80,414-17 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
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tying product to which buyers can turn. Such a seller might enter into
an agreement with the other sellers under which they would sell their
output of the tying product to it. 8 1 The seller would therefore be able
to set the terms of sale for the tying product so as to force buyers to
accept its tied product. There seems no reason not to condemn such
an agreement among the sellers, quite apart from any agreement the
tying seller might enter into with its buyers: although the seller would
generally have the right to purchase goods from other sellers, it should
not be permitted to do so as a means of creating market power.3 1
The situation is more complicated in Service & Training because Data
General's power came initially not from agreements with other sellers,
but from its intellectual property protections. Yet it still is unclear why
it should be permitted to enter into agreements that go beyond exploiting
those protections in the market to which they apply.38 2 Assuming that
the purpose of the license restrictions was indeed to go beyond that
market, they would have caused exactly the sort of harm at which the
cost-shifting test is aimed: the denial to buyers of the availability of the
tying product on terms undistorted by any attempt to increase demand
for some other product.
B. MONOPOLY LEVERAGING UNDER SECTION 2
If a demand-increasing practice involved no agreement, and therefore
did not violate Sherman Act Section 1, it might still violate Section 2.
Most straightforwardly, if the degree of demand-based market power
that was created presented a "dangerous probability" of monopoly power,
the practice that created it could be condemned as an attempt to mo-
nopolize. 8 3 An attempt-to-monopolize challenge to the creation of
demand-based market power presents no particular problems beyond
310 In fact, in Kodak an agreement like this existed, in that Kodak contracted with the
manufacturers of its repair parts not to sell those parts to anyone but Kodak itself. Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458 (1992).
981 Indeed, to do so might make the seller liable for monopolization or attempted
monopolization under § 2, quite apart from the presence of an agreement.
382 Inagine that Data General had not developed its software itself, but instead had
licensed it from some other seller. And imagine that Data General then entered into
agreements with the other licensees that they would not be able to use the software on
hardware other than their own. These agreements would be functionally equivalent both
to the buying-up-the-tying-product agreements discussed in the text and to the actual
agreements in Service & Training. This suggests that all of the agreements should be treated
the same.
313 In its most recent attempted-monopolization case, the Supreme Court said that "it
is generally required that to demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove
(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a
specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (citation omitted).
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those present in the supply restriction context, so it will not be discussed
further here. But if no dangerous probability of demand-based monopoly
power were present-that is, if only some degree of market power were
at issue-a claim under Section 2 would have to be pursued under a
"monopoly leveraging" theory, which presents more difficulties.
A claim of "monopoly leveraging" is a claim that a seller used a monop-
oly in one market to achieve an advantage in another market.384 In
the demand context, such a claim would allege that the seller used its
monopoly in one market to increase demand, and thereby create
demand-based market power, in another. A monopoly leveraging claim
against Microsoft, for example, might allege that Microsoft used its
operating system monopoly to create demand-based power in the applica-
tion program or Internet service markets.3 85 The status of monopoly
leveraging as an antitrust theory is uncertain, however. Although the
Supreme Court has made comments suggesting the possibility of a lever-
age claim, 38 6 and the Second Circuit has explicitly said that such a claim
is possible "even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the
second market," 387 other circuits have said that such a claim is valid only
where the elements of an attempt-to-monopolize claim are present.8 8
A focus on cost shifting offers another approach to this issue. From
a cost-shifting perspective, the harm of leveraging, like that of tying, is
not in the leveraged (or tied) market at all. The harm is instead in the
market from which the leverage is exercised, where consumers are denied
384 The monopoly-leveraging doctrine has its origin in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948), where the Court said that "the use of monopoly power, however lawfully
acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competi-
tor, is unlawful." Id. at 107. In its recent Kodak decision, the Court said that it "has held
many times that power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent,
copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next.'" Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (citations omitted).
"I See supra part V.B.2.
3 See supra note 384.
387 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (1979); see also Kerasotes
Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc. 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988) (accepting
the possibility of a monopoly-leveraging claim); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v.
Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal of monopoly-
leveraging claim). However, more recently the Second Circuit characterized some of its
statements regarding leveraging in Berkey Photo as dictum, and indicated that leveraging
"requires tangible harm to competition." Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900
F.2d 566, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1990).
388 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546-49 (9th Cir. 1991);
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 203-06 (3d Cir. 1992); see also
Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publications,
Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1551 n.8 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting split in circuits).
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the leveraging product as a result of their refusal to accept its accompany-
ing burdens in the second, leveraged market. Where leveraging results
in this sort of denial of the leveraging product, whether the seller threat-
ens to monopolize the leveraged market is irrelevant because the antitrust
liability comes not from an extension of one monopoly to a second
market, but "from the 'abuse' of economic power already held in the first
market." ' That is, monopoly leveraging, like tying and other demand-
increasing practices, can cause a shifting of costs to, and a consequent
reduction of output in, a market related to the one in which demand
is increased. This reduction in output would, under the cost-shifting test,
be an antitrust violation.""
VII. CONCLUSION
A seller can raise price in two ways: it can reduce supply or it can
increase demand. Antitrust law has well-developed rules for dealing with
sellers' efforts to reduce supply, but the law that applies to efforts to
increase demand is both controversial and confused. In this article, I have
proposed a test to evaluate the competitive effect of demand-increasing
practices: if the costs of the seller's efforts to increase demand for a
product are borne only by the buyers of that product, the seller's efforts
would not be condemned;3"' if, instead, those costs are shifted to buyers
of another product, the seller's efforts would be condemned under the
antitrust laws as anticompetitive.
3811 HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 7.9, at 284 (describing Berkey Photo's view of the harm
of monopoly leveraging); cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14
(1984) (stating that "the law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power
by merely enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting
to impose restraints on competition in the market for a tied product, on the other").
,11) Interestingly, another, broader explanation of how monopoly leveraging (and tying)
can be anticompetitive is a supply-oriented counterpart to the demand-oriented approach
of the cost-shifting test. This alternative explanation argues that monopoly leveraging
allows the monopolist to shift some of the exercise of its monopoly power from the
leveraging market to the leveraged one, making it more difficult for a seller to enter into
competition with the monopolist. More specifically, by dividing its supracompetitive profits
across two markets, the monopolist ensures that a seller entering into competition with
it will have access to (all of) those profits only if the competitor enters both markets,
rather thanjust one. As other commentators have observed, various market imperfections,
notably those in the capital markets, may make it more difficult to enter two markets than
one. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 41, at 536-39. Thus, the shifting of the exercise of power
from the leveraging market to the leveraged one allows the monopolist to distribute its
power in such a way to minimize the likelihood that other sellers will enter the market,
just as the cost shifting involved in demand-based market power allows a seller to distribute
its power in such a way to minimize the likelihood that buyers will switch to other sellers.
" " They might, however, be condemned under some other rationale. See supra notes
165, 212, 274 & 277 and text accompanying notes 323-24.
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This test serves two useful purposes. First, it meets the immediate need
for a means to evaluate plaintiffs' novel claims of demand-based market
power. Such claims are increasingly common, and antitrust law currently
has no well-defined means of addressing them. Second, and more gener-
ally, it unifies the rules applicable to a variety of demand-increasing
practices that appear to be diverse but are in fact fundamentally similar.
It does this by recognizing that, in whatever exact form it takes, a shifting
of costs from one market to another distorts consumer demand in both
markets. More significantly, it is the cost-shifting seller that determines
how demand in the two markets is distorted,just as an agreement among
sellers allows them to determine how supply will be distorted. Hence,
just as an agreement among sellers can injure competition when it
restricts supply, a shifting of costs can do so when a seller creates demand-
based market power.

